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ABSTRACT
K-12 PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHER FREE SPEECH: THE IMPACT OF GARCETTI v.
CEBALLOS ON FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS
Erin M. Slater, Ed.D.
Department of Leadership, Educational Psychology and Foundations
Northern Illinois University, 2018
Christine Kiracofe, Director
With the Supreme Court’s 2006 ruling in Garcetti v. Cebellos, this study examines how
Garcetti has impacted K-12 public school teachers’ First Amendment free speech protections.
Garcetti added a threshold layer to an established test courts had been guided to use—since
1968—when evaluating whether teachers qualified for First Amendment protection when
speaking out. Garcetti has guided courts to first consider whether a public employee was
speaking pursuant to their official duties prior to ruling on whether a teacher’s speech was a
matter of public concern. The Supreme Court ruled when a public employee is speaking
pursuant to their official duties, First Amendment protections would not apply. Garcetti
involved a deputy district attorney; however, it is the standard public employee free speech
threshold that is also applied to K-12 public school teachers. Since the Garcetti decision, very
few public school teachers have realized First Amendment free speech protections.
This study examines relevant U.S. District Court and U.S. Circuit Court decisions postGarcetti to determine the impact Garcetti has had on K-12 public school teachers’ free speech
protections. This study reviews relevant case law and related literature regarding public school
teacher free speech rulings. Understanding the Garcetti decision is critical if school
administrators wish to avoid possible litigation when contemplating discipline against a teacher
for their speech.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Historically, public school teachers have been disciplined for engaging in speech both
inside and outside the classroom walls. However, the type of speech and the consequences
suffered by the teacher-speakers vary widely. K-12 public school teachers make curricular and
discussion topic decisions on a daily basis as part of their jobs. When a teacher goes outside the
Board of Education’s prescribed curriculum, their speech can be subject to interpretation as to
whether or not it is appropriate. K-12 public school teachers have been subject to discipline up
to and including termination for speech determined to be inappropriate by administrators and
Boards of Education across the nation.
There are approximately 3.2 million public school teachers employed in the United
States.1 A non-profit news multimedia site, The 74, conducted a survey in February 2017, about
First Amendment speech in high schools across the country.2 The study showed that public high
school teachers value their First Amendment right to free speech. Of the 726 high school
teachers that responded to the survey, 95% of them “supported the[ir] right to express unpopular
opinions…”3 When the survey wording was changed from “’unpopular’ [speech] to

Nat’l Center for Educ. Statistics, Fast Facts, available at https://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372 (last
visited May 2, 2018).
2
Mark Keierleber, First Amendment is Strong at Nation’s High Schools: 91% of Students, 95% of Teachers Back
Free Speech, available at https://www.the74million.org/article/first-amendment-is-strong-at-nations-high-schools91-of-students-95-of-teachers-back-free-speech/ (last visited May 2, 2018).
3
Id.
1

2

‘offensive’”[speech],4 the percentage of teachers who supported their rights to express their
opinions dropped to 53%.5 Establishing the difference between “unpopular” and “offensive”
speech is a matter of interpretation and subjectivity. It is vital that public school officials and
school board members understand the legal issues surrounding public school teacher First
Amendment speech rights when considering disciplinary consequences to impose upon teachers
for allegedly inappropriate speech.
In a multi-media world where information is readily available, teachers often try to
engage their students in discussions on current events and controversial issues to which students
can connect. There are several recent examples of teachers who have been disciplined for
classroom speech that has centered around controversial topics.6 For example, in January 2016,
a first grade teacher in Lake County, Florida was investigated after teaching a lesson on
discrimination to her students.7 During the lesson in question, the teacher conducted a
demonstration, separating students by eye color and giving prizes to students with blue eyes and
no prizes to students with brown eyes.8 The teacher explained she was trying to illustrate the
concept of racism to her students.9 Six months prior in June 2015, a middle school teacher in
Martinsville, Illinois was fired for stepping on a United States flag during a classroom lesson on

4

Id.
Id.
6
Charles Hayes, Illinois Teacher Fired for Stepping on U.S. Flag During Free Speech Lesson, June 30, 2015,
available at http://wgntv.com/2015/06/30/teacher-claims-he-was-fired-for-stepping-on-flag-during-free-speechlesson/ (last visited May 2, 2018).
7
Lake County First Grade Teacher Under Investigation For ‘Lesson in Racism,’ Jan. 22, 2016, available at
http://www.wesh.com/article/lake-county-first-grade-teacher-under-investigation-for-lesson-in-racism/4446985 (last
visited (last visited May 2, 2018).
8
Id.
9
Id.
5

3

free speech.10 One month earlier in May 2015, a New York public high school teacher was fired
after teaching a lesson about five Hispanic men who were imprisoned after they were falsely
accused of sexually assaulting a jogger.11 Explaining her decision, the teacher stated, “I kind of
wanted to hook them [i.e., her students] in, engage them, win them over. I thought that this
material was not only engaging but important.”12 The teacher sued the New York Department of
Education claiming her termination was retaliation for her exercise of First Amendment
protected speech.13 One year earlier in June 2014, a Caucasian middle school teacher was
suspended after showing a blackface video in his classroom during a lesson on racism. The video
depicted white students mocking black students.14
Teachers who share personal opinions which are outside of the school board’s approved
curriculum run the risk of being disciplined. A review of media sources suggests that teachers
increasingly engaged in political discussions with students (sometimes sharing personal biases)

10

Charles Hayes, Illinois Teacher Fired for Stepping on U.S. Flag During Free Speech Lesson, June 30, 2015,
available at http://wgntv.com/2015/06/30/teacher-claims-he-was-fired-for-stepping-on-flag-during-free-speechlesson/ (last visited May 2, 2018).
11
Victoria Bekiempis & Leonard Greene, NYC High School Teacher Claims She was Fired for Central Park Five Lessons that
Administrators Feared Would Create 'Riots,' NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Jan. 8, 2016, available at
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-teacher-fired-lessons-central-park-article-1.2489687 (last visited May
2, 2018).
12
Id.
13
Id. The teacher sued the New York Department of Education. Walker-Lee v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 220
F. Supp.3d 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York held, "A public
employee, however, must 'by necessity accept certain limitations on his or her freedom,' because, his or her speech
can contravene governmental policies or impair the proper performance of governmental functions." Weintraub v.
Bd. Of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of N.Y., 593 F.3d 196, 201 (2d Cir. 2010), quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410,
418-19 (2006). The teacher appealed to the Second Circuit. Lee-Walker v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 220 F.
Supp.3d 484 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.
14
Natalie DiBlasio, Michigan Teacher Suspended Over Blackface Lesson Plan, USA TODAY, May 31, 2014,
available at https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/31/monroe-michigan-lesson-plan/9807147/ (last
visited May 2, 2018).

4

during the 2016 United States presidential election.15 A Florida high school teacher was put on
administrative leave after addressing a group of African-American students stating, “’Don’t
make me call Donald Trump to get you sent back to Africa.’”16 A middle school physical
education teacher was fired after he told a group of minority students their parents were going to
be deported and they would be placed in foster care.17 A California high school teacher was
placed on administrative leave after making comparisons in the classroom between Donald
Trump and Adolf Hitler.18
In addition to classroom speech, the current impact of social media has blurred the lines
between teachers’ private and public lives.19 According to a national survey conducted in 2016
by the Pew Research Center on Internet and Technology, Facebook is the most popular social
networking platform for adults. Approximately 8-in-10 Americans who use the internet utilize
Facebook.20 Teachers who use Facebook or other social media platforms to engage in critical
speech relating to their jobs have been disciplined. For example, two teachers in Charlotte,
North Carolina were terminated from their positions after posting derogatory comments about
their jobs. One teacher posted, “I’m feeling pissed because I hate my students.”21 The second

15

Olivia Becker, Some Teachers are Losing their Jobs for Bringing Opinions on the Election to the Classroom,
available at http://www.businessinsider.com/teachers-fired-for-bringing-opinions-on-the-election-to-the-classroom2016-11 (last visited May 2, 2018).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Amy E. Casey, Speaking Up: The First Amendment and Wisconsin’s Public Educators, available at
http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/article.aspx?Volume=89&Issue=4&ArticleID=2
4749 (last visited May 2, 2018).
20
Shannon Greenwood, Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Social Media Update 2016: Facebook Usage and
Engagement is on the Rise, While Adoption of Other Platforms Holds Steady, PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Nov., 11,
2016, available at http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016/ (last visited May 2, 2018).
21
Mike Simpson, Social Networking Nightmares: Cyberspeak No Evil, NAT’N ED. ASSOC., available at
http://www.nea.org/home/38324.htm (last visited May 2, 2018).

5

teacher posted, “I’m teaching in the most ghetto school in Charlotte.”22 Likewise, a first grade
teacher in New Jersey was suspended from her position after posting she felt like a “’warden’
overseeing ‘future criminals’” on her Facebook page.23 A high school English teacher in
Philadelphia was suspended for posting that she had imagined writing on students’ report cards
that they were “rude, disengaged, lazy whiners” and “dress[ed] like streetwalker[s].”24 To date,
it remains unclear how many K-12 public school teachers have been disciplined for engaging in
unprotected speech; however, this number is certainly increasing.
The National Center for Educational Statistics followed a representative sample of
teachers who began their careers during the 2007-08 school year.25 According to the Center,
approximately 17% of teachers nationwide leave the profession within the first five years of
teaching.26 The National Commission on Teaching and America’s Future (NCTAF) found the
estimated cost for replacing a single teacher is approximately $8,700 for an urban district and
$6,200 for a rural district.27 These costs include human and financial resources for recruitment,
hiring, processing, orientation and training. There is a cost benefit for public school districts
when staff turnover is minimized. If teachers and administrators were well informed about free
speech laws where discipline and termination is one cause of staff turnover, this cost benefit
could be realized. At an instructional level, it is also imperative that teachers and school

22

Id.
Jonathan Zimmerman, When Teachers Talk Out of School, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 2011, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/opinion/04zimmerman.html (last visited May 2, 2018).
24
Id.
25
Emma Brown, Study: Far Fewer New Teachers are Leaving the Profession than Previously Thought, WASH.
POST, Apr. 30, 2015, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2015/04/30/study-new-teacherattrition-is-lower-than-previously-thought/ (last visited May 2, 2018).
26
Id.
27
NAT’L COMMISSION ON TEACHING AND AMERICA’S FUTURE, District Costs of Teacher Turnover, available at
https://nctaf.org/teacher-turnover-cost-calculator/district-costs-of-teacher-turnover/ (last visited May 2, 2018).
23

6

administrators understand free speech laws. Teachers are delivering board-adopted curriculum
on a daily basis. At the same time, teachers are also making numerous decisions about how and
what to say to students when they are teaching. Teachers that stray from the curriculum can run
the risk of discipline. Administrators and boards of education must understand the parameters of
teachers’ free speech rights to appropriately determine necessary disciplinary action.
Defining when a public school teacher may or may not be disciplined for their speech
either inside or outside of the classroom setting has proven to be a complex task. An 1892 case
involving a police officer’s free speech rights provided early guidance for courts regarding the
First Amendment speech rights of public employees, including public school teachers.28 Oliver
Wendell Holmes, then Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, explained while
a government employee may enjoy First Amendment rights, they do not necessarily have a
constitutional right to keep their job when they exercise those rights.29 Holmes opined public
employees must accept limits to their rights as a result of their public employment. 30
For more than 75 years after that decision in 1892, the law related to teacher speech
remained relatively stable. However, Holmes’ interpretation of employee speech rights was
modified by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1968 Pickering v. Board of Education decision.31 In
Pickering, the Court established a test that struck a “balance between the interests of the (public
employee), as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its

28

McAuliffe v. Mayor of N. Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
Diane Norocross, Separating the Employee From the Citizen: The Social Science Implications of Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 40 U. BALT. L.REV. 543 at 546, quoting McAuliffe v. Mayor of N. Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
30
Norocross, supra note 29, at 547, quoting McAuliffe v. Mayor of N. Bedford, 29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
31
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
29

7

employees.”32 The Pickering balancing test consists of a three prong analysis for courts to
employ when evaluating whether a public school employee’s speech was entitled to First
Amendment protection. The balancing test poses the following three questions:
1. Did the employee establish that his or her speech addressed a matter of public concern?
2. Did the employee demonstrate that his or her speech was a significant or motivating factor
in the employer's decision to discipline?
3. Did the court balance the employee’s interests in commenting on matters of public
concern as a citizen against the public employer's interest in promoting work-place
efficiency?33
A modified Pickering balancing test continues today as applicable law for public
employee free speech cases. Between 1968 and 2006, the three prongs of the Pickering test were
modified as a result of several U. S. Supreme Court cases. Fifteen years post-Pickering, the U.S.
Supreme Court heard a public employee free speech case involving an assistant district attorney
in Garcetti v. Ceballos.34 In this case, the High Court held lower courts must first consider
whether a public employee is speaking in their role as a public employee or in the role of a
private citizen before sanctioning the speech. If the public employee speaks in their role as a
public employee, the original Pickering balancing test would no longer be applied. This
modified test became known as the Connick/Pickering balancing test. In 2006, the U.S. Supreme
Court heard another public employee free speech case involving a deputy police officer that

32

Id. at 568.
Norocross, supra note 29, at 547-548, referencing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The balancing
test consists of three separate prongs or questions. In order for speech to be protected under the First Amendment,
all three prongs must be met in the eyes of the court.
34
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
33

8

added yet another layer to the balancing test.35 Prior to applying the Connick/Pickering
balancing test, the Supreme Court held lower courts needed to first determine whether a teacher
was speaking pursuant to their official duties. The test then became known as the modified
Connick/Pickering balancing test. Under this modified test, a public school teacher’s speech
uttered pursuant to their official duties or in conjunction with their role as a public employee
would generally lack First Amendment protection.36
Purpose of the Study
School administrators are responsible for the daily operations of their school buildings.
Ultimately, the building administrator is the one who is often confronted by parents, other
teachers, board members, or community members when a teacher says or does something
perceived to be controversial. As such, school administrators must be aware of the legal issues
surrounding public school teachers’ free speech rights when contemplating disciplinary action
against a teacher. This is also a frequently changing area of law. Therefore, being aware of
current litigation holdings in teacher free speech cases can help guide the discipline actions of a
school district.
Statement of the Problem
First Amendment free speech protection for public school teachers has evolved over time.
The Supreme Court has provided guidance via Pickering and the modified Pickering tests for
lower courts to utilize when ruling on First Amendment free speech cases involving public

35

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). The Connick/Pickering balancing test is not required by law to be
applied. It is guidance for lower courts to employ when deciding a public employee free speech case.
36
Nicholas K. Tygesson, Cracking Open the Classroom Door: Developing a First Amendment Standard for
Curricular Speech, 107 NW. U.L.REV. 1917, 1929 (Summer, 2013).

9

school teachers. It is critical that teachers, administrators, and school boards understand relevant
case law related to the First Amendment and its impact on public school teacher speech. This
study examines when public school teachers can be disciplined for speech in regard to this area
of the First Amendment. This study reviews case law and related literature regarding First
Amendment free speech rights impacting public school teachers.37 Chapter 1 provides an
overview of relevant case law in this area, organized in chronological order.
Research Questions
This study will investigate the following questions:
1.

What is the relevant legal history of the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment free
speech rights for public school teachers?

2. What is the current status of public school teachers’ First Amendment speech rights?
3. What guidance does prior litigation provide to public school officials and boards of
education when determining disciplinary action related to public school teacher
speech?
Delimitations
This study is delimited to published, teacher speech case law that has been litigated in
federal courts. Federal court decisions involving private schools, charter schools, and postsecondary institution employees are not included.
Limitations
Due to litigation costs, many free speech disagreements involving disciplinary action are
settled prior to litigation. Additionally, not all cases are publicly reported.

37

The federal court system is comprised of 94 U.S. District Courts, 13 U.S. Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court of
the United States. Case law involving the United States Constitution and its amendments are heard in the federal
court system.

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution states, “Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”38 Adopted in 1791, the First Amendment
established many freedoms for Americans. The freedom of speech provision of the First
Amendment allows citizens to express themselves without intrusion from the government. This
freedom has been interpreted to apply to both public and private sectors. As early as the late 19th
Century, the U.S. Constitution was interpreted to afford public employees the same speech
protections as non-public employees. However, in 1892 a Supreme Court decision limited the
scope of public employee free speech rights. At issue in McAuliffe v. Mayor and Board of
Alderman of New Bedford39 was whether the First Amendment allowed a police officer to solicit
contributions for a political party while performing his duties as a public employee.40 The Court
concluded the United States Constitution did not prevent a public employer from limiting an
employee’s speech while he or she was performing his or her duties as a public employee.41
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McAuliffe established guidelines governing all public employee free speech rights, including
public school teachers.
Over time judicial opinions coalesced to formulate a framework for examining public
school teacher free speech rights. These opinions focused on the question of when teacher
speech was and was not protected by the First Amendment. During the 1950s-60s public
employees were “required to swear oaths of loyalty to the state and reveal the groups with which
they associated.”42 In 1967, however, the Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals’ decision in Keyishian v. Board of Regents.43 The Second Circuit had rejected the idea
that public employees should be subjected to certain limitations on their speech.44 One year
later, the Supreme Court would rule on a public employee free speech case that would define the
parameters of First Amendment free speech protection for public school employees.45
In 1968, the Supreme Court’s decision in Pickering v. Board of Education46 established a
test that struck a “balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”47 The Court acknowledged
public employees do not forfeit their right to comment on matters of public concern.48 However,
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the Court also recognized a public employer’s interest in regulating employee speech. The Court
noted the need to balance the free speech rights of a public employee with the need of the
employer in maintaining efficiency in its services.49 The Court outlined a test in order to balance
the interests of both the public employee and the employer.50 This became known as the
Pickering balancing test and set forth a test courts could apply when evaluating whether a public
school employee’s speech was entitled to First Amendment protection.
An Overview of Early Cases Addressing Public school Teacher Speech Rights
Pickering v. Board of Education (1968)
In September 1964 the Board of Education of Township High School District 205 in
Illinois requested that voters approve a tax increase to fund the school district’s educational
needs.51 This proposal failed, and four months later the Board of Education requested a second
bond proposal that also failed.52 After the defeat of the second tax increase proposal, Marvin
Pickering, a high school teacher in the school district, wrote a letter to the editor of the local
newspaper. Pickering’s letter included financial information about the district’s spending.53 He
believed the Board of Education and the superintendent had historically mismanaged taxpayer
dollars and made poor spending decisions.54 Unbeknownst to Pickering, some of the financial
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information set forth in his letter was inaccurate.55 In response to the publication of Pickering’s
letter, the Board of Education fired Pickering from his teaching position.56 To support their
decision to fire Pickering, the Board of Education cited the false information in the letter and
noted these inaccuracies had called into question “the motives, honesty, integrity, truthfulness,
responsibility and competence of both the Board of Education and the school administration.”57
Pickering challenged his termination through the process of administrative review, but a hearing
officer subsequently upheld the dismissal.
Pickering filed a lawsuit in the Will County Circuit Court arguing that because his
termination was the result of his letter to the newspaper, his firing constituted a violation of his
First Amendment speech rights. The circuit court rejected Pickering’s claim and upheld the
hearing officer’s decision. The court held Pickering’s letter criticizing the Board of Education
was not protected free speech. Pickering appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of
Illinois.58 In its decision, the panel held that the school board’s decision was not “impulsive or
capricious.”59 Therefore the panel concluded when a teacher “[m]akes unsupported accusations
against . . . officials [it] is not promoting the best interest of his school, and the Board of
Education does not abuse its discretion in dismissing him.”60 Accordingly, both the Will County
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Circuit Court and the Supreme Court of Illinois concluded Pickering’s termination was lawful.
Pickering appealed, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.61
In deciding whether Marvin Pickering’s letter was entitled to First Amendment
protection, the High Court established a balancing test.62 The test considered various aspects of
Pickering’s letter and balanced these factors against the school district’s right to promote
workplace efficiency. The Court observed Pickering’s letter had criticized the school district’s
use of taxpayer funds.63 Additionally, the Court noted the school district’s request for additional
taxpayer funding constituted a matter of public concern and further noted that Pickering’s
statements had not been directed towards individuals whom he regularly encountered in his daily
teaching duties.64 As a result, the Court reasoned Pickering’s critical statements about the school
district did not interfere with the district’s functioning.65 Additionally, the Court pointed out the
administration’s interest in limiting negative speech about the school district would have been
consistent regardless of whether the speaker was an employee or a non-employee. Relying upon
Garrison v. Louisiana,66 the Court noted when public officials comment on matters of public
concern, even when the speech is directed at their supervisors, the speech must be accorded First
Amendment protection.67 Accordingly, the Court found the First Amendment protects a public
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employee’s right to speak on matters of public concern without fear of dismissal. The Court
affirmed Pickering could not be dismissed for speaking “on issues of public importance.”68
Utilizing a test that would come to be known as the Pickering balancing test, the Court ruled
Pickering’s letter should be treated as protected free speech.69
The Supreme Court’s Pickering decision set forth guidance for lower courts to apply
when determining if a public school teacher’s speech merits First Amendment protection.70
Specifically, the Court explained a teacher’s right to speak should be balanced “between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees.”71
The prongs of this test asked:
1. Did the individual show his or her speech addressed a matter or matters of
public interest and concern?
2.

Did the individual show his or her speech was a significant or motivating
factor in the employer’s [disciplinary] decision?

3. Did the court balance the individual’s interests in commenting on matters of
public concern as a citizen against the public employer’s interest in
“promoting the efficiency” of public service?72
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Utilizing this framework, the Court first considered whether Pickering’s letter addressed
a matter of public concern. The Court pointed out Pickering’s letter addressed school district
funding issues and reasoned public school districts relied upon taxpayers to fund public school
districts; therefore, funding issues were inherently a matter of public concern.73 Next, in order to
determine if the balance of interests between the public concern and the efficiency of the public
school district was maintained, the Court considered whether Pickering’s letter disrupted the jobs
of his co-workers or immediate supervisors.74 The Court pointed out Pickering’s letter was not
directed toward employees with whom Pickering had daily contact in his role as a classroom
teacher.75 Therefore, the Court reasoned Pickering’s letter had not interfered with the
functioning of the school district.
Finally, the Court considered whether Pickering’s letter was a motivating factor in his
termination. The Court pointed out after a full board of education hearing regarding Pickering’s
letter, the board made the decision to terminate Pickering because the letter was “detrimental to
the efficient operation and administration of the schools of the district and…require[d] [his
dismissal].”76 The Court reasoned teachers should be able to speak out on school district
operational matters without fear of retaliation.77 The Court found Pickering’s letter was a public
statement criticizing his employer and the letter’s content had not affected the performance of
Pickering’s duties nor interfered with the general operations of the school district.78 Based upon
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these conclusions, the Supreme Court found Pickering’s letter was entitled to First Amendment
protection.79
Connick v. Myers (1983)
For the next fifteen years, the Pickering balancing test guided courts in examining public
school employees’ free speech rights.80 In 1983 the Supreme Court’s Connick v. Myers81
decision further delineated the scope of public employee free speech rights. While Connick did
not involve a public school teacher, the decision addressed a public employee’s First
Amendment speech rights and is frequently cited in cases involving public school employees.82
Sheila Myers had been employed by the New Orleans Parish in Louisiana for more than
five years as an Assistant District Attorney. In October 1980, Myers was notified she was being
transferred to a different position within the District Attorney’s office.83 Myers opposed the
transfer and voiced her concerns to several of her supervisors, including both Dennis Waldron
and her immediate supervisor, Harry Connick.84 Myers stated the transfer would result in her
working with a judge whom she had previously worked with in a juvenile probation program.
Myers feared it would create a conflict of interest for her to potentially prosecute minors she had
previously counseled in the probation program.85 Neither Waldron nor Connick shared these
concerns. Subsequently, Connick sent Myers a memorandum assigning her to the judge against
her wishes. Myers again spoke to Waldron regarding the transfer. During this discussion, Myers

79

Id. at 575.
Elkind, supra note 71, at 157.
81
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
82
Elkind, supra note 71, at 157.
83
Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 753 (E.D. La. 1981).
84
Id. at 753-754.
85
Id. at 754.
80

18

also shared her concerns regarding office working conditions.86 Waldron responded by telling
Myers he did not believe her concerns were shared by other employees.
That evening, Myers created a questionnaire designed to solicit the opinions of her fellow
office workers regarding the concerns she had discussed with Waldron. The following day,
Myers distributed the questionnaire to fifteen assistant district attorneys in the New Orleans
office.87 After the questionnaire was distributed, Waldron contacted Connick, stating Myers was
“creating a mini-insurrection.”88 Thereafter, Connick met with Myers. During the meeting,
Connick informed Myers she was being terminated as a result of refusing to accept the transfer.
Myers filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
alleging her termination was a result of circulating the office questionnaire in exercise of her
First Amendment free speech rights.
Applying the Pickering balancing test, the district court first considered whether Myers’
questionnaire addressed a matter of public concern. The court noted Myers’ questionnaire
solicited opinions from her colleagues on issues related to office transfer policies, the need for a
grievance committee, and the perceived pressure for employees to volunteer outside the office to
work on political campaigns.89 The court found one portion of Myers’ questionnaire—the
question addressing public employees working on political campaigns—addressed a matter of
public concern.90 The court next applied the balancing test’s second prong to determine if
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Myers’ questionnaire was a motivating factor in her termination. The court noted that Myers
was terminated immediately after the questionnaire’s distribution. This observation led the court
to conclude Myers’ termination was the result of her circulating the questionnaire.91
Finally the court applied the balancing test’s third prong to determine if Myers’
“questionnaire was a ‘substantial or motivating factor’ in the termination of her employment.”92
Here the court noted the District Attorney’s office was not “adversely affected or substantially
impeded by [Myers’] distribution of the questionnaire.”93 The court reasoned Myers’
questionnaire was not a factual statement but rather an attempt to solicit ideas and opinions from
fellow colleagues.94 Based upon these observations, the court determined Myers’ questionnaire
was protected free speech. Therefore, the court found Myers was terminated after exercising her
First Amendment speech rights.95
Myers’ supervisor, Connick, appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit. The appellate panel reviewed the lower court’s decision and examined whether
Myers’ questionnaire merited free speech protection. Applying Pickering, the appellate panel
affirmed the lower court’s decision that Myers was terminated after exercising her First
Amendment speech rights.96 Thereafter, the U. S. Supreme Court granted Connick’s certiorari
petition.97
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The Supreme Court concluded both the district court and appellate panel had “misapplied
our decision in Pickering and consequently,…erred in striking the balance for [Myers].”98 The
Court pointed out when determining if a public employee’s speech addressed a matter of public
concern, the speech in question should be evaluated based upon the “content, form and context
of a given statement…”99 Applying this threshold inquiry, the Court first observed the majority
of the questionnaire’s content addressed Myers’ concerns over her involuntary transfer.100
However, the question of whether the assistant district attorneys felt pressure to work on political
campaigns did touch upon a matter of public concern.101 The Court reasoned public employees
should not experience retaliation as a result of speaking out about politics.102
Next, the Court considered one of the questions that asked if respondents had confidence
in their supervisor. The court reasoned this question undermined office relationships and
attempted to disrupt the role of office supervisors.103 The Court noted “the Government, as an
employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its personnel and
internal affairs.”104 Relying upon Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District,105 the
Court examined the form of Myers’ questionnaire. The Court held because Myers distributed
her questionnaire in the office setting, Connick had a legitimate concern about its impact on
office operations.106 Finally, the Court examined the context of Myers’ questionnaire. The Court
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pointed out the questionnaire was the culmination of a continuing dispute between Myers and
Connick over office transfer policies.107
Upon review of the content, form, and context of Myers’ questionnaire, the Court held
Myers’ questionnaire amounted to a grievance about office procedures.108 The Court explained
Myers’ questionnaire interfered with office operations and negatively impacted Connick’s role as
a supervisor.109 Based upon these conclusions, the Court reversed the appellate panel’s decision
and ruled Myers’ questionnaire was not protected speech, holding that, her termination was not
the result of the exercise of her First Amendment free speech rights.110
The Court’s decision in Connick modified the first step of the Pickering balancing test.
Connick added a layer of guidance for courts when determining whether a public employee’s
speech addressed a matter of public concern.111 This additional guidance outlined that when
applying the Pickering balancing test, courts evaluate a public employee’s speech based upon its
content, form, and context to determine if the employee’s speech interest outweighs the interest
of the government employer in promoting the efficiency of the services it delivers.112 This
modified analysis became known as the Connick/ Pickering balancing test.
Garcetti: A New Threshold for public school Teacher Speech Rights
The modified Connick/Pickering test would guide lower courts from 1983 until 2006. In
2006, the Supreme Court redefined the test federal courts would apply when deciding whether a
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public employee’s speech qualified for First Amendment protection.113 Although Garcetti v.
Ceballos114 did not involve a public school teacher, this case added a question to the modified
Connick/Pickering test for courts to use as guidance when determining public school teacher
First Amendment free speech protections.
Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006)
Garcetti v. Ceballos115 involved a challenge by Los Angeles County Deputy District
Attorney Richard Ceballos, who worked as a calendar deputy in the District Attorney’s Office.
As a calendar deputy, Ceballos supervised other lawyers.116 A defense attorney in a pending
case contacted Ceballos regarding “inaccuracies in an affidavit used to obtain a critical search
warrant.”117 It was not unusual for a defense attorney to ask a calendar deputy to investigate
inaccuracies in pending cases. Ceballos investigated and concluded the “affidavit contained
serious misrepresentations.”118 Ceballos reported his findings to the deputy sheriff who had
issued the warrant. Not satisfied with the sheriff’s explanation for the affidavit’s inaccuracies,
Ceballos informed his supervisors of his concerns. Thereafter, Ceballos submitted a memo to his
supervisors recommending that, as a result of the affidavit’s inaccuracies, the case should be
dismissed.119
Ceballos, his supervisors, the deputy sheriff and other members of the sheriff’s
department met to discuss Ceballos’ findings. During the meeting a lieutenant criticized the way
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Ceballos had handled the case.120 After the meeting, Ceballos’ supervisor, Sundstedt, opted to
bring the case to trial in spite of Ceballos’ concerns. During the trial Ceballos was called to
testify by the defendant’s attorneys, after which he claimed he was “subjected to a series of
retaliatory employment actions...”121 These alleged actions included “reassignment…transfer…
and denial of a promotion.”122 Ceballos filed an employment grievance which was denied based
on the determination that Ceballos’ claim lacked evidence showing retaliation.123
Ceballos filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California alleging his reassignment, transfer, and promotion denial were the result of his memo
and consequently violated his First Amendment rights.124 Relying upon Connick, the district
court first considered whether Ceballos’ memo should be considered protected free speech. In
Brewster v. Board of Education of the Lynwood Unified School District125 the Ninth Circuit had
previously concluded First Amendment free speech protections did not apply if the evidence in
question did not address a matter of public concern.126 Applying Pickering, the Brewster court
further observed if speech addresses a matter of public concern, the court must apply a balancing
test.127 Referencing Johnson v. Multnomah County, Oregon,128 to clarify when speech
constituted a matter of public concern, the Ninth Circuit had noted, “Speech involves a matter of
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public concern when it can fairly be considered to relate to any matter of political, social, or
other concern to the community.”129
As a result, in Garcetti the district court concluded “police misconduct [was] a matter of
great political and social concern to the community.”130 Additionally, the district court
referenced Gonzalez v. City of Chicago131 in its conclusion, referencing a Seventh Circuit
decision that found when a public employee’s “ordinary job duties included writing reports
regarding police misconduct, the employee’s written reports did not address matters of public
concern.”132 Relying upon Gonzalez, the district court noted like Ceballos’ memorandum,
Gonzalez’s memorandum was “simply a summary of his findings following his official
investigations.”133 As a result, the district court concluded Ceballos had drafted his
memorandum as part of his duties as a calendar deputy. Therefore, the district court reasoned
Ceballos’ memorandum did not address a matter of public concern and should not be treated as
protected speech.134 Ceballos appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit where the appellate panel considered whether Ceballos’ memorandum should be
considered protected free speech. Applying Connick and Pickering, the Ninth Circuit noted:
[W]e ask whether the speech addresses a matter of public concern, and, it if does; (2), we
engage in an inquiry, commonly known as the Pickering balancing test, to determine

129

Ceballos v. Garcetti, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039 at *13. (C.D. Cal. 2002), quoting Johnson v. Multnomah
Cnty. Oregon, 48 F.3d 420, 422 (9th Cir. 1995) and Connick v. Myers 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
130
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039 at *15 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
131
Gonzalez v. City of Chi., 239 F.3d 939 (7th Cir. 2001). A civilian employee working at a city police department
complained about police officers’ conduct. The court found the employee was not speaking as a citizen on a matter
of public concern.
132
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039 at *16 (C.D. Cal. 2002, quoting Gonzalez v. City of Chi., 239
F.3d 939, 941 (7th Cir. 2001).
133
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039 at *19 (C.D. Cal. 2002), quoting Gonzalez v. City of Chi.,
239 F.3d 939, 941-942 (7th Cir. 2001).
134
Ceballos v. Garcetti, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28039 at *21 (C.D. Cal. 2002).

25

whether Ceballos’ interest in expressing himself outweighs the government’s interest in
promoting work-place efficiency and avoiding workplace disruption.135
The panel reasoned Ceballos wrote his memorandum as a part of his employment duties and,
therefore, the memo should be subject to the balancing test.136
Applying the Connick/Pickering balancing test, the Ninth Circuit considered whether
Ceballos’ memorandum had caused a “workplace disruption.”137 The panel noted there was
insufficient evidence showing Ceballos’ memorandum had caused an “inefficiency in the
workings of the District Attorney’s Office…”138 Therefore, the panel reversed the lower court’s
decision and held Ceballos’ memorandum was entitled to First Amendment protection.139
Garcetti sought Supreme Court review and his certiorari petition was granted.140
At the Supreme Court, five Justices held that a balance of interests between a public
employee’s right to speak on matters of public concern as a citizen and the State’s interests in
being operationally efficient must be maintained.141 This opinion was consistent with Pickering.
The Court explained that when a private citizen becomes a public employee they “must accept
certain limitations on his or her freedom.”142 Further relying upon Connick/Pickering, the Court
pointed out school administrators could not limit teacher speech when a teacher was participating
in public discussions.143 However, the Court noted Ceballos had drafted his memorandum in the
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course of performing his official duties. Therefore, the Court reasoned Ceballos was not
speaking as a private citizen when he authored the memo, holding public employees were not
vested “with a right to perform their jobs however they see fit.”144 The Court held when public
employees participate in communications pursuant to their official duties, their speech must be
accurate and not disrupt the operations of the organization.145 Thus, Ceballos’ speech did not
qualify for First Amendment protection.
In summary, the Garcetti Court ruled the First Amendment does not insulate public
employees from employer discipline when the employee’s speech is expressed pursuant to their
official duties.146 The Court clarified, however, that “Our precedents do not support the
existence of a constitutional cause of action behind every statement a public employee makes in
the course of doing his or her job.”147 Garcetti modified the Connick/ Pickering balancing test
by first considering whether a public employee was speaking pursuant to their official duties
prior to determining whether the speech in question addressed a matter of public concern.148
Post-Garcetti: An Overview of Teacher Speech Rights
Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County School Board (2006)
In Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County Board of Education149 the Eleventh Circuit considered
whether a public high school teacher’s feedback about cheerleading tryouts should be treated as
protected speech. Angela Gilder-Lucas was a non-tenured high school science teacher and junior
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varsity cheerleading sponsor. Her colleague, Karen Nanquin, was the varsity cheerleading
sponsor. Following the varsity level cheerleading tryouts, several parents contacted the principal
claiming the tryout process had been unfair. Specifically, parents complained Nanquin had
contacted judges during the varsity tryout process and added gymnastic components to the tryout
that had not been included previously. Gilder-Lucas only observed the tryouts but also shared
parents’ concerns. The principal met with Gilder-Lucas and directed her to answer six written
questions he had prepared regarding the varsity tryout process. Gilder-Lucas completed the
feedback form and expressed her concerns about Nanquin’s tryout procedures. Gilder-Lucas
accused Nanquin of “tamper[ing] with the cheerleading selection process…”150 and violating the
National Federation of Cheerleader (NFC) Guidelines.151
One month after receiving Gilder-Lucas’ completed feedback form, the principal met
with Gilder-Lucas. During this meeting, the principal told Gilder-Lucas he would not renew her
teaching contract for the following year but would provide her an opportunity to resign.152 The
principal did not provide Gilder-Lucas a reason for her non-renewal. Gilder-Lucas did not
resign, and subsequently, her employment contract was not renewed. Gilder-Lucas filed a
lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama. Gilder-Lucas alleged her
contract non-renewal was the result of the accusations she had documented in the cheerleading
tryout feedback form. The feedback included Gilder-Lucas’ accusation that the varsity
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cheerleading sponsor tampered with the tryout results and had added new gymnastic
requirements the day of the tryouts. Gilder-Lucas also alleged the varsity cheerleading sponsor
had discussed the results during the tryouts with the judges, which was a violation of the NFC
guidelines. Gilder-Lucas claimed the non-renewal was a result of her engaging in First
Amendment free speech.
Referencing Connick, the district court examined whether Gilder-Lucas’ responses on the
cheerleading feedback form should be considered protected free speech.153 The court considered
whether the feedback form “relat[ed] to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
community.”154 The court noted the content of Gilder-Lucas’ responses “address[ed] the internal
management of the school cheerleading tryouts.”155 However, Gilder-Lucas’ responses had been
provided at the principal’s request. Despite this, the court reasoned Gilder-Lucas’ feedback form
responses did not address a matter of public concern and, therefore, were not entitled to First
Amendment protection.156 Gilder-Lucas appealed the trial court decision to the Eleventh Circuit.
Applying the recent Garcetti decision, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether GilderLucas’ feedback form responses should be considered protected speech.157 The appellate panel
noted, per Garcetti, when a public employee speaks pursuant to their official duties, their speech
is not protected by the First Amendment.158 The panel observed that Gilder-Lucas filled out the
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feedback form at the principal’s request regarding a school-sponsored activity. Therefore, the
panel reasoned Gilder-Lucas had completed the feedback form as part of her official duties and,
therefore, should not be entitled to First Amendment protection.159 Citing Garcetti, the Eleventh
Circuit further explained, “When public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes and the
Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”160 As a result,
the panel concluded Gilder-Lucas’ feedback form responses were within her official duties and,
therefore, her speech was not protected.161 Gilder-Lucas did not appeal the decision further.
Pagani v. Board of Education (2006)
One year later, in Pagani v. Board of Education,162 the United States District Court of
Connecticut considered whether a middle-school science teacher’s complaints to the Department
of Children and Families should be treated as protected free speech. Richard Pagani, a science
teacher at Lincoln Middle School, received a complaint about a substitute teacher who taught in
his absence and had showed students a nude photograph. Pagani reported the students’
complaint to the principal. The principal told Pagani not to report the incident to the Connecticut
Department of Children and Families (DCF).163 Pagani did not agree with the principal’s
decision, and two days later filed a “verbal complaint”164 with the DCF. The next day, the
superintendent met with Pagani. During the meeting, the superintendent informed Pagani,
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effective immediately, he was being reassigned and demoted to a permanent substitute teacher
position at Maloney High School.165 Pagani filed a grievance against the superintendent
claiming his reassignment was the result of his DCF complaint.
One month after his reassignment as a permanent substitute teacher, Pagani was again
reassigned to a new position, this time as an in-school suspension supervisor.166 In response,
Pagani filed three separate grievances arguing his transfers and demotions constituted
“retaliation”167 for his complaints to the DCF. All three of Pagani’s grievance proceedings failed
and thus he initiated arbitration.168 Subsequently, Pagani agreed to “withdraw his grievances and
waive his right to appeal the arbitration as a condition of his reinstatement as a science
teacher…”169 After the district rejected his request, Pagani filed a lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the District of Connecticut alleging his transfers and subsequent demotion
were the result of his complaints to the DCF. In support of his assertions, Pagani noted the
superintendent’s meeting informing him of his initial transfer took place just one day after his
verbal report was made to the DCF.170
Pagani argued, under Pickering, his reports to the DCF addressed a matter of “public
concern.”171 However, citing Garcetti, the court observed when public employees perform
official duties their employers are within their rights to impose discipline.172 The court further
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observed Connecticut law mandated public school teachers to “report incidents of child abuse to
the DCF.”173 As a result, the court reasoned when Pagani filed his report with the DCF he was
performing his official duties as a teacher.174 The court found Pagani’s complaints were “legally
mandated by state statute and written policy.”175 As a result of this observation, the court
concluded Pagani’s report to the DCF was not protected by the First Amendment and upheld his
dismissal. Pagani did not appeal the decision.
Wilcoxon v. Red Clay Consolidated School District (2006)
The same year, in Wilcoxon v. Red Clay Consolidated School District,176 the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware considered whether a teacher’s private journal
should be considered protected speech. Richard Wilcoxon, a physical education and health
teacher, was employed at Skyline Middle School. Wilcoxon co-taught his classes with a female
colleague.177 Wilcoxon became frustrated because his co-teacher was often tardy to class and
frequently left the classroom during instructional time. He confronted the co-teacher with his
concerns and later learned the co-teacher had told colleagues in the building Wilcoxon was
“difficult to work with.”178 Wilcoxon consulted several veteran teachers who advised him to
keep a journal recording both his co-teacher’s class attendance and any other professional
concerns. He took this advice and kept this journal locked in his desk.
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Subsequently, when Wilcoxon was absent from school, the assistant principal found the
journal while looking for a student class roster for a substitute teacher. The assistant principal
gave the journal to the principal. The next day, the principal met with Wilcoxon and demanded
Wilcoxon identify the teachers who had advised him to maintain the journal.179 Wilcoxon
refused and returned to his classroom. Later that day, the principal, assistant principal, and
Wilcoxon’s co-teacher met with Wilcoxon. During this meeting, Wilcoxon again refused to
name the teachers who had advised him to maintain the journal. The co-teacher accused
Wilcoxon of saying “inappropriate things to her and threatened to file a sexual harassment
complaint against him.”180 At the end of the day, Wilcoxon met with the principal and assistant
principal and expressed his concerns over the co-teacher’s sexual harassment allegations.
Thereafter, Wilcoxon received a letter in his staff mailbox directing him to attend an afterschool
meeting with the principal. During this meeting, Wilcoxon received a disciplinary letter
indicating he had made “inappropriate comments…”181 about his female co-teacher. Wilcoxon
refused to sign the disciplinary letter and requested the meeting be suspended so he could secure
union representation. However, the principal refused to suspend the meeting and issued
Wilcoxon two additional disciplinary letters. The second disciplinary letter cited Wilcoxon for
failure to have current lesson plans when previously requested by the principal. The third
disciplinary letter cited Wilcoxon for failure to sign up for required bus duties.182 Wilcoxon

179

Id. The principal was female.
Id. at 240.
181
Id.
182
Wilcoxon v. Red Clay Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 437 F. Supp.2d 235, 241 (D. Del. 2006).
180

33

became frustrated and felt he was the target of gender discrimination and subsequently filed a
discrimination claim with the Delaware Department of Labor.183
Two months later, the principal came to Wilcoxon’s classroom to conduct an
unannounced classroom observation. Wilcoxon was concerned, as a result of the pending
discrimination claim, that the principal’s evaluation would be biased. After the evaluation,
Wilcoxon requested a meeting with the director of secondary education. During the meeting
Wilcoxon expressed his concerns, but no action was taken by the director. Wilcoxon followed
up by writing several letters to the director, but did not receive a response.
As he had feared, Wilcoxon received negative classroom performance feedback from his
principal. These evaluations cited Wilcoxon’s poor classroom management procedures and
insufficient lesson planning.184 Wilcoxon had never received negative feedback about his
teaching performance before the visit in question, and requested the director of secondary
education and the superintendent remove the negative performance feedback from his personnel
file. The director of secondary education denied the request.185 Thereafter, the principal met
with Wilcoxon. During the meeting, Wilcoxon was given a letter stating he was being dismissed
from his teaching position as a consequence of his “poor lesson plans, poor classroom
management and for making inappropriate comments.”186
Wilcoxon filed a second complaint with the Delaware Department of Labor. The
Department of Labor investigated both complaints and concluded Wilcoxon had been disciplined
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and terminated in retaliation for filing the Charges of Discrimination against the principal.187
Wilcoxon filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware alleging he had
been fired in retaliation for the discrimination charges he had filed with the Department of Labor
against the principal. Wilcoxon alleged the discrimination charges were based upon the content
of his journal, which constituted protected free speech.
Applying Garcetti, and referencing both Pickering and Connick, the district court first
considered whether Wilcoxon’s journal qualified for free speech protection. The Garcetti Court
had applied Pickering, concluding “a public employee’s speech [was] protected if he [spoke] ‘as
a citizen on a matter of public concern.’”188 However, Garcetti also pointed out when a public
employee’s speech was uttered in conjunction with their official duties, the employee was “not
speaking as a citizen for First Amendment purposes.”189 This led the district court in the present
case to conclude, pursuant to Garcetti, that Wilcoxon’s journal entries regarding the co-teacher’s
classroom attendance had not been created as part of his duties as a teacher. The court explained
that a teacher’s official duties did not include tracking the attendance of a colleague. However,
the court subsequently noted that the contents of Wilcoxon’s journal, highlighting his colleague’s
attendance patterns, did address a matter of public concern. The court reasoned the colleague’s
absences created class size overages for Wilcoxon. Having one teacher in charge of two classes
of students was a matter of public concern.190 The court explained that the co-worker’s conduct
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repeatedly placed Wilcoxon “in the position of fulfilling the responsibilities of two teachers.”191
As a result, the court held that Wilcoxon’s journal was not part of his official duties. This,
coupled with the fact that the content of the journal was a matter of public concern, led the court
to decide that the journal was First Amendment protected speech. Based upon these
observations, the court held school officials could not use the journal to support Wilcoxon’s
dismissal.192 The school district did not appeal the decision.
Houlihan v. Sussex Technical School District (2006)
Later that year, in Houlihan v. Sussex Technical School District,193 the United States
District Court for the District of Delaware considered whether the First Amendment protected a
school psychologist’s complaints to school officials and a school board member that the school
district was not complying with special education laws. Dorothy Houlihan was employed by
Sussex Technical High School as a school psychologist. Houlihan voiced concerns to the vice
principal regarding the school district’s “non-compliance with the Individuals with Disabilities
Act [IDEA].”194 After learning of Houlihan’s concerns, the principal “re-wrote [Houlihan’s] job
description to prevent her from speaking out on IDEA violations.”195 Specifically, the principal
directed Houlihan to report any future allegations regarding IDEA violations only to building
administrators.196 Houlihan was frustrated and contacted a school board member. Thereafter,
Houlihan received several written reprimands and negative performance evaluations from the
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building principal. Subsequently, the assistant superintendent, teacher union president, and
building principal met with Houlihan. During this meeting, Houlihan was informed her
employment contract would not be renewed.197 She filed a lawsuit with the U.S. District Court
for the District of Delaware alleging her written reprimands and negative performance
evaluations were a consequence of her speaking out about perceived IDEA violations. Houlihan
claimed her speech about IDEA violations amounted to protected First Amendment free speech.
Applying the Supreme Court’s recent Garcetti decision, the district court considered
whether Houlihan’s complaints to building administrators and a school board member about
perceived IDEA violations should be considered protected free speech. The court noted “a
public employee’s statement is protected activity when the employee is speaking as a citizen.”198
The court further noted, “when a public employee makes a statement pursuant to his or her
official duties, the public employee is not speaking as a citizen.”199 The court observed
Houlihan’s job duties as a school psychologist, regardless of the formal job description, “always
entailed reporting alleged incidents of IDEA noncompliance.”200 Therefore, the court reasoned
Houlihan’s complaints were directly connected to her job duties and were not made in her role as
a private citizen.201 As a result, the court found Houlihan’s speech was not entitled to First
Amendment protection. Houlihan did not appeal the decision.
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Ryan v. Shawnee Mission Unified School District (2006)
The same year another district court, the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas, considered in Ryan v. Shawnee Mission Unified School District202 whether a school
district physical therapist was improperly terminated as a consequence of engaging in protected
speech. Juanita Ryan was assigned to several buildings within the Shawnee Mission Unified
School District. Ryan’s responsibilities included providing Individual Education Plan (IEP)
services to students at three different buildings in the district.203 During the 2003-04 school year,
Ryan made numerous complaints to the special education coordinator about her caseload,
equipment needs, lack of cooperation from colleagues, and scheduling issues in all three
buildings.204 For example, Ryan spoke to the special education coordinator about a colleague’s
uncooperativeness and also raised three different complaints about scheduling concerns.
During Ryan’s end-of-year performance evaluation conference, the special education
coordinator informed Ryan if she did not resign within ten days, the school district “would
enforce the $1,000 penalty for late resignations...”205 The coordinator told Ryan none of the
three schools wanted her to return and the coordinator would not entertain a transfer request.206
Ryan submitted her resignation and filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
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District of Kansas, alleging her forced resignation was prompted by her complaints to the special
education coordinator. Ryan asserted this violated her First Amendment free speech rights.
Applying Garcetti, and quoting language from both Pickering and Connick, the district
court considered whether Ryan’s complaints to the special education coordinator qualified for
First Amendment protection. The court first considered whether Ryan’s complaints had been
made pursuant to her official duties.207 The court noted the “overwhelming bulk”208 of Ryan’s
speech fell within the “parameters of [her] official job duties as a [physical therapist] for the
school district.”209 Next, applying the Connick/Pickering, analysis, the court evaluated whether
Ryan’s complaints about her colleagues addressed a matter of public concern. The court noted
Ryan’s complaints had not been made for the “purpose of informing the public…”210 but rather
constituted “personal grievances.”211 As a result, the court concluded Ryan’s speech did not
qualify for First Amendment protection.212 Ryan did not appeal the decision.
2007
Mayer v. Monroe County Community School Corporation (2007)
The next year, in Mayer v. Monroe County Community School Corporation,213 a Seventh
Circuit panel evaluated whether a public school teacher’s in-class speech was entitled to First
Amendment protection. Deborah Mayer was an elementary public school teacher in Indiana.
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While teaching a current events class, a student asked Mayer if she had participated in any
political demonstrations. Mayer explained she had driven past an anti-war demonstration and
observed a sign asking passersby to “Honk for Peace.”214 When one of the students asked Mayer
whether she had honked her horn in support of the demonstrator Mayer replied she had.
That evening, the student went home and informed her parents about Mayer’s statements.
The student’s parents complained to school officials. The principal responded by holding a
faculty meeting and directing all teachers “not to take sides in any political controversy.”215
Mayer was not individually disciplined, but at the end of the school year the board of education
did not renew Mayer’s employment contract. While the school board did not specify a reason,
Mayer believed her termination was the result of her classroom speech. Mayer filed a lawsuit in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana alleging her contract non-renewal was
a consequence of her exercising her First Amendment speech rights.
Mayer argued her classroom speech should be protected by the First Amendment because
her response to the student’s question was not part of her duties as a public school teacher.216
Applying the Fourth Circuit’s Boring v. Buncombe County Board of Education217 decision, the
district court examined whether Mayer’s classroom speech should be considered protected
speech. The district court noted the classroom was a unique venue under the school board’s
control.218 The court further pointed out “public school teachers are not free, under the First
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Amendment, to arrogate control of the curricula.”219 As a result, the court reasoned Mayer’s
classroom political comments were made outside of the board of education’s adopted
curriculum. Therefore, the court concluded Mayer’s classroom comments had not been made as
a citizen commenting on a matter of public concern. Based upon these findings, the court ruled
Mayer’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment.220 Mayer appealed.
Applying Webster v. New Lenox School District,221 the Seventh Circuit panel examined
whether a teacher has the right to introduce their own personal ideas on a curricular topic. The
panel explained teachers do “[n]ot have a constitutional right to introduce [their] own views on
[a] subject but must stick to the prescribed curriculum . . . .”222 The panel further explained “the
First Amendment does not entitle primary and secondary teachers, when conducting the
education of captive audiences, to cover topics, or advocate viewpoints, that depart from the
curriculum adopted by the school system.”223 As a result, the panel concluded Mayer’s
classroom speech had not been uttered in her capacity as a citizen for First Amendment purposes,
and, therefore, her classroom comments did not qualify for First Amendment protection.224
Mayer did not appeal the decision.
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Lee v. York County School Division (2007)
That same year the Fourth Circuit, in Lee v. York County School Division,225 considered
whether a Spanish teacher’s classroom bulletin board displays were entitled to consideration as
protected free speech. William Lee, a third year Spanish teacher at Tabb High School, displayed
both religious and political posters in his classroom. A parent complained to the school board
and the school board directed the principal to investigate. The next day, Lee was absent from
school and the principal entered the room to examine the posters. After looking over the posters,
the principal removed five items, later testifying he “could not find any reason why [these items]
would be posted in a classroom.”226 The following day, Lee met with the principal. The
principal explained he had removed the posters because he felt they were “inappropriate in a
Spanish classroom.”227 Lee did not seek union representation and but instead personally hired a
lawyer. Lee’s lawyer wrote a letter to the superintendent requesting permission to re-hang the
posters.228 The board of education’s attorney conducted an investigation and recommended that
the district superintendent deny the request. As a result, Lee filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, alleging the removal of the posters was a violation of
his First Amendment free speech rights.
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Applying the Supreme Court’s Connick/Pickering analysis as set forth in Boring, the
district court observed “curricular speech encompasses a wide range of types of
communication.”229 Referencing Urofsky v. Gilmore230, the court further noted Lee’s speech
through his posters were “nothing more than an execution of a teacher’s employment duties.”231
Based upon this definition, the district court reasoned Lee’s posted materials “qualif[ied] as the
type of materials that [could] constitute curricular speech.”232 As a result, the district court ruled
Lee’s posters did not constitute speech made as a private citizen nor did they address a matter of
public concern.233 Based upon these conclusions, the district court ruled Lee’s posters were not
entitled to First Amendment protection. Lee appealed the court’s decision to the Fourth Circuit.
Citing Tinker v. Des Moines,234 the appellate panel reiterated that “teachers do not shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”235
However, the panel also noted “…certain limitations are placed on the free speech rights of
schoolteachers…due to the nature of their employment by government-operated schools.”236
Applying the Pickering-Connick balancing test, the panel concluded Lee’s posters did not
address matters of public concern because they were curricular in nature.237 Based upon this
conclusion, the panel reasoned Lee’s posters were not entitled First Amendment protection. As a
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result, the Fourth Circuit upheld the school district’s decision to remove the posters.
Subsequently, Lee appealed to the Supreme Court, but his certiorari petition was denied.238
Pearson v. Board of Education (2007)
Three months later, another district court in the eastern part of the United States, the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of New York, decided Pearson v. Board of Education.239
The court in this case considered whether an employee’s grievances over negative classroom
evaluations and perceived unfair treatment should be treated as protected free speech. Ronald
Pearson, an African-American, was employed as a New York City public school teacher.
Pearson received a letter from his assistant principal alleging Pearson had made threats towards
him.240 Pearson did not immediately respond because he knew the accusation was false. Two
weeks later, Pearson received a negative classroom evaluation from the principal. Pearson
responded by filing a grievance with the principal alleging he had been treated unfairly. The
principal dismissed the grievance.241
Pearson filed a second grievance alleging his supervisor had previously denied him
access to the social studies department’s computer.242 The principal also dismissed this
grievance. Later, Pearson and a group of other African-American teachers filed several
grievances alleging unfair treatment by building officials towards African-American teachers.243
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These grievances were also dismissed.244 Pearson and other African-American teachers also sent
several complaints to the principal expressing concerns regarding the assistant principal’s sexual
conduct towards female staff and students.245 No action was taken by the principal.
The following school year, Pearson requested a one-year unpaid leave of absence.
Pearson’s cited reasons for the request included references to school officials’ racist treatment of
African American teachers, claiming the assistant principal “operate[d] the Social Studies
department like a southern plantation.”246 The superintendent denied Pearson’s leave request
and directed Pearson to contact a pension consultant about retirement options. As a result,
Pearson resigned and filed a lawsuit with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York. His lawsuit alleged his resignation had been tendered as a consequence of school officials’
response to his exercise of his First Amendment free speech rights.
Applying Garcetti, and referencing Connick, the district court considered whether
Pearson’s grievances and complaints qualified for free speech protection. Pursuant to Garcetti, if
public employees speak as a part of their employment duties, their speech is not protected.247
The district court found Pearson’s complaints to the principal about his negative classroom
evaluation and the denial of computer access were made as part of Pearson’s official duties as a
classroom teacher.248 The court also held Pearson’s report alleging sexual misconduct on the
part of the assistant principal was made as part of his duties as a public school teacher, noting
public school employees were mandated to report knowledge of sexual misconduct.249
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Therefore, when Pearson reported the assistant principal’s conduct to the principal he was doing
so as part of his official duties.250 Based upon these conclusions, the court reasoned Pearson’s
grievances and complaints were not entitled to First Amendment protection.251 Pearson did not
appeal the decision.
Williams v. Dallas Independent School District (2007)
Later that year, in Williams v. Dallas Independent School District,252 the Fifth Circuit
considered whether a public school athletic director’s written requests for an athletic fund
balance should be considered protected free speech. Gregory Williams was an athletic director
and head football coach at Pinkston High School. Prior to the start of the school year, Williams
was not provided a fund balance for the general athletic account. Believing he needed this
information to perform his job, Williams sent a memo to the school office manager requesting
the fund balance.253 When he did not receive a response to his request, Williams sent a second
memo to both the office manager and the principal. Williams’ request was again ignored; he did
not receive a response from either party. A short time later, Williams sent the principal a third
memo expressing his concerns over the lack of response to his requests for the general athletic
account balance. In the third memo Williams also expressed concern with the school district’s
fiscal practices, noting the office manager had told Williams the general athletic account had a
negative fund balance. However, Williams was aware of a recent deposit made to the account
and doubted the veracity of the office manager’s statement.254
250
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Two months later, Williams was notified by both the varsity and freshman boys’
basketball coaches the school district had not paid upcoming tournament entry fees. Williams
knew recent football gate receipts should have been deposited into the general athletic account to
cover the entry fees. Williams sent another memo to the office manager and principal alleging
inappropriate athletic fund practices.255 Four days later, Williams was removed from his position
as the school’s athletic director.256 Following Williams’ removal as athletic director, the school
board voted to not renew Williams’ athletic director contract.257 While the school board did not
specify a reason for the nonrenewal, Williams believed his nonrenewal was prompted by his
written memoranda. Williams filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas, alleging his nonrenewal was a consequence of exercising his First Amendment
speech rights.
Williams argued his memoranda should be interpreted like Pickering’s letter which the
U.S. Supreme Court had ruled constituted protected free speech.258 Applying the content-formcontext analysis the Supreme Court had utilized in Connick, the district court first considered
whether Williams’ memoranda addressed a matter of personal interest or public concern.259 The
court explained in applying the content-form-context analysis, when an employee speaks about a
matter of personal interest the speech does not address a matter of public concern. The court
noted the content of Williams’ memoranda amounted to internal communications about
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“standard operating procedures.”260 Next, the court noted Williams’ memoranda had been
directed to his supervisor, not to the public. Finally, the court pointed out the purpose of
Williams’ memoranda had been to address budgeting issues within the athletic department.
Therefore, the court concluded Williams had not drafted the memoranda in his role as a public
citizen.261 Based upon these conclusions, the court reasoned Williams’ memoranda were drafted
as part of his employment duties and were not protected by the First Amendment. Williams
appealed the decision to the Fifth Circuit.
Applying Garcetti, referencing Pickering, the appellate panel focused on Williams’ role
when he had drafted the memoranda to the office manager and the principal. The panel
examined Williams’ memoranda to determine if they were related to his role as the athletic
director.262 The panel reasoned Williams’ duties as an athletic director included the need “[t]o
consult with his supervisor about his budget.”263 Therefore, the court held Williams’ speech took
place within his role as a public employee and concluded Williams’ memoranda were drafted as
part of his employment duties and were not entitled to First Amendment protection.264 Williams
did not appeal the decision.
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2008
Panse v. Eastwood (2008)
One year later, in Panse v. Eastwood,265 the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of New York considered whether a public school teacher’s official duties included discussing
college scholarship requirements with students. Peter Panse was a tenured high school art
teacher in Middletown School District, New York. After researching collegiate art student
scholarship program requirements, Panse learned select art programs required students to submit
portfolios that included nude sketches. Panse shared this information with his high school art
students. Panse also told students he was considering opening his own art school and that the
curriculum would include nude sketching.266 Upon learning of Panse’s classroom comments, the
superintendent “filed disciplinary charges.”267 Although Panse did not follow through with his
plans to establish his own school, the superintendent’s charges nonetheless included an
allegation that Panse had attempted to solicit his high school art students to “’participate in a forprofit course [Panse] was intending to teach, off of school premises, which was to include…the
drawing and sketching of male and female nude models.’”268 Panse was charged with “falsely
representing [the high school] course [and] recruiting for [his] course…”269 The Board of
Education suspended Panse.270 Panse filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
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District of New York alleging the disciplinary charges and subsequent suspension were a
consequence of exercising his First Amendment speech rights.
Applying Garcetti and referencing Mayer, the district court considered whether Panse’s
classroom comments regarding recruiting students for his potential for-profit art course were
made pursuant to his official teaching duties. The district court pointed out rather than
establishing clear guidelines for determining the contours of a public employee’s official duties,
the Garcetti Court had instead simply noted job descriptions “often bear little resemblance to the
duties an employee actually is expected to perform.”271 As a result, the district court reasoned
Panse “spoke to his own students, at school, during class, concerning a topic that he believed to
be of importance to their continuing art education.”272 As a result, the court reasoned these
comments should be considered part of Panse’s official teaching duties. Therefore, the court
held Panse’s comments were made pursuant to his official duties and were not entitled to First
Amendment protection.273 Panse appealed the decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Second Circuit explained the Garcetti Court did not decide whether its decision
“’would apply to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching’ [because] ‘[t] there
is some argument that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction
implicates additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court’s
customary employee-speech jurisprudence.’”274 The panel pointed out however, that Panse’s
encouragement of students to participate in his proposed for-profit class that planned to include
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nude sketching had “legitimate pedagogical concerns … commercial solicitation during class
time and investigating potentially inappropriate discussion of material that could be construed as
being of a sexual nature.”275 As a result, the panel affirmed the district court’s decision that
Panse’s classroom comments, although inappropriate, were made in his capacity as a high school
art teacher and therefore were not entitled to First Amendment protection.276 Panse did not
appeal the decision.
Samuelson v. LaPorte Community School District (2008)
The same year in another circuit court decision, the Seventh Circuit examined in
Samuelson v. LaPorte Community School District,277 whether a board of education’s staff-tosupervisor communication policy limited a coach’s ability to voice complaints to school board
officials, parents, and community members. The panel also examined whether a coach’s
complaints should be considered protected free speech. Gregory Samuelson was a tenured
teacher and girls’ varsity basketball coach for the LaPorte Community School District.
Samuelson frequently voiced concerns to members of the board of education, parents, and
community members about differences in the school’s treatment of the girls’ and boys’
basketball programs.278 Specifically, Samuelson was concerned about the salary differences that
existed between the girls’ and boys’ basketball coaches and the fact that the girls’ basketball
program had less access to athletic facilities than the boys’ basketball program.

275

Panse v. Eastwood, 303 F. Appx. 933, 935 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id.
277
Samuelson v. LaPorte Cmty. Sch. Corporation, 526 F.3d 1046 (7th Cir. 2008).
278
Id. at 1049.
276

51

The school board’s chain-of-command policy directed staff members to communicate
school district concerns to their department supervisor.279 Samuelson did not follow the chainof-command policy and instead voiced his concerns directly to members of the board of
education, parents, and community members. School officials did not immediately respond to
Samuelson’s concerns or his failure to follow the chain-of-command policy. However, at the
end of the school year, the superintendent submitted a letter to the school board recommending
that Samuelson’s coaching contract not be renewed.280 The superintendent pointed out
Samuelson had failed to follow the board of education’s chain-of-command policy.281 The
school board unanimously approved the superintendent’s recommendation and Samuelson’s
coaching contract was not renewed. As a result, Samuelson filed a lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Indiana alleging the nonrenewal of his coaching
contract was a consequence of him exercising his First Amendment free speech rights.282
Applying Connick/Pickering, the district court first considered whether the board of
education’s chain-of-command policy violated Samuelson’s First Amendment free speech rights.
The court pointed out “the government may impose restraints on the free speech of their
employees if it can show that the employee’s interest as a citizen in commenting upon matters of
public concern are outweighed by the interests of the State...”283 Utilizing the Connick/Pickering
balancing test, the court determined the board of education’s chain-of-command policy did not
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prohibit the content of an employee’s speech.284 For example, the court noted a school district
employee could continue to voice their concerns after speaking with a supervisor.285 As a result,
the court concluded that the board of education’s chain-of-command policy did not limit
Samuelson’s speech.
Applying Waters v. Churchill,286 the district court next examined whether Samuelson’s
complaints to the school board, parents, and community members should be accorded First
Amendment protection. The court noted that the board of education’s chain-of-command policy
was in place to promote efficiency in school district operations. In light of this, the court found
the board of education’s interest in efficiency outweighed Samuelson’s interest in speaking
directly to the board of education, parents, and community members.287 Based upon this
reasoning, the court concluded Samuelson’s complaints to the school board, parents, and
community members were subject to the school district’s chain of command policy and held that
the board of education’s application of the policy did not violate Samuelson’s free speech rights.
As a result, the court ruled Samuelson’s complaints to the school board, parents and community
members did not qualify for First Amendment protection.288 Samuelson appealed the court’s
decision to the Seventh Circuit.
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Applying Garcetti, and referencing United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union289 and Crue v. Aiken,290 the appellate panel evaluated whether Samuelson’s complaints
constituted First Amendment protected speech and considered whether this speech was
unconstitutionally limited by the chain-of-command policy. The panel pointed out in order for a
public school employee’s speech to qualify for First Amendment protection, the employee must
be speaking in their role as a private citizen and their speech must address an issue of public
concern.291 The panel opined that Samuelson had been functioning in his coaching role when he
voiced his concerns over perceived differences in basketball programs to the parents,
community, and school board members.292 Thus, the court held that Samuelson’s complaints
addressed coaching concerns at the high school and did not address matters of public concern.293
Therefore, the court reasoned Samuelson’s complaints had been made in the course of
performing his official duties. Based upon these conclusions, the panel determined Samuelson’s
complaints did not qualify for First Amendment protection, affirming the lower court decision.294
Next, the panel examined whether the board of education’s chain-of-command policy
limited Samuelson’s speech in violation of the First Amendment. The panel noted the chain-ofcommand policy applied only to school district administrative matters that should be discussed
with a supervisor.295 Because Samuelson’s complaints were related to his coaching
responsibilities, the panel concluded the chain-of-command policy had not inappropriately
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limited Samuelson’s speech.296 Based upon these conclusions, the panel ruled Samuelson’s
complaints were not entitled to First Amendment protection.297 Samuelson did not appeal the
decision.
Carone v. Mascolo (2008)
The same year, in Carone v. Mascolo,298 the U.S. District Court for the District of
Connecticut examined whether a high school teacher’s emails to her assistant principal about a
lack of course materials were entitled to First Amendment protection. Ann Carone taught
advanced level business courses at Seymour High School. At the conclusion of the school year
the assistant principal told Carone a new business course would be added to her fall teaching
schedule. The teaching materials for the new course included a board-approved textbook,
newspapers, videos, and Internet resources. Several days before the fall semester began, Carone
emailed the assistant principal, explaining she had not yet received the teacher’s manual or the
student textbooks.299 The assistant principal informed Carone the materials had been
misplaced.300 When school began, Carone taught the class using only a course outline and one
student textbook. During the second week of the semester, Carone emailed the assistant
principal and requested assistance in locating the course materials.301 In response, the assistant
principal provided Carone with one student workbook.302 Unhappy with the response, Carone
sent an email to the assistant principal requesting the date when she would receive the missing
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course materials.303 In the email Carone also stated she was planning to send parents a letter
explaining students would be sent to a study hall instead of the business class until the course
materials arrived.304 Despite this threat, Carone did not send the letter to the parents nor
implement the study hall plan.
As a result of Carone’s statement, the assistant principal and a teacher union
representative met with Carone. During the meeting, Carone was issued a written reprimand for
her plan to assign the students to a study hall.305 Carone objected to the reprimand because she
had not implemented the study hall plan. After the meeting, Carone taught the class using
alternative materials until the standard materials arrived several weeks later. At the end of the
school year, Carone resigned and filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
District of Connecticut alleging the reprimands and her subsequent resignation were a
consequence exercising her First Amendment free speech rights.
Applying Garcetti, the court examined whether Carone’s emails to the assistant principal
were created pursuant to her official duties as a teacher. The court pointed out Garcetti “[d]id
not ‘articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee’s duties.’”306
The court noted Carone’s emails to the assistant principal regarding the missing materials were
made pursuant to her official teaching duties. Furthermore, the court noted Carone’s job
description included maintaining communications with a supervisor regarding student needs.307
The court reasoned a teacher’s duties also included advocating for necessary student materials to

303

Id.
Carone v. Mascolo, 573 F. Supp.2d 575, 584 (D. Conn. 2008).
305
Id.
306
Id. at 589, quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006).
307
Carone v. Mascolo, 573 F. Supp.2d 575, 589 (D. Conn. 2008).
304

56

appropriate supervisors. Referencing the Garcetti test, the court determined there was a clear
connection between Carone’s teaching duties and the content of her emails to the assistant
principal. Based upon this conclusion, the court ruled Carone’s emails were not entitled to First
Amendment protection.308 Carone did not appeal the decision.
Bryant v. Gardner (2008)
That same year in Bryant v. Gardner,309 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois considered whether a public school teacher’s complaints to a principal and
athletic director about perceived unfair treatment of athletic teams should be treated as protected
speech. Lamont Bryant was a tenured high school physical education teacher and basketball
coach at Marshall High School. Bryant frequently complained to the interim principal about
various decisions made by the athletic director. Bryant’s complaints included the athletic
director’s decisions to have the boys’ basketball team travel on what he perceived to be
substandard busses, the lack of funding for the boys’ basketball program, and the boys’
basketball team’s unequal access to practice facilities in comparison to the girls’ basketball
program.310
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Later in the year, the athletic director received a complaint from the Illinois High School
Association (IHSA) about Bryant’s failure to attend a required athletic press conference.311 No
action was taken by the athletic director in response to the IHSA’s complaint. Thereafter, the
bus company responsible for transporting the boys’ basketball team complained to the athletic
director that Bryant had cursed at a driver.312 Again, no action was taken by the athletic director.
Following a subsequent basketball tournament, the school cheerleading sponsor complained to
the athletic director that Bryant had cursed at the cheerleaders.313 The day after receiving the
cheerleading sponsor’s complaint, the athletic director met with Bryant and told him to ‘“tone
down his style,”’ and that ‘“a high profile coach should act like one.”’314 As a result, Bryant
began considering other high school and collegiate coaching offers and discussed these offers
with the interim principal. The interim principal told Bryant if he remained the coach, Bryant
would need to work collaboratively with the athletic director.315 The interim principal and
Bryant reached an agreement that Bryant would remain in his coaching role for one more year.
This agreement included Bryant coaching the boys’ basketball team in an upcoming high profile
annual Martin Luther King (MLK) Classic Basketball Tournament.316
The following month the athletic director and interim principal met with Bryant to
discuss the boys’ basketball team budget. During the meeting, the athletic director informed
Bryant the boys’ basketball team accounts would be dissolved and the funds would be deposited
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in the school’s general fund. Bryant knew the athletic director had been allowed to have separate
accounts for different tournaments and events and questioned the interim principal as to why the
athletic director was allowed to maintain separate accounts. Bryant mentioned specifically that
the revenue for the MLK Classic Tournament was kept in a separate account by the athletic
director and those funds had not been used to benefit the boys’ basketball program. The interim
principal did not respond, but instead the athletic director responded by stating the athletic
accounts were “none of [Bryant’s] business.”317
Several months later, the interim principal notified Bryant the boys’ basketball open gym
times would no longer be available for the team.318 In response to Bryant’s request for
clarification, the interim principal responded “because I said so.”319 Subsequently, when Bryant
observed the girls’ basketball team participating in open gym activities, Bryant emailed a
complaint to the interim principal.320 Thereafter, Bryant’s assistant coach initiated a
conversation with the interim principal about the importance of open gym for the boys’
basketball program. Bryant requested that his assistant coach document the conversation he had
with the interim principal in writing. The assistant coach submitted copies of the conversation to
Bryant. Bryant took the copies and submitted them to the athletic director and interim principal.
Thereafter, the interim principal informed Bryant, effective immediately, he was being removed
as the boys’ basketball coach for failure to comply with the school’s code of conduct
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expectations.321 Bryant filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois alleging his termination as the boys’ basketball coach was a consequence of
him exercising his First Amendment free speech rights.322
Applying Garcetti, the court examined whether Bryant’s complaints to the interim
principal and athletic director were made pursuant to his official coaching duties. The court first
analyzed Bryant’s complaints about the lack of open gym opportunities and found Bryant had
expressed these concerns pursuant to his coaching responsibilities.323 The court reasoned Bryant
had advocated for open gym as a vital part of the boys’ basketball program and his complaints
were an attempt to change the interim principal’s decision.324 Under Garcetti, the court
reasoned, if the speech of a public employee was determined to be the result of an official duty, it
was not protected by the First Amendment.325
Next, the court examined whether Bryant’s complaints regarding the athletic department
budget constituted First Amendment protected speech. The court found Bryant’s official duties
as the head boys’ basketball coach included budget oversight. Therefore, the court reasoned the
First Amendment did not protect Bryant’s speech regarding the athletic budget.326 As a result,
the court held Bryant’s complaints to the interim principal and athletic director had been made
pursuant to his coaching responsibilities. Based upon these conclusions, the court determined
Bryant’s complaints did not qualify for First Amendment protection.327 Bryant did not appeal.
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2009
Baar v. Jefferson County Board of Education (2009)
The following year, in Baar v. Jefferson County Board of Education,328 the Sixth Circuit
considered whether a public school teacher’s email to a colleague about attending a professional
workshop should be accorded free speech protection. Robert Baar was a high school science
teacher in Kentucky. Baar sent a letter to a fellow teacher accusing her of having an affair with
another teacher. The accused teacher gave the letter to their school principal, Mr. Dohn. After
conferring with the Board of Education, the principal met with Baar. During the meeting, Baar
was presented with and signed a memorandum of understanding requiring him to discontinue all
forms of communication with his fellow teacher and to cease representing the school district at
future science meetings.329 Thereafter, the principal issued Baar a written reprimand for the
letter he had written to his fellow teacher and transferred Baar to another high school within the
school district.330 Baar filed a grievance with the Board of Education regarding the transfer and
demanded the reprimand be removed from his personnel file. The Board of Education removed
the reprimand from Barr’s personnel file. However, the memorandum of understanding remained
in his file and Baar’s transfer to the other district high school was upheld.331
A few years later, the same colleague who had received the accusatory letter from Baar
emailed all the district high school science teachers, including Baar, inviting them to the
Louisville Area Chemistry Alliance (LACA) professional organizational science meeting. Baar
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emailed the teacher indicating he would attend the meeting.332 The teacher reported Baar’s email
to Principal Dohn. Dohn notified Baar’s new principal, Jury. Jury was aware of the prior
memorandum of understanding Baar had signed prohibiting him from contacting that teacher as
well as not being allowed to represent the district at future district science alliance meetings. As
a result, Jury issued Baar a written reprimand for violating the memorandum of understanding.
Baar filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky,
alleging Jury’s reprimand violated his First Amendment speech rights.
Applying Connick/Pickering, the district court considered whether the most recent email
Baar sent—that led to his reprimand from Jury—addressed a matter of public concern.333 The
court held Baar’s email had not violated the memorandum of understanding nor did it address a
matter of public concern.334 The court noted the general public would not have an interest in the
professional meetings attended by teachers. As a result, the court held Baar’s email did not
constitute First Amendment protected speech.335 Baar appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit.
Applying Garcetti, quoting City of San Diego v. Roe,336 the appellate panel considered
whether Baar’s email to the teacher about the LACA meeting was protected free speech. The
panel noted Baar’s email was not “’a subject of general interest of value and concern to the
public…’” 337 Based upon this conclusion, the panel affirmed the district court’s ruling that
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Baar’s email was not entitled to First Amendment protection.338 Baar did not appeal the
decision.
Veggian v. Camden Board of Education (2009)
In Veggian v. Camden Board of Education339 the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey considered whether a public school teacher’s complaints to her supervisor
about grading practices should be accorded free speech protection. Paula Veggian was a veteran
teacher in the Camden School District. In addition to her teaching duties, Veggian’s
employment responsibilities included scheduling student courses for another district high
school.340 One of these duties required Veggian to print student report cards. While printing a
set of student report cards, Veggian noticed discrepancies between the final grades listed on
several student report cards and the corresponding final grades listed on the students’
transcripts.341 In most cases, the final transcript grade for the students was higher than the
students’ corresponding report card grade. Veggian reported these discrepancies to the vice
principal but no further action was taken.342
Two months later a new principal was assigned to the high school. The new principal
requested that Veggian prepare a student class rank report.343 After completing the report,
Veggian discovered two sophomore students and one junior student had insufficient credits to be
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promoted to the next grade level.344 Additionally, the report revealed four seniors had graduated
from the high school with insufficient credits.345 Veggian told the principal about the
discrepancies and was subsequently was transferred and demoted.346 Veggian filed a lawsuit in
the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey alleging her transfer and demotion were the
result of her exercising her First Amendment free speech rights.
Veggian argued her comments to the principal and vice principal regarding the grading
discrepancies—which resulted in her transfer and demotion—were a matter of public concern
and, therefore, should be entitled to First Amendment protection. Applying Garcetti, and
referencing Hill v. Borough of Kutztown,347 the district court considered whether Veggian’s
comments to the principal and vice principal regarding the grading discrepancies were made
pursuant to her official duties. The district court pointed out Veggian’s employment duties as a
scheduler included complying with requests from her supervisors and communicating the results
to her supervisors.348 Therefore, the court reasoned Veggian had been acting pursuant to her
official duties when she notified the principal and vice principal about the grading
discrepancies.349 As a result, the court concluded Veggian’s comments were not entitled to First
Amendment protection.350 Veggian did not appeal the decision.

344

Id.
Veggian v. Camden Bd. of Educ., 600 F. Supp.2d 615, 621 (D. N.J. 2009).
346
Id. at 618 (2009). The court opinion did not specify what position Veggian was demoted to.
347
Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 242 (3rd Cir. 2006).
348
Veggian v. Camden Bd. of Educ., 600 F. Supp.2d 615, 620 (D. N.J. 2009).
349
Id.
350
Id. at 622.
345

64

Dorcely v. Wyandanch Union Free School District (2009)
The same year, in another east coast district court decision, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York considered, in Dorcely v. Wyandanch Union Free
School District,351 whether a school psychologist’s complaints to his supervisor should be
considered protected free speech. Jacques Dorcely was a male probationary teacher at Milton L.
Olive Middle School. While working with a small group of students in a sixth grade classroom,
one of the students, who was not in Dorcely’s group, had an “emotional outburst.”352 Dorcely
did not react to the student’s outburst but instead continued to work with his small group of
students. The classroom teacher complained to the principal that Dorcely had not intervened
with the student; however, no subsequent action was taken by the principal. The next day, the
principal requested that Dorcely test a student with special needs. Dorcely felt the test was
unnecessary and requested a follow-up meeting with the principal to discuss the request. During
the meeting, the principal told Dorcely that both his lack of response to the student’s outburst the
previous day and ignoring his request to test a student immediately were unprofessional. 353 The
principal told Dorcely he “did not fit into the culture of the school, that she did not want to see
his face in the building, and that he was being insubordinate.”354
Thereafter, the principal called the interim superintendent and reported both the
classroom incident and Dorcely’s refusal to test a student. During the phone call, the principal
recommended to the interim superintendent that Dorcely be fired.355 The next day, Dorcely
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received a letter from the interim superintendent placing him on administrative leave and
prohibiting him from entering school buildings or contacting any school district employees. 356
Subsequently, the interim superintendent wrote a letter to the school board recommending that
Dorcely be terminated. In support of his recommendation, the interim superintendent cited
Dorcely’s “failure to involve himself professionally in a classroom incident… [and] failure to
maintain effective, professional communication with the building principal.”357 Dorcely
requested a hearing with the Board of Education. After the hearing, the Board of Education
voted against the interim superintendent’s termination recommendation. The interim
superintendent notified Dorcely he was not being terminated but instead was being reassigned to
another elementary school within the school district.358
After arriving at the new elementary school, Dorcely requested testing materials and
teaching supplies from his new principal. When the materials were not received, Dorcely asked
other employees for assistance. Thereafter, the principal requested Dorcely cover a classroom
for an absent teacher. Dorcely took 30 minutes to report to the classroom. The principal issued
Dorcely a written reprimand for failing to respond in a timely manner.359 Subsequently, Dorcely
failed to evacuate the building during a building evacuation drill. The principal issued Dorcely
another written reprimand for failing to follow evacuation procedures.360
Thereafter, Dorcely voiced concerns to the principal about a lack of student resources.361
The principal responded by issuing Dorcely a letter of reprimand indicating his remarks had
356
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constituted “blatant insubordination.”362 Subsequently, the principal contacted the interim
superintendent and recommended that Dorcely be terminated. Dorcely responded by submitting
his own letter to the interim superintendent alleging he was being punished for his complaints
and voicing his concerns regarding the lack of student resources.363 The termination
recommendation was not acted upon and no further action was taken by either party.
At the end of the school year, Dorcely received a performance evaluation from the
principal. Dorcely received the lowest possible evaluation rating in the area of
professionalism.364 Shortly after the evaluation, the interim superintendent notified Dorcely he
would be terminated.365 Dorcely requested reasons for the termination and a hearing before the
Board of Education. The interim superintendent responded to Dorcely, explaining his
termination recommendation was based upon:
[Dorcely’s] failure to follow up appropriate direction from the building
principal…failure to maintain appropriate discipline in a professional manner in a
classroom incident…inappropriate and unprofessional conduct toward school
personnel and the building principal…[and] failure to maintain appropriate,
effective and professional communications with the building principal.366
The Board of Education held a hearing on the termination recommendation and approved
Dorcely’s firing. In response, Dorcely filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York alleging his termination was a consequence of exercising his First
Amendment free speech rights.
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Applying Johnson v. Ganim367 quoting Connick, and referencing Garcetti, the district
court examined whether Dorcely’s letter to the interim superintendent and complaints to his
principals qualified for free speech protection. The court first considered whether Dorcely’s
letter to the interim superintendent was written as a private citizen or pursuant to his official
duties.368 The court pointed out Dorcely’s letter challenging the interim superintendent’s
termination recommendation was a personal matter concerning his own employment and not a
matter of public concern.369 As a result, the court concluded Dorcely’s letter to the interim
superintendent did not qualify for First Amendment protection.
Next, the court considered whether Dorcely’s complaints to his principals regarding the
school’s lack of resources should be accorded free speech protection. Applying its own recent
decision in Weintraub v. Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New
York,370 referencing Garcetti, the district court pointed out Dorcely’s duties as a school
psychologist and educator included advocating for student resources.371 Because Dorcely’s
comments were directly related to his job duties, the court concluded Dorcely’s claim did not
qualify for First Amendment protection. Thus, the court found Dorcely’s letter to the interim
superintendent and his complaints to his principals were not protected speech.372 Dorcely did not
appeal the decision.
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2010
Kramer v. New York City Board of Education (2010)
One year later, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York also
decided Kramer v. New York City Board of Education.373 Here, the district court considered
whether a public school teacher’s incorporation of sexually explicit words during a health lesson
should be considered protected free speech. Prior to teaching an HIV/AIDS lesson, eighth grade
health teacher Faith Kramer sent a letter home notifying parents about the upcoming class topic.
Kramer told parents she would be using the Board of Education’s adopted curriculum and the
content would be appropriate for eighth graders. During the lesson, Kramer instructed her
students to identify familiar words describing “sexual acts, body parts or bodily fluids.”374 Each
word was written on the chalk board along with the more “socially acceptable equivalent.”375
The next day, the assistant principal told Kramer parents had telephoned to complain
about her lesson and the principal met with Kramer. During the meeting the principal pointed out
Kramer’s lesson had violated the Board of Education’s policy on verbal abuse.376 As a result, the
principal told Kramer he would be initiating an investigation with the “Board’s Office of Special
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Investigations [OSI].”377 Thereafter, the school district’s human resources department notified
Kramer she was being reassigned to non-classroom duties for the remainder of the school
year.378 Kramer was also told she would be ineligible to be employed for any extra-curricular
assignments.379 Kramer filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York alleging her removal from the classroom, assignment to non-classroom duties, and
ineligibility to receive additional extracurricular assignments were the result of exercising her
First Amendment free speech rights.
Applying several earlier court decisions, the court examined whether Kramer’s
instructional speech was entitled to First Amendment protection.380 Referencing Garcetti and
the Connick/Pickering test, the court pointed out when a public employee is speaking pursuant to
their official duties, the speech does not qualify for First Amendment protection.381 The court
further pointed out the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuit Courts had determined “teacher
instructional speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection because teachers do not speak
on matters of public concern when they follow a school mandated curriculum.”382 As a result the
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court concluded Kramer’s instructional speech was not entitled to First Amendment
protection.383 Kramer did not appeal the decision.
Weintraub v. Board of Education of the City School District
of the City of New York (2010)
In Weintraub v. Board of Education of the City School District of the City of New York,384
the Second Circuit considered whether a public school teacher’s complaint to a supervisor and
colleagues about student discipline and the teacher’s filing of a related grievance should be
considered protected free speech. David Weintraub was a fifth-grade public school teacher in
Brooklyn, New York. One of Weintraub’s students, who had a history of violent behavior, threw
a book at Weintraub in the classroom. Weintraub sent the student to the assistant principal. Later
that day, the student was returned to Weintraub’s classroom without any communication or
explanation from the administrator. The next day, the same student threw two books at
Weintraub.385 Weintraub once again sent the student to the assistant principal. Like before, the
student was returned to Weintraub’s classroom without any explanation or follow-up
communication from the assistant principal. Frustrated, Weintraub told the assistant principal
that if the student was not disciplined, he would file a grievance with the teachers’ union.386 The
student was not disciplined, and Weintraub filed a grievance. Weintraub also complained to his
colleagues about the incidents and the assistant principal’s lack of response.387 Subsequently,
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Weintraub alleged he suffered retaliation from school officials.388 Weintraub filed a lawsuit in
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York alleging his complaints to the
assistant principal, colleagues and the grievance had triggered a series of events targeting him for
discipline. Weintraub claimed both his complaints and grievance addressed matters of public
concern and were constitutionally protected free speech.
Applying Connick, the district court considered whether Weintraub’s complaints and
grievance should be accorded free speech protection. The court pointed out that any First
Amendment protection of public employee speech was determined by examining the content,
form and context of the speech.389 The court considered whether the content, form, and context
of Weintraub’s complaints and grievance addressed matters of public concern. The court first
examined the content of Weintraub’s complaints to the assistant principal and colleagues. The
court reasoned this speech addressed a matter of public concern because classroom discipline is
the subject of “extensive public comment, policy debate, and persistent coverage in the
media.”390 Based upon this conclusion, the court did not consider the form or context of
Weintraub’s complaints.
Next, the court examined whether Weintraub’s grievance was entitled to First
Amendment protection. Because the court concluded the content of Weintraub’s grievance
addressed a matter of public concern, Weintraub’s grievance met the content test for First
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Amendment protection. As a result, the district court concluded Weintraub’s complaints and
grievance, pursuant to Connick, qualified for First Amendment protection.391 However, shortly
after the district court’s ruling, the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Garcetti. As a
result, the Board of Education filed a motion for reconsideration.392
Applying Garcetti, the district court re-examined whether Weintraub’s complaints to the
assistant principal, colleagues and the grievance were made pursuant to his official duties as a
public school employee.393 The court pointed out First Amendment protection per Garcetti
could apply to Weintraub’s complaints to colleagues because this speech had not been made
pursuant to his official teaching duties.394 However, First Amendment protection per Garcetti
would not apply to either Weintraub’s complaints to the assistant principal or to the grievance
because Weintraub was “proceeding through official channels to complain...”395 Guided by
Garcetti, the district court concluded:
[A] substantial ground for difference of opinion may exist on the precise issue of
whether a public employee acts as an employee, and not as a citizen when he
notifies his supervisors, either formally or informally, of an issue regarding the
safety of his workplace that touches upon a matter of public concern, as well as on
the employee’s own private interests.396
Based upon this conclusion, the district court reasoned Weintraub’s complaints to his
colleagues were not made pursuant to Weintraub’s official teaching duties.397 However, the
court further reasoned when Weintraub complained to the assistant principal and filed the

391

Id. at 53, referencing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 410, 147-148 (1983).
Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 593 F.3d 196, 199 (2d Cir. 2010).
393
Id. at 200.
394
Id.
395
Id.
396
Id.
397
Id.
392

73

grievance, Weintraub was speaking as a public school employee.398 As a result, the district
court held Weintraub’s complaints to the assistant principal and grievance were not entitled to
First Amendment protection.399 Weintraub appealed the decision to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals.
On appeal, Weintraub argued the grievance was not filed pursuant to his official teaching
duties. Applying Garcetti, referencing Givhan, the appellate panel found that a public school
teacher’s duties include maintaining classroom discipline.400 The panel noted Weintraub’s
grievance addressed concerns about the administration’s disregard for classroom discipline,
which was part of Weintraub’s duties as a classroom teacher.401 The panel further observed that
Weintraub filed the grievance utilizing district procedures and therefore was not engaging in
speech as a private citizen.402 As a result, the panel concluded Weintraub’s grievance was filed
within his role as a public school teacher and was not entitled to First Amendment protection,
and affirmed the district court’s decision in favor of the school district.403 Weintraub petitioned
the Supreme Court where his petition for certiorari was denied.404
Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Public Schools Board of Education (2010)
The same year in another circuit court decision, the Tenth Circuit in Reinhardt v.
Albuquerque Public Schools Board of Education,405 examined whether a speech-language
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pathologist’s complaints to her supervisors about special education services for students
qualified for First Amendment protection. Janet Reinhardt was employed as a speech-language
pathologist at Rio Grande High School in the Albuquerque Public Schools. Reinhardt
complained to building administrators that teachers were not providing accurate caseload lists for
students who required speech and language services.406 Reinhardt alleged these inaccurate lists
could result in qualified students not receiving appropriate services. Reinhardt also complained
the inaccurate lists could affect speech-language pathologists’ extended time contracts.407
Building administrators did not respond to Reinhardt’s complaints. As a result, Reinhardt
consulted a private attorney and filed an Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
complaint with the New Mexico Public Education Department (NMPED).408 The NMPED
conducted an investigation, and school officials were directed to provide accurate and timely
special education caseload lists to all special education personnel.409
The following school year, the assistant principal reassigned several of Reinhardt’s
students to other building speech and language pathologists. This student load decrease resulted
in Reinhardt’s extended contract being reduced to a standard contract.410 Several months later,
Reinhardt’s caseload numbers increased, and she requested that her extended contract be
reinstated. The building administrators denied Reinhardt’s request.411 Reinhardt filed a lawsuit
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in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico alleging her contract reduction
was a consequence of her complaints to building administrators and to the NMPED. Reinhardt
argued her complaints addressed a matter of public concern and were protected free speech.
Applying Garcetti, the district court examined whether Reinhardt’s complaints to
building administrators and the NMPED were made pursuant to her official duties and, therefore,
qualified for First Amendment protection. The court held Reinhardt’s complaints and report to
the NMPED regarding special education concerns were related to her employment
responsibilities.412 The court reasoned Reinhardt’s duties as a special education teacher included
advocating for special education students.413 Based upon this conclusion, the court held
Reinhardt’s complaints to building administrators and report to the NMPED were not entitled to
free speech protection.414 As a result, the district court upheld the school officials’ actions.
Reinhardt appealed the lower court decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Applying the Connick/Pickering analysis outlined in Garcetti, the appellate panel
considered whether Reinhardt’s complaints to building administrators and report to the NMPED
were made in her role as a private citizen or pursuant to her job responsibilities.415 The panel
considered two factors when determining whether Reinhardt was speaking as a private citizen or
pursuant to her job responsibilities.416 The first factor was whether Reinhardt’s duties related to
advocating for her special education students.417 The second factor was whether Reinhardt went
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outside the chain of command when advocating for her special education students.418 The panel
pointed out Reinhardt was hired to provide students at Rio Grande High School with speech and
language services. The court reasoned when Reinhardt advocated to building administrators for
services for special education students she was acting pursuant to her official duties.419
However, the panel opined Reinhardt had gone outside the chain of command by consulting a
private attorney and filing the NMPED complaint. As a result, the panel concluded Reinhardt’s
actions in contacting an attorney and filing a report with the NMPED were outside of her official
employment duties.420 The panel argued Reinhardt was not hired to “ensure IDEA
compliance.”421 Thus, the panel concluded Reinhardt was speaking as a private citizen when she
consulted a private attorney and filed the NMPED complaint. Based upon these conclusions, the
panel ruled Reinhardt’s report to her attorney and the NMPED was protected speech.422 The
school district did not appeal the decision.
Adams v. New York State Education Department (2010)
In Adams v. New York State Education Department,423 the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York considered whether a teacher’s complaints to school
administrators about the falsification of student records should be considered protected free
speech. Upon reviewing her students’ academic records, middle school teacher Julianne Polito
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discovered her principal had changed the attendance records and final grades on her students’
report cards. The altered report cards showed fewer absences and higher grades than some of her
students had earned.424 Due to a history of conflicts between Polito and her principal, she did not
discuss her findings with the principal.425 Polito instead filed a complainant with the Department
of Education’s Office of Special Investigations (OSI).426 The OSI investigated Polito’s complaint
but did not take any action. Subsequently, Polito’s principal accused her of misconduct
including the corporal punishment of a student.427 Based upon the corporal punishment
allegation, the principal requested a formal investigation by the Department of Education (DOE).
During the investigation, Polito was suspended from her teaching duties and reassigned to a
Temporary Reassignment Center (TRC).428 The TRC was a room located within a district
facility where teachers who were under investigation were directed to report each day.
While these events were occurring, Thomasina Robertson was teaching high school
physical education classes at another building within the same school district. Her principal
approached Robertson and directed her to change the grades for any failing students.429
Robertson discussed her concerns about the directive with the principal, but no resolution was
reached. Fearing retaliation from her principal, Robertson complied with the principal’s request.
Subsequently, Robertson contacted the local teacher’s union chairperson alleging the principal’s
request violated the school district’s grading policy.430 Thereafter, the principal met with
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Robertson and told her that her students had claimed she was mistreating them by pulling their
hair and uttering racial slurs.431 The principal requested a formal investigation by the DOE,432
and during the investigation Robertson, like Polito, was also reassigned to the TRC.433 Polito
and Robertson filed a joint lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York alleging their assignments to the TRC were the consequence of their exercise of
protected First Amendment speech.
Applying Garcetti, and referencing Weintraub, the district court considered whether
Polito and Robertson’s complaints to their principals, teachers’ union and the OSI were entitled
to First Amendment protection.434 The court pointed out a public employee’s speech could be
interpreted as being pursuant to an employee’s official job duties even if the content of the
speech was not included in the employee’s job description.435 The court noted Polito’s
complaints to the OSI about the principal altering student attendance records and Robertson’s
complaints to her principal and the teacher’s union about changing student grades both fell
within the responsibilities of a public school teacher.436 The court noted Garcetti had defined
public employee speech to be outside the First Amendment’s protection when the speech was the
result of a public employee’s job responsibilities.437 As a result, applying Garcetti, the court
concluded both Polito and Robertson’s complaints were made within the scope of their
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responsibilities as public school teachers.438 Based upon this conclusion, the court held Polito’s
complaints to the OSI and Robertson’s complaints to the principal and teachers’ union were not
entitled to First Amendment protection.439 Polito and Robertson did not appeal the decision.
Fox v. Traverse City Area Public Schools Board of Education (2010)
The same year, in Fox v. Traverse City Area Public Schools Board of Education,440 the
Sixth Circuit considered whether a special education teacher’s complaint about her caseload to
her principal and director of special education should be considered protected free speech. Susan
Fox was a non-tenured special education teacher at Blair Elementary School. Prior to the 200607 school year, Fox maintained the legal limit caseload of twenty-one special education
students.441 During the 2006-07 school year, the school district implemented a new reading
intervention program. Fox volunteered to work with students who qualified for the program.
After Fox began working in the program, she complained to the principal and the special
education director that the reading intervention program had resulted in her student caseload
increasing to thirty-four students, in excess of special education contractual limits.442
Subsequently, the principal removed Fox from the intervention program.
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Thereafter, Fox received negative performance evaluations from the principal stating Fox
was unable to fulfill her job responsibilities. These evaluations mentioned Fox’s failure to
complete required special education reports for Individual Education Plan (IEP) meetings, failure
to provide required instruction time to students and unauthorized delegation of responsibilities to
teaching assistants.443 Additionally, the principal’s evaluation noted parents had complained that
Fox had made inappropriate recommendations regarding student medications during IEP
meetings.444 At the end of the school year, the principal informed Fox her teaching contract
would not be renewed. Fox filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of
Michigan alleging her non-renewal was a consequence of exercising her First Amendment
speech rights.
Applying Garcetti, the district court evaluated whether Fox’s contract non-renewal was a
result of Fox exercising her First Amendment speech rights. The court considered whether Fox’s
complaints qualified for free speech protections and whether the complaints had resulted in Fox
suffering adverse consequences as a result of her protected speech.445 The court pointed out
Fox’s complaints about her special education caseloads were within her duties as a special
education teacher.446 As a result, the court did not examine whether Fox had suffered adverse
actions as a result of her complaints and ruled Fox’s complaints were not protected speech.447
Fox appealed the decision to the Sixth Circuit.
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Before the Sixth Circuit, Fox alleged her complaints about special education caseload
numbers were a matter of public concern and should be entitled to First Amendment protection.
Applying Garcetti, and quoting Weisbarth v. Geauga Park District,448 the appellate panel
considered whether Fox’s complaints to the principal and special education director were entitled
to First Amendment protection.449 The panel considered both the content and context of Fox’s
complaints, noting that public employee speech is not protected if it “owes its existence to [the
speaker’s] professional responsibilities.”450 The panel highlighted that Fox’s special education
caseload was part of her responsibilities as a special education teacher.451 As a result, the panel
concluded Fox’s complaints about the number of students on her caseload did not qualify for
First Amendment protection. Additionally, the panel determined Fox’s complaints were not
made in her role as a private citizen addressing matters of public concern, but rather were made
pursuant to her official duties as a public school employee.452 As a result, the Sixth Circuit ruled
Fox’s complaints did not qualify for First Amendment protection. Fox appealed the Sixth
Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court, but her certiorari petition was denied.453
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Evans-Marshall v. Board of Education of the Tipp City
Exempted Village School District (2010)
In Evans-Marshall v. Board of Education of the Tipp City Exempted Village School
District,454 the Sixth Circuit considered whether a public school teacher assigning books from the
American Library Association’s (ALA) banned book list should be accorded First Amendment
speech protection. Shelly Evans-Marshall, a non-tenured English high school teacher, assigned
her freshman students to select a book from the “100 Most Frequently Challenged Books,”455
and investigate why the book they selected had been banned. Students were also told to prepare
and lead a debate about their selected book’s controversial content. The school principal
received a complaint from a parent about the book her child had selected. The title of the
selected book was Heather Has Two Mommies. The parent was concerned about the book’s
homosexual themes.456 The principal asked Evans-Marshall to have this student choose an
alternative title, and Evans-Marshall complied.
Later in the term, Evans-Marshall selected the book Siddhartha for another class
assignment. Evans-Marshall indicated she selected the book to explore themes of “spirituality,
Buddhism, romantic relationships, personal growth, [and] familial relationships.”457 A second
parent complained to Evans-Marshall about the reading selection, believing Siddhartha was
inappropriate because of its “explicit language and sexual themes…”458 and requested EvansMarshall assign an alternative book. Evans-Marshall provided the student three alternate reading
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choices. After receiving the three alternate reading choices, the parent complained again, stating
two of the three book options were at the level of a “four-to eight-year-old.”459
At the next Board of Education meeting, a group of twenty-five parents complained about
the content of the Siddhartha book. During the meeting, the superintendent explained EvansMarshall’s curricular choices were selected from Board of Education approved materials.460
Evans-Marshall continued to teach the course utilizing Siddhartha. During the following
month’s Board of Education meeting, approximately one hundred parents attended, and many
addressed the board, citing concerns about several books utilized in several of the high school’s
English classrooms and in the school’s library.461 A petition containing 500 signatures was
presented to the school board calling for “decency and excellence…”462 in the classroom.
Later in the semester, the principal reviewed samples of student writing from EvansMarshall’s creative writing class.463 After his review, the principal requested a meeting with
Evans-Marshall. During the meeting, the principal told Evans-Marshall the student creative
writing samples he had reviewed were too graphic and directed Evans-Marshall to discontinue
using them for in-class discussions. The principal specifically noted concerns over the themes of
rape, murder and religious persecution addressed in some of the essays.464 Evans-Marshall
agreed to discontinue discussing controversial themes in her classes. However, Evans-Marshall
and the principal continued to have disagreements about controversial themes she continued to
explore during her class discussions.
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At the end of the school year, Evans-Marshall received a negative performance
evaluation from the principal. The evaluation criticized Evans-Marshall’s continued exploration
of controversial themes.465 The principal recommended to the Board of Education that EvansMarshall’s teaching contract not be renewed and the Board of Education agreed.466 EvansMarshall requested reasons for the non-renewal and received a letter from the Board of
Education stating her non-renewal was due to communication issues.467 Evans-Marshall
requested a hearing before the Board of Education. The Board of Education held the requested
hearing but voted unanimously to uphold the non-renewal of Evans-Marshall’s contract. EvansMarshall filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio alleging her
contract non-renewal was in retaliation for her curricular choices and in-class discussion themes,
all of which should be considered protected free speech.468
Applying Garcetti, the district court pointed out the Supreme Court had not specifically
addressed whether Garcetti applied to public school classroom teaching.469 The district court
noted in Lee v. York County School District,470 a case involving public school classroom speech,
that the appellate panel had applied the Connick/Pickering analysis.471 Based on this
observation, the district court applied the Connick/Pickering analysis to determine whether
Evans-Marshall’s curricular choices and controversial in-class discussion themes qualified for
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free speech protection. Applying the first part of the Connick/Pickering analysis, the district
court considered whether Evans-Marshall’s curricular choices addressed a matter of public
concern.472 As part of their decision, the court pointed out that the controversial themes EvansMarshall used and discussed in her classroom had received national media exposure.473 Thus,
the court concluded the content of Evans-Marshall’s teaching materials touched on matters of
public concern.474
Applying the second prong of the Connick/Pickering analysis, the district court
considered whether Evans-Marshall’s curricular choices and the thematic topics addressed
during in-class discussions outweighed the Board of Education’s interest in promoting students’
exposure to age-appropriate material.475 The court reasoned the Board of Education had not
given prior permission for Evans-Marshall to use either the selected stories or the studentauthored pieces. The court noted the Board of Education was responsible for determining
whether curriculum materials were age-appropriate.476 As a result, the court concluded under a
Connick/Pickering analysis that Evans-Marshall’s curricular choices and in-class discussion
themes were not aligned to the Board of Education’s interests. The court also highlighted the
fact that Evans-Marshall had been warned by her principal to stop discussing controversial
themes in her classroom but failed to do so. As a result, the panel concluded Evans-Marshall’s
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curricular choices and controversial thematic discussions did not qualify for First Amendment
protection.477 Evans-Marshall appealed the lower court decision to the Sixth Circuit.
Applying Garcetti, and referencing the Connick/Pickering analysis, the appellate panel
considered whether Evans-Marshall’s curricular choices and controversial thematic discussions
were made pursuant to her official teaching duties.478 The panel pointed out as a public
employee, in selecting books for classroom use and discussing controversial themes, EvansMarshall was not speaking as a private citizen.479 As a result, the panel concluded EvansMarshall’s curricular choices and controversial in-class discussions were made in her capacity as
a public school teacher and were not entitled to First Amendment protection.480 Subsequently,
Evans-Marshall appealed to the Supreme Court; however, her certiorari petition was denied.481
2011
Johnson v. Poway (2011)
The following year, in Johnson v. Poway,482 a Ninth Circuit panel considered whether
banners in a public school teacher’s classroom should be considered protected free speech.
Bradley Johnson, a high school calculus teacher, displayed two large banners in his classroom.
One banner contained the phrases “IN GOD WE TRUST”; “ONE NATION UNDER GOD”;
“GOD BLESS AMERICA”; and “GOD SHED HIS GRACE ON THEE’” [sic].483 The second
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banner stated, “All men are created equal, they are endowed by their CREATOR”[sic].484 A
colleague of Johnson’s was concerned that the banners over-emphasized the religious words in
each phrase and reported his concerns about the banners to the principal. After viewing the
banners, the principal contacted the assistant superintendent. The principal described the first
banner’s emphasis on the words God and creator and the second banner’s partial quotes from the
Declaration of Independence emphasizing God.485 The assistant superintendent told the principal
to meet with Johnson. During the meeting, the principal told Johnson to remove the banners.
Johnson refused, arguing the banners were patriotic, noting that he considered it his right to
display them.486 No resolution was reached at this meeting, so the principal again contacted the
assistant superintendent. As a result of this contact, the assistant superintendent issued Johnson a
letter directing him to remove the banners. Johnson refused, and the assistant superintendent
notified the Board of Education. During the next Board of Education meeting, the board
discussed the issue and voted to support the administrative decision to require Johnson to remove
the banners.487 Johnson complied but thereafter filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of California arguing his banners were First Amendment protected free
speech.488
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Citing Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,489 the court
acknowledged “[n]either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”490 The court pointed out the “government’s
power is at its least when speech takes place in a public forum, [but] is greater when it is
regulating speech in a limited public forum, and is at its greatest when regulating speech in a
non-public forum.”491 The court noted the Board of Education had created a limited public
forum for speech in its classrooms. Directing Johnson to remove the banners, the court reasoned,
had limited Johnson’s speech.492 Because Johnson’s banners were displayed in what the court
considered to be a limited public forum, the court concluded Johnson’s First Amendment rights
had been violated.493 As a result, the court found Johnson’s banners were protected free
speech.494 The Board of Education appealed the lower court decision to the Ninth Circuit.
The appellate panel disagreed with the district court. The Ninth Circuit panel pointed out
the district court “erred in applying a pure forum-based analysis rather than the Pickering-based
inquiry crafted by the Supreme Court to measure the constitutionality of the government’s
curtailment of government-employee speech.”495 Referencing Eng v. Cooley,496 the panel cited
the following “sequential five-step Pickering-based test…:”497
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(1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern;
(2) whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee;
(3) whether the plaintiff’s protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor
in the adverse employment action;
(4) whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee
differently from other members of the general public; and
(5) whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action even
absent the protected speech.498
Applying the first prong, the panel found Johnson’s posters addressed a matter of public
concern because religion was inherently a matter of public concern.499 Next, the panel examined
prong two of the inquiry and considered whether Johnson was speaking as a private citizen or
pursuant to his official duties. Applying Garcetti, referencing Downs v. Los Angeles Unified
School District,500 the panel pointed out the posters were displayed in a school setting and
therefore did not constitute speech as a private citizen but instead as a public employee.501 The
panel noted the common tradition of teachers decorating their classrooms. However, referencing
Mayer, the court reiterated that limitations exist.502 The panel also noted a teacher’s expression
is their “stock in trade, the commodity he sells to [his] employer in exchange for a salary.”503
Johnson owed the existence of the posters to his teaching position and therefore, the district was
within their rights to limit that speech.504 Based upon these conclusions, the panel did not
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proceed with any further analysis. The panel reversed the district court decision and ruled
Johnson’s banners were not protected free speech. As a result, the removal of Johnson’s banners
did not violate his free speech rights.505 Johnson appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, but
his certiorari petition was denied.506
Condiff v. Hart County School District (2011)
In Condiff v. Hart County School District,507 the United States District Court for the
Western District of Kentucky considered whether a middle school teacher’s involvement in her
family’s sexual harassment allegations should be accorded First Amendment speech protection.
Mrs. Condiff was a non-tenured middle school language arts teacher in Hart County School
District, Kentucky. Mrs. Condiff’s step-daughter attended Hart High School in the same school
district where Mrs. Condiff was employed. Mrs. Condiff’s step-daughter told her a Hart High
School teacher had made sexual comments to her in the hallway.508 Mrs. Condiff directed her
step-daughter to document the incident in an email to her and forwarded the email to her
husband, the child’s father. After receiving the email, Mr. Condiff telephoned the high school
principal to file a sexual harassment complaint and forwarded his daughter’s email to the
administrator.509 Additionally, Mr. Condiff informed the principal that his wife, Mrs. Condiff,
was a teacher in the school district. The principal met with Mr. Condiff, the accused teacher, and
the school guidance counselor. During the meeting, the accused teacher admitted to having had
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an inappropriate conversation with Mr. Condiff’s daughter.510 The principal removed Mr.
Condiff’s daughter from the accused teacher’s classroom. Thereafter, Mr. Condiff learned from
his daughter the accused teacher had allegedly made sexually inappropriate comments to another
student. Mr. Condiff contacted the superintendent and the superintendent held a meeting with
Mr. Condiff.511 During the meeting, Mr. Condiff told the superintendent his wife, Mrs. Condiff
was a teacher in the school district, and stated he did not want his wife to experience retaliation
for the allegations of sexual harassment.512 The superintendent told Mr. Condiff if he wanted to
file a formal complaint against the accused teacher, he would need to utilize the school district’s
complaint forms. Mr. and Mrs. Condiff declined to file a formal complaint against the accused
teacher and no further action was taken by either party.
In the spring, Mrs. Condiff received notice from the principal informing her that her
employment contract would not be renewed. When Mrs. Condiff requested reasons for the
contract non-renewal, the principal told her the non-renewal was due to a reduction in force.513
Subsequently, two language arts teaching vacancies were posted in the school district.514 Mrs.
Condiff applied but was not placed on the superintendent’s qualified candidate list.515 Believing
her contract non-renewal and failure to be rehired was in retaliation for her involvement with the
sexual harassment allegations, Mrs. Condiff filed a lawsuit with the United States District Court
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for the Western District of Kentucky. Mrs. Condiff argued the sexual harassment allegations she
made should be protected under the First Amendment.
Applying Garcetti, the district court considered whether Mrs. Condiff’s sexual
harassment allegations were entitled to First Amendment protection. The court analyzed
whether Mrs. Condiff was speaking as a citizen or as a public school employee when she raised
concerns about the sexual harassment of her step-daughter.516 The court pointed out that Mrs.
Condiff directed her stepdaughter to document the sexual harassment and send the allegations to
Mr. Condiff for the purposes of reporting to the principal. The court noted if Mrs. Condiff’s
sexual harassment allegations were made pursuant to her official duties as a teacher in the
district, her allegations would not be protected by the First Amendment.517 The court also noted
that Garcetti had not formally outlined how to determine the scope of an employee’s duties.
However, Garcetti had explained that a public employee’s duties included the duties the
employee actually was expected to perform.518 The court reasoned Mrs. Condiff, as an employee
of the school district, was obligated to report sexual harassment allegations to school officials.519
Therefore, the court concluded Mrs. Condiff, in filing the complaint, was speaking pursuant to
her official duties as a teacher and not as a private citizen.520 Based upon these findings, the
court ruled Mrs. Condiff’s sexual harassment allegations were not entitled to First Amendment
protection.521 Mrs. Condiff did not appeal the decision.
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Nagle v. Marron (2011)
The same year, in Nagle v. Marron,522 the Second Circuit considered whether a specialeducation teacher’s complaints to her supervisors about a colleague’s mistreatment of students
and a forgery allegation against her evaluator should be considered protected free speech. Nancy
Nagle was a special-education public school teacher in Henrico County, Virginia. During the
2002-03 school year, Nagle overheard a teacher in the adjoining classroom verbally
reprimanding students in what she considered to be an abusive manner.523 Nagle reported the
incident to the principal. Subsequently, other adults in the building told Nagle that the same
teacher was physically and verbally abusing her students.524 Nagle reported this to the Henrico
County Early Childhood Special Education Program Department. Later, a private nurse working
at the school witnessed similar behavior from the same teacher Nagle had complained about
striking a child. After learning about the nurse’s observation, Nagle contacted Virginia’s
Department of Child Protective Services (DCPS),525 which contacted the local police. Following
an investigation, the teacher was charged with felony child abuse and resigned.526
Several years later, Nagle transferred to a different teaching position in another school
district. In December 2006, the principal and assistant superintendent met with Nagle. During
the meeting, Nagle was verbally reprimanded for failing to follow school protocols when she
read a book on autism to her students without first obtaining permission from the school
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psychologist.527 Additionally, Nagle was reprimanded for sending one of her students’ home
from school early without obtaining permission from school officials.528 Nagle subsequently
received a classroom observation feedback report from the assistant principal. Nagle disagreed
with the report’s negative feedback and refused to sign it. Later, Nagle received a copy of the
original report containing both her forged signature and the assistant principal’s signature. Nagle
complained to the principal and the union president about the forged signature.529 The principal
informed the superintendent, who called the police to investigate the forgery. The investigation
concluded the assistant principal had forged Nagle’s signature and, as a result, the assistant
principal resigned.
At the conclusion of the school year, the principal and assistant superintendent for human
resources met with Nagle. During the meeting Nagle was informed her contract would not be
renewed.530 When Nagle requested reasons for the contract non-renewal, the assistant
superintendent documented in a letter that Nagle had failed to demonstrate collaboration,
professional judgment, and had failed to meet teaching expectations.531 Nagle learned her
current supervisors had become aware of her prior child abuse report from her former school
district. Believing her non-renewal was a consequence of both the former child abuse report and
the forgery complaint, Nagle filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York alleging her contract non-renewal was a consequence of exercising her
First Amendment speech rights.
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The district court first considered whether Nagle’s child abuse report to the DCPS was
entitled to First Amendment protection. The court pointed out Nagle’s child abuse report was
not considered protected free speech because it was old information. “The court therefore
HOLDS that, due to temporal and geographic remoteness, plaintiff’s expressive conduct in
Henrico, to the extent it was protected speech when uttered, was no longer protected speech
when defendants learned of plaintiff’s reports and/or denied her tenure.”532 Next, the court
evaluated whether Nagle’s complaints to her principal about the observation form’s forgery were
entitled to First Amendment protection. Applying Ezekwo v. New York City Health and
Hosptials Corporation,533 referencing Connick, the court pointed out the forgery was not the type
of information that would concern the general public and did not involve a crime.534 Instead, the
court concluded the forgery was an internal personnel matter.535 Thus, the court held Nagle’s
complaints about the forgery were not entitled to First Amendment protection.536 Based upon
these conclusions, the court ruled that neither Nagle’s report to the DCPS nor her complaints
about her supervisor’s forgery were entitled to First Amendment protection.537 Nagle appealed
the decision to the Second Circuit.
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Applying Weintraub, quoting Williams v. Dallas Independent School District,538 the
appellate panel first considered whether Nagle’s forgery complaint qualified for First
Amendment protection.539 The panel pointed out both public employee evaluations and speech
related to the content of an evaluation were not matters of public concern. The panel reasoned
Nagel’s forgery complaints did not hold practical significance to the general public.540 As a
result, the panel concluded Nagle’s forgery complaints did not satisfy the Connick/Pickering
public concern prong.541
The panel next evaluated whether Nagle’s child abuse report qualified for First
Amendment protection. The panel pointed out the district court had “confused the first prong of
the First Amendment inquiry, which ask[ed] whether the speech at issue was protected with the
last, which examines whether the protected speech caused the adverse employment action.”542
The panel held the district court erred by considering whether Nagle’s complaints had caused
adverse employment actions instead of first determining whether the speech was actually
protected.543
As a result of these conclusions, the Second Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling that
Nagle’s forgery complaints did not qualify for First Amendment protection. However, the
Second Circuit opined that Nagle’s child abuse report was protected by the First Amendment but
found there was a lack of evidence it was a “substantial and motivating factor in the adverse
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employment action.”544 As a result of these conclusions, the Second Circuit upheld the district
court’s ruling, holding Nagle’s complaints and child abuse report were entitled to First
Amendment protection but remanded for further proceedings regarding the question of whether
the abuse report was a factor in Nagle’s contract non-renewal.545
Stahura-Uhl v. Iroquois Central School District (2011)
In Stahura-Uhl v. Iroquois Central School District546 the United States District Court for
the Western District of New York considered whether a public school special education teacher’s
complaints to her principal about students’ non-receipt of Individual Education Plan (IEP)
accommodations should be considered protected free speech. Jene-Elise Stahura-Uhl was a
special education teacher at Wales Primary School in New York. Stahura-Uhl voiced concerns
to her principal regarding the lack of mandated IEP services for her students and claimed
students’ IEPs were not being properly implemented. These claims included the removal and
denial of mandated teacher assistants for qualified students.547 Stahura-Uhl also informed a
parent that their child’s IEP indicated the need for a personal aide, but that school officials were
not providing one. Thereafter, the principal removed a special education student from StahuraUhl’s classroom and added a general education student who did not qualify for IEP services.
Stahura-Uhl complained to the school district’s social worker and psychologist. Subsequently,
the principal and director of instruction met with Stahura-Uhl. During the meeting, Stahura-Uhl
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voiced concerns regarding the proper implementation of student IEPs. After the meeting,
Stahura-Uhl contacted the parents of her special education students and informed them school
officials’ failure to properly implement student IEPs was a violation of the law.548
Stahura-Uhl requested that the principal and director of instruction add personal aides for
qualified students. However, the principal and director of instruction denied the request. As a
result, the principal issued Stahura-Uhl a written memorandum claiming she was
“unprofessional… and ‘was not performing her duties in a competent manner.’”549 Next, the
principal issued Stahura-Uhl written reprimands for tardiness and for utilizing teacher assistants
for playground supervision.550 Because using assistants for supervision was a common building
practice, Stahura-Uhl claimed she was being targeted by the principal.551 Stahura-Uhl requested
a transfer to another school but the principal denied her request. Later, the superintendent
informed Stahura-Uhl’s union representative if she continued to contact students’ parents
regarding IEP regulations she would be disciplined.552 Stahura-Uhl complied with the
superintendent’s request.
Over the course of the next two years, Stahura-Uhl was transferred to three different
teaching assignments without any explanation from school officials for the reassignments.553
Stahura-Uhl considered each reassignment to be a demotion.554 Following her third transfer,
Stahura-Uhl was suspended for six days.555 Stahura-Uhl claimed the suspension was based on
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inaccurate information.556 As a result, Stahura-Uhl claimed her reputation in the district was
damaged. Stahura-Uhl requested a meeting with the director of instruction following the
suspension. The director of instruction and the school district’s attorney met with Stahura-Uhl’s
union representative.557 Following this meeting, Stahura-Uhl’s union representative met with her
and advised her that if she tried to “’clear her name…’” she would be “’blackball[ed]’ … and
force[d] out of a job.”558 Stahura-Uhl filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York, alleging her reprimands and transfers amounted to retaliation in
response to her protected speech under the First Amendment.
Applying Sousa v. Roque,559 quoting Garcetti, the district court considered whether
Stahura-Uhl’s complaints to her principal and district staff should be considered protected free
speech. The district court pointed out if a public employee is exercising First Amendment free
speech rights, then the employee must demonstrate both that the employer retaliated and the
employee’s free speech resulted in disciplinary action.560 The court further noted that when a
public employee voices complaints in an established chain of command the complaints are not
entitled to First Amendment protection.561
Applying Weintraub,562 the court pointed out speech that “owe[s] its existence to [a
public employee’s] professional responsibilities…[is] a keen example of an act that is ‘part-and-
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parcel’ of [the teacher’s] duties...”563 The court opined that Stahura-Uhl’s complaints were made
within an established chain of command and did not fall outside her official duties.564 The court
also noted Stahura-Uhl limited her complaints “to those who had a direct relationship with her
students, past or present; she directed no speech to the public at large.”565 Thus the court
reasoned Stahura-Uhl’s speech involved the very nature of her job as a public school employee.
As a result, the court held Stahura-Uhl’s complaints to administrators and district staff were
made as part of her employment duties and were not entitled to First Amendment protection.566
Stahura-Uhl did not appeal the decision.
2012
Kelly v. Huntington Union Free School District (2012)
One year later, in Kelly v. Huntington Union Free School District,567 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York considered whether two public school gifted
teachers’ complaints about their shared supervisor should be considered protected free speech.
Anne Kelly and Christine Lofaro both taught in the school district’s gifted education program in
two separate schools. Kelly and Lofaro both reported concerns about the gifted program
chairperson’s job performance to the school district’s assistant superintendent for personnel.
Both teachers complained that the chairperson was tutoring students prior to the students
completing the gifted program entrance exam.568 They also reported the chairperson was
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sending letters requesting parental candidate endorsements for an upcoming board of education
election.569 In response to the teachers’ stated concerns, the assistant superintendent simply told
Kelly and Lofaro he “wished [they] would ‘learn to play nice in the sandbox.’”570
The following year, the assistant superintendent for curriculum and instruction met with
Kelly and Lofaro. During the meeting, the assistant superintendent informed both teachers their
gifted teaching positions were being eliminated.571 Kelly and Lofaro returned to their classrooms
and informed their students the school district’s gifted program was changing, resulting in the
elimination of their teaching positions. Kelly and Lofaro encouraged students to inform their
parents. Kelly also encouraged her students to ask their parents to attend the next board of
education meeting.
The principal from each of the respective schools met separately with Kelly and Lofaro.
During these meetings, Kelly and Lofaro were informed they had crossed the line by telling
students and parents about the program changes and encouraging parents to voice concerns at a
board meeting.572 During each separate meeting, Kelly and Lofaro were informed they could
avoid disciplinary proceedings by paying a fine, accepting a transfer to an alternative position,
and forfeiting their rights to file a grievance.573 Both teachers refused. Following their refusals,
both teachers were transferred to other teaching positions within the school district.574
Thereafter, Kelly and Lofaro jointly filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
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Eastern District of New York, alleging their transfers were the result of their complaints about
the gifted program chairperson and their classroom comments to students. They alleged their
complaints should be treated as protected speech under the First Amendment.
Applying Garcetti, referencing Mills v. City of Evansville,575 the district court first
considered whether Kelly and Lofaro’s complaints to the assistant superintendent about the
program chairperson’s job performance were made as public citizens for First Amendment
purposes.576 The court pointed out the Second Circuit had previously ruled a public employee’s
speech could be protected pursuant to their official job duties, even if it was not required or
included in their job description.577 The court reasoned Kelly and Lofaro’s complaints about the
gifted program chairperson fell within their duties as gifted teachers. Therefore, the court
concluded the teachers’ complaints to the assistant superintendent about the program chairperson
were made in their capacity as teachers and thus were not entitled to First Amendment
protection.578
Further applying Garcetti, the court next analyzed Kelly’s classroom comments
encouraging her students to have their parents attend a board of education meeting. The court
pointed out Kelly’s job responsibilities included discussing the gifted program with her students
and therefore held these classroom comments were also not made as a private citizen.579 Based
upon these conclusions, the court ruled Kelly and Lofaro’s complaints and comments to students
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were made in conjunction with their roles as public school teachers and thus were not entitled to
First Amendment protection.580 Kelly and Lofaro did not appeal the decision.
Massaro v. New York City Department of Education (2012)
In Massaro v. New York City Department of Education,581 the Second Circuit examined
whether a public school teacher’s complaints to her supervisor and to the state department of
education about the unsanitary conditions in her classroom should be considered protected free
speech. Yvonne Massaro was a public high school art teacher at Edward R. Murrow High School
in New York City. In December 2005, Massaro contracted scabies.582 Massaro notified the
principal and assistant principal claiming the skin disease had been caused by unsanitary
conditions in her classroom.583 One month later, Massaro informed the principal and assistant
principal she had once again contracted a scabies infection.584 Massaro complained about the
continued unsanitary conditions in her classroom. The principal told the building custodian to
clean and disinfect Massaro’s classroom. Thereafter, Massaro submitted an injury report to the
Department of Education (DOE) claiming she had been bitten by mites.585 Massaro requested a
transfer to another classroom within the building but her principal denied the request.
Subsequently, Massaro filed a second report with the DOE describing how the classroom had
been unclean, delineating the cost of her medical care, the principal’s failure to immediately
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address the issue after the first complaint and school officials’ denial of her request for a transfer
to another classroom.586
The following semester, Massaro alleged she began to be unfairly targeted by school
officials. For example, Massaro’s television production class was eliminated and she was
assigned a disproportionate number of special education students in her remaining classes as
compared to other colleagues. Massaro alleged she failed to receive adequate teaching supplies
in a timely manner. She also learned school officials had directed her colleagues to notify them
if she was late to work.587 Massaro filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York alleging the assignment of a disproportionate number of special education
students to her classes, the elimination of the television production class and colleague scrutiny
were punishment for exercising her First Amendment speech rights.
Applying Connick, referencing Johnson v. Ganim,588 the district court considered
whether Massaro’s complaints to school officials and the DOE should be considered protected
free speech. The district court pointed out for speech to qualify for First Amendment protection,
a public employee must have spoken as a citizen on a matter of public concern.589 The court first
noted speech that is a matter of public concern is defined as “’any matter of political, social or
other concern to the community.’”590 The court observed that Massaro’s complaints were related
to personal compensation for sick days and the state of her classroom environment. The court
determined Massaro’s personal issues were not a matter of public concern.591
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Next, applying Garcetti, the court noted Massaro’s complaints to her supervisors
regarding the unsanitary conditions in her classroom were made pursuant to her duties as an
employee.592 The court reasoned Massaro’s teaching duties included providing a safe learning
environment.593 Therefore, Massaro’s complaints regarding the sanitary conditions in her
classroom and her subsequent health condition were part of her professional responsibilities.594
Based upon these conclusions, Massaro’s complaints to school officials and the DOE about the
unsanitary conditions of her classroom and her health condition were not protected by the First
Amendment.595 Massaro appealed the decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Applying Garcetti, referencing Weintraub, the appellate panel considered whether
Massaro had engaged in First Amendment protected speech and had subsequently suffered
retaliation as a result of that protected speech. The panel pointed out Massaro had voiced her
complaints to school officials and not to the general public.596 Additionally, the panel noted
Massaro’s report to the DOE was submitted on school district forms that were not intended for
use by private citizens.597 Therefore, the panel concluded there was “no relevant citizen
analogue.”598 Next, the panel considered whether Massaro’s complaints about the conditions of
her classroom were made pursuant to her official duties. The panel reasoned Massaro was not
complaining about the conditions of her classroom as a private citizen but rather in her role as a
public school teacher. As a result, the panel concluded Massaro’s complaints to school officials
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and the DOE had been uttered in her capacity as a public school teacher and were not entitled to
First Amendment protection.599 As a result, the panel held there was no viable retaliation claim
based on First Amendment protected speech available to Massaro. Massaro did not appeal the
decision.
Goudeau v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board (2012)
In Goudeau v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board,600 the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Louisiana considered whether a public school teacher’s
complaints to her principal and assistant superintendent about a new grading policy should be
considered protected free speech. Sheila Goudeau was a public school teacher employed at
Riveroaks Elementary School when a new grading policy was implemented. As part of the new
grading policy, the principal informed Goudeau she needed to change any student’s failing
grades to a “D” and that no student was to be given a score lower than a 60.601 Goudeau ignored
the new grading policy and continued to assign grades reflecting her students’ performance. As
a result, several students received failing grades. The principal and office secretary changed the
failing grades Goudeau had listed on student report cards. After changing the grades, the
principal met with Goudeau. During the meeting, the principal threatened Goudeau with a writeup and a subsequent transfer if she failed to comply with the new grading policy. Goudeau’s
colleagues complied with the policy.602
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Goudeau claimed she suffered high levels of stress and anxiety as a result of the
principal’s pressure and harassment to implement the policy.603 Thereafter, the principal
transferred Goudeau to another school within the district. After the transfer, Goudeau reported
her former principals’ grading irregularities to the assistant superintendent for instructional
support. The assistant superintendent determined Goudeau’s issues with her former principal
and the grading policy were personal.604 Subsequently, Goudeau filed a complaint with the
district office using the school district’s “’Official Complaint Against Employee Form.’”605
Thereafter, Goudeau’s former principal met with her and asked her to sign a letter rescinding all
of the complaints listed on the form. Goudeau refused to sign the letter.606 A hearing was held
by the interim chief academic officer regarding Goudeau’s complaint form. During the hearing,
the interim chief academic officer determined the principal had failed to adhere to the school
board’s approved grading scale, in violation of school board’s policy.607 Goudeau then claimed
her transfer had been the result of her former principal’s implementation of a grading practice
that violated board policy. Goudeau claimed her transfer was retaliation for First Amendment
protected speech and filed a lawsuit with the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Louisiana. Goudeau alleged her transfer was the result of her complaints about the principal’s
grading policy which was First Amendment protected speech.
Referencing Connick/Pickering, the district court pointed out in order for a public
employee’s speech to qualify for First Amendment protection, the employee speech must be
603
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made in the role of a private citizen, not merely addressing issues of a personal concern. The
district court observed the modified Connick/Pickering test shifted the analysis from using the
content of the employee’s speech to determine First Amendment protection instead of
considering the role the speaker was working in when it was uttered.608 Referencing Kennedy v.
Tangiphara Parish Library Board of Control,609 the district court highlighted the Fifth Circuit’s
opinion that a public employee’s speech may be “mixed” (both public and private) if it contains
“elements of both personal and public concern.”610 The district court reviewed the Fifth
Circuit’s three-pronged analysis to determine whether a mixed-speech ruling was applicable in
Goudeau. The Fifth Circuit’s three-pronged analysis was:
(1) A matter of public concern does not involve solely personal matters of strictly
a discussion of management policies that is only interesting to the public by virtue
of the manager’s status as an arm of the government. Additionally, if releasing the
speech to the public would inform the populace of more than the fact of an
employee’s employment grievance, the content of the speech may be public in
nature. (2) The court must consider that speech on a matter of public concern
need not be made before a public audience, although it may relate to the public
concern if it is made against the backdrop of public debate. (3) The court must
consider that speech is not a matter of public concern if it is made solely in
furtherance of a personal employer-employee dispute.611
The district court pointed out the principal’s actions requiring teachers to change student
grades violated both a state law and a board of education policy and therefore was partially a
matter of public concern.612 However, the district court also found Goudeau’s complaints to be
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private in nature because Goudeau was in personal conflict over implementing the new grading
policy.613 Thus, the district court reasoned Goudeau’s complaints about the new grading policy
qualified as mixed-speech, because it partially addressed a matter of public concern.
Applying the modified Connick/Pickering analysis to Goudeau’s mixed speech, the
district court next examined whether Goudeau’s speech “…impeded the school’s general
performance and operation…”614 The district court pointed out although Goudeau had brought
the inappropriate actions of the grading policy to light, Goudeau’s complaint did not disrupt the
school’s operations.615 As a result, Goudeau’s complaints failed the modified
Connick/Pickering analysis. Based upon this analysis, the district court held Goudeau’s
complaints to the principal and assistant superintendent about the grading policy were not
entitled to First Amendment protection.616 Goudeau did not appeal this decision.
2013
Duvall v. Putnam City School District (2013)
The following year, in Duvall v. Putnam City School District,617 the Tenth Circuit
considered whether the First Amendment protects a public school teacher’s complaints to fellow
colleagues and state agencies about her perception that her employing school district was noncompliant with special education laws. Louise Duvall was a special education teacher employed
at Tulakes Elementary School in Oklahoma. Duvall’s responsibilities included providing
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Individual Education Plan (IEP) services to qualified students, developing students’ IEPs,
facilitating IEP meetings and ensuring these tasks were completed in compliance with both state
and federal law.
Prior to the 2007-08 school year, Duvall taught special education students in a pull-out,
flexible delivery model.618 The following year, the assistant principal directed Duvall to deliver
special education services using a full inclusion, co-teaching instructional model.619 Duvall
became concerned this model would not provide adequate support for student needs and that it
did not comply with federal special education regulations. Duvall emailed her concerns to the
principal and assistant principal but did not receive a response. Thereafter, Duvall requested a
meeting with the school district’s executive director of special services. During the meeting, the
executive director assured Duvall the full inclusion model did not violate any federal
regulations.620 Following the meeting, Duvall asked the executive director to issue a written
statement documenting the meeting, and outlining his assurances that no laws were being
violated. The executive director’s written statement noted the full inclusion model did not
violate any state or federal guidelines and stated if Duvall performed her duties as a special
education teacher, she had no reason to be concerned with liability.621
Duvall continued to be concerned about special education issues. Subsequently, without
notifying her supervisors, Duvall contacted the State Department of Education (DOE) about IEPs
that had been written utilizing the full inclusion model. Duvall inquired about the process
618
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regarding “proper preparation of a letter of dissent...”622 During subsequent IEP meetings,
Duvall submitted letters of dissent to the IEP team that raised concerns regarding the school
district’s delivery of IEP services.623 The assistant principal received a complaint from Duvall’s
colleague about Duvall’s behavior at an IEP meeting. Duvall’s colleague reported Duvall had
made unprofessional comments to the parents and team members and presented a letter of dissent
concerning the IEP team’s decision regarding the student’s special education placement. In
response, the assistant principal met with Duvall and issued her a letter of admonishment for
unprofessional behavior.624
At the end of the school year, the principal met with Duvall and notified her she was
being transferred to a regular education first grade teaching position. During the meeting, Duvall
complained she did not want to lose the extra salary she earned as a special education teacher.625
Duvall complained the transfer would amount to a demotion due to the salary reduction. The
principal responded that because Duvall did not agree with the school district’s transition to an
inclusive special education model she was being transferred to a regular education position.626
Instead of taking the new position, Duvall resigned and filed a lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma alleging the transfer was the result of her
complaints about the special education services’ model to her supervisors and her contact with
the DOE.627 Duvall alleged her complaints amounted to protected First Amendment speech.

622

Id.
Id. A letter of dissent is a written document submitted to an IEP team when a member of the IEP team disagrees
with the team’s recommendation of services.
624
Duvall v. Putnam City Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95050 at *7 (W.D. Okla. 2011).
625
Duvall v. Putnam City Sch. Dist., 530 F. Appx. 804, 809 (10th Cir. 2013). Special education teachers were on a
differential pay schedule in which they earned a higher salary than a general education teacher.
626
Id.
627
Duvall v. Putnam City Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95050 (W.D. Okla. 2011).
623

112

Applying the modified Pickering test, the district court examined whether Duvall’s
complaints to her supervisors were made pursuant to her official duties.628 The specific elements
the court applied consisted of the following five prongs:
(1) whether the speech was made pursuant to an employee's official duties; (2)
whether the speech was on a matter of public concern; (3) whether the
government's interests, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff's free speech interests; (4) whether
the protected speech was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action;
and (5) whether the defendant would have reached the same employment decision
in the absence of the protected conduct. 629
The court pointed out Duvall’s responsibilities as a special education teacher included
ensuring school district compliance with state and federal regulations.630 The court reasoned
Duvall’s complaints about the special education service delivery model were within her
responsibilities as a special education teacher and were made pursuant to her official duties.631
The court next examined Duvall’s complaints to the DOE. The court highlighted that Duvall
contacted the DOE in consultation for preparing a letter of dissent. The court stated that
inquiring about how to prepare a letter of dissent regarding the district’s delivery method for
special education services was not a matter of public concern.632 As a result, the court reasoned
Duvall’s complaints failed the two prongs of the modified Connick/Pickering test and, therefore,
did not require further analysis. Based upon these conclusions, the court ruled neither Duvall’s
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complaints nor contact with the DOE were entitled to First Amendment protection.633 Duvall
appealed the decision to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Applying the Garcetti/Pickering analysis utilized in Reinhardt,634 the appellate panel
considered whether Duvall’s complaints to her supervisors were made pursuant to her official
employment duties.635 The panel noted Duvall’s complaints to supervisors about the
instructional model change were performed within the course of her official duties.636 The panel
further noted Duvall testified her teaching responsibilities included complying with state and
federal laws as well as communicating about the special education program to her
administrators.637 As a result of Duvall’s acknowledgement, the panel concluded Duvall’s
complaints to her supervisors were not entitled to First Amendment protection.638
Next, the panel pointed out the district court had analyzed only the first prong of the
Garcetti/Pickering test when determining whether Duvall’s complaints to the DOE were entitled
to First Amendment protection.639 The panel concluded Duvall’s complaints to the DOE passed
the first prong of the Garcetti/Pickering analysis because Duvall had gone outside the normal
chain of command and thus went beyond the scope of her official job duties.640 The panel noted,
however, that even if Duvall’s claim passed the next two prongs of the Garcetti/Pickering
analysis, her claim would have failed the fourth prong due to the lack of evidence that her DOE
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contact was a motivating factor in school officials’ decision to transfer her.641 The court noted
the lack of evidence that school officials were aware of Duvall’s contact to the DOE.642
Skipping to the fourth prong of the Garcetti/Pickering test, the court concluded Duvall’s
complaints to the DOE were not the cause of her transfer.643 Based upon these conclusions, the
court held Duvall “failed to establish causation under the Garcetti/Pickering test…”644 As a
result, the appellate panel upheld the district court ruling.645 Duvall did not appeal the decision.
Palmer v. Penfield Central School District (2013)
In Palmer v. Penfield Central School District,646 the United States District Court for the
Western District of New York considered whether a public school teacher’s complaints to her
supervisors about racial concerns should be considered protected speech. Karen Palmer was a
probationary kindergarten teacher in a predominately Caucasian school. Palmer recommended
several students for placement in the school district’s extended day kindergarten program. 647
After a black student who met the same academic profiles as other admitted students was denied
admission, Palmer asked her supervisor why the student had been denied admission into the
program. Palmer’s supervisor explained the student’s poor behavior was the reason for the
decision.648 Palmer believed the only difference between the accepted students and the denied
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student was the student’s race. Palmer felt the non-admission decision was the result of the
student being black. Palmer was frustrated and shared her concerns at a kindergarten grade level
meeting. During the meeting, attended by several school administrators, Palmer complained
about the “disparate treatment of an African American student in a predominately Caucasian
school district.”649 The next day, the principal met with Palmer. During the meeting the
principal told Palmer her employment contract would not be renewed. When Palmer requested a
reason, the principal stated Palmer had failed to provide appropriate activities for her students.650
Palmer wrote a letter to the superintendent alleging the timing of her contract nonrenewal suggested the reason for the non-renewal was due to her voicing concerns about the
school’s treatment of her minority student.651 The superintendent reviewed Palmer’s complaint
but supported the principal’s non-renewal decision nonetheless. Palmer resigned and filed a
lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York alleging her
contract non-renewal constituted retaliation for her complaints at the kindergarten grade level
meeting about the school district’s treatment of a black student. Palmer specifically claimed her
comments addressed a matter of public concern and, therefore, should be considered protected
free speech.
Applying Garcetti, referencing Skehan v. Village of Mamaroneck,652 the district court
considered whether Palmer suffered retaliation as a result of her complaints about the alleged
mistreatment of a black student. The court pointed out Palmer must prove “(1) she engaged in
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constitutionally protected speech because she spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern;
(2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) her speech was a ‘motivating factor’ in
the adverse employment decision.”653
The court found Palmer’s speech occurred while attending a required grade level
meeting and involved a professional program recommendation, and thus held Palmer was
functioning within her role as a public school teacher when she spoke at the kindergarten
meeting.654 The court reasoned Palmer had expressed her opinion to an audience of educators
and therefore was not speaking as a citizen on a matter of public concern.655 Based upon these
conclusions, the court did not proceed with any further analysis. This reasoning led the court to
conclude Palmer’s complaint was made pursuant to her role as a public school teacher and was
not entitled to First Amendment protection.656 Palmer did not appeal the decision.
Bielewicz v. Penn-Trafford School District (2013)
The same year, in Bielewicz v. Penn-Trafford School District,657 the United States
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania considered whether a public school
teacher’s complaints to her supervisor about policy infractions should be considered protected
speech. Judith Bielewicz was a tenured Spanish teacher at Penn-Trafford High School. Parents
of a student in Bielwicz’s Spanish III honors class complained to both Bielewicz and to the
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building principal because their child was failing Bielwicz’s class. The parents alleged Bielwicz
was treating their child unfairly and had refused to provide their daughter with help.
Several weeks prior to the end of the grading period, the principal transferred the student
to another teacher’s Spanish III honors class. At the end of the grading period, Bielewicz learned
the student had received an “A” grade. After learning about the student’s final grade, Bielewicz
complained to the principal that the student transfer was against school policy.658 The principal
met with Bielewicz but did not address Bielewicz’s concern about the student transfer. The
principal instead told Bielewicz he had concerns with her “punctuality, unwillingness to help
struggling students, miss[ed] open house days and issues with parents.”659 The principal also
told Bielewicz she would be receiving a low performance evaluation rating.
The following year, Bielewicz was assigned to teach regular level Spanish I classes
instead of the advanced Spanish classes she had previously taught. Bielewicz was also placed on
a teacher improvement plan. One of the requirements of the teacher improvement plan was that
Bielewicz was required to enter weekly student grades into a grade book. After reviewing
Bielewicz’s grade book and finding that she had been non-compliant, the principal suspended
Bielewicz for failure to enter weekly student grades as required by the terms of the improvement
plan. Bielewicz filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Pennsylvania alleging her suspension constituted retaliation for her complaints about the student
transfer which she claimed was First Amendment protected free speech.
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Applying the Connick/Pickering analysis outlined in Garcetti, the district court
considered whether Bielewicz suffered retaliation as a result of engaging in First Amendment
protected speech. The court first evaluated whether Bielwicz was speaking as a private citizen or
in her role as a public school teacher during her meeting with the principal.660 Bielewicz argued
her complaints about the student’s transfer addressed a matter of public concern. However, the
court found Bielewicz’s complaint about the student transfer was “‘part and parcel’ of her job as
a teacher...”661 The court further noted Bielewicz’s complaint to the principal regarding the
student transfer “owed its existence solely to her role as a teacher...”662 Therefore, the court
reasoned Bielewicz’s speech on this issue was made not as a citizen, but rather in her role as a
public school teacher. Based upon this conclusion, the court found Bielewicz’s complaints to the
principal about the student transfer were not entitled to First Amendment protection.663
Bielewicz did not appeal the decision.
Ross v. New York City Department of Education (2013)
In Ross v. New York City Department of Education,664 the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of New York considered whether a public school teacher’s complaints to
both his supervisors and to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) about
classroom conditions should be considered protected speech. Brian Ross was an elementary
physical education teacher employed by the New York City public schools. The principal
notified Ross the school gymnasium where Ross taught his classes would be used for state
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mandated student-testing sessions. The principal told Ross he would be assigned to teach
physical education classes for three days at the school district’s nearby unoccupied middle
school facility while the state testing took place. After visiting the facility, Ross became
concerned about the gymnasium’s conditions. Ross complained to the assistant principal about
leaking pipes, peeling paint, exposed nails and an unlocked exterior door leading into an
alleyway.665 The assistant principal told Ross to “keep his mouth shut...’”666 Ross notified his
union representative who advised Ross to talk to the principal.
The following day, Ross met with the principal. During the meeting, the principal told
Ross if he refused to teach his physical education classes at the alternative site he would no
longer receive satisfactory evaluations and threatened to fire him.667 Under duress, Ross agreed
to teach at the alternative site. Thereafter, Ross filed a complaint with the Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA).668 OSHA inspected the building and determined Ross’
complaints were unfounded.669 Over the next two years, the principal repeatedly evaluated Ross’
teaching performance as unsatisfactory. These performance ratings resulted in Ross’ salary being
frozen.670 Ross filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern Division of
New York alleging the poor evaluation ratings resulting in a salary freeze constituted retaliation
for exercising his First Amendment free speech rights.
Applying Garcetti, the district court considered whether Ross suffered retaliation as a
result of exercising protected speech. Quoting the Second Circuit’s decision in Nagle, the panel
665

Id. at 512.
Id.
667
Id.
668
Id. at 513.
669
Id.
670
Ross v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 935 F. Supp.2d 508, 513 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
666

120

pointed out in order to successfully raise a First Amendment retaliation claim Ross would need
to present evidence showing; (1) the speech at issue was protected, (2) he suffered an adverse
employment action, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the
adverse employment action.671 The court noted Garcetti had shifted the focus from the content
of the speech to the role the speaker occupied when the speech was uttered.672 The court noted
Ross’ comments to the principal and assistant principal about the conditions of the alternative
physical education site were made in his role as a public school teacher. As a result, the court
reasoned Ross’ complaints about the gymnasium conditions were made as part of his official
duties.673 Therefore, the court concluded Ross’ complaints to building administrators were not
protected by the First Amendment.674
Further applying Garcetti, referencing Weintraub, the court evaluated whether Ross’
complaints to the OSHA were protected speech. The court observed Ross’ complaints to the
OSHA regarding student safety were part of Ross’ official duties as he was functioning as an
employee concerning his students. 675 The court reasoned in his complaints to the OSHA, Ross
was acting in his public employee role as an advocate for the health and safety of his students. 676
Based upon these observations, the court concluded Ross’ complaints to his supervisor and to the
OSHA were made pursuant to his role as a public school teacher and were not entitled to First
Amendment protection.677 Ross did not appeal the decision.
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Diadenko v. Folino (2013)
Later that year in Diadenko v. Folino,678 the Seventh Circuit considered whether the First
Amendment protected a public school teacher’s complaints to her supervisors and the state
department of education about perceived non-compliance with special education laws. Elena
Diadenko was a special education teacher at Schurz High School in Chicago, Illinois. Diadenko
complained to the assistant principal and principal that the special education case manager was
not fulfilling her required duties.679 Diadenko complained attendance sheets for Individual
Education Plan (IEP) meetings were improperly signed and the required parent meeting notices
were not mailed to parents’ homes.680 Subsequently, Diadenko reported these same concerns to
the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE).681
Shortly thereafter, during a special education department meeting, the assistant principal
presented a new school policy. Diadenko disagreed with the policy and voiced her concerns
during the meeting. The next day, the assistant principal and principal met with Diadenko.
During the meeting, the principal issued Diadenko a written reprimand for disrupting the special
education meeting.682 Diadenko was also reprimanded for missing a mandatory school faculty
meeting. Diadenko responded she missed the faculty meeting because she was filing a report
with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).683 The principal then
verbally reprimanded Diadenko for failure to follow the school district’s protocol of notifying a
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building administrator upon contacting the DCFS. Thereafter, Diadenko sent an email to
members of the special education department and special education staff disclosing confidential
student information.684 As a result, the principal issued Diadenko a pre-disciplinary hearing
notice.685 Following the hearing, the school board suspended Diadenko for three days.686
Diadenko filed an appeal, but the Board of Education upheld the suspension.687
Subsequently, Diadenko sent a letter to the mayor of Chicago regarding her concerns
about the school district’s special education department.688 One month later, the principal served
Diadenko with a second pre-disciplinary notice.689 This notice cited Diadenko’s failure to attend
a student evaluation meeting, disrupting a special education meeting and referring to the
principal as the “’Italian Mafia and… a Nazi concentration camp leader.’”690 Following a
hearing before the Chicago Board of Education, Diadenko was suspended for ten days without
pay.691 Diadenko filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, alleging her suspensions were the result of exercising her First Amendment free speech
rights.
Applying Garcetti, referencing Davis v. Cook County,692 the district court first considered
Diadenko’s role when she complained to the principal and assistant principal about the special
education manager and when she emailed confidential student information to colleagues. The
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court considered whether Diadenko’s complaints and emails fell within her responsibilities as a
special education teacher.693 The court found Diadenko’s complaints regarding the special
education department and case manager concerned special education students and were thus
made within her role as a special education teacher. The court further reasoned the emails and
complaints were internal communications and were included within Diadenko’s job
responsibilities.694 As a result, the court held Diadenko’s emails and complaints to building
administrators were not entitled to First Amendment protection.695
Further applying Garcetti, the district court considered whether Diadenko’s letter to the
mayor qualified as protected speech given that the letter was communicated outside a normal
district chain of command.696 The court reasoned in order for Diadenko’s letter to the mayor to
be linked to her ten-day suspension, Diadenko needed to “produce evidence that [her] speech
was at least a motivating factor…of the employer’s decision to take retaliatory action.”697 The
court reasoned there was no evidence Diadenko’s supervisors were aware she had written a letter
to the mayor.698 As a result, the court concluded Diadenko’s letter to the mayor had not resulted
in her ten-day suspension.699 Based upon these conclusions, the court held Diadenko failed to
prove the district retaliated against her based upon her complaints, emails and letter to the mayor.
Diadenko appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit.
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On appeal, Diadenko’s only legal argument was that her ten-day suspension was a result
of her letter to the mayor. Applying Garcetti, the panel noted Diadenko needed to provide
evidence showing she had written the letter as a citizen speaking on a matter of public
concern.700 However, the panel observed Diadenko failed to present evidence showing her letter
was the cause of her ten-day suspension. The panel noted Diadenko needed to “demonstrate that
her speech was at least a motivating factor in [the principal’s] decision making process.”701 The
panel further noted “Diadenko’s retaliation claim still fail[ed] because she [had] not presented
evidence to show that the letter was the reason she was suspended.”702 As a result, the panel
ruled Diadekno’s letter to the mayor was not a motivating factor in her ten-day suspension and
upheld the district court’s decision.703 Diadekno did not appeal the decision.
2014
Mpoy v. Rhee (2014)
The following year in Mpoy v. Rhee,704 the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit considered whether a special education teacher’s letter to the
Chancellor of the District of Columbia Schools should be considered protected free speech.
Bruno Mpoy was employed as a special education teacher at Ludlow Taylor Elementary School
in the District of Columbia Public Schools. Mpoy was concerned about the lack of special
education teaching resources and complained to the principal.705 Shortly thereafter, the principal
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conducted Mpoy’s formal teaching classroom observation. Mpoy requested feedback on the
classroom observation from the principal but did not receive a response. Thereafter, the
principal reviewed Mpoy’s student assessment results. The principal told Mpoy to alter the
assessment results to show an increase in student achievement.706 Mpoy refused.
Next, the principal issued Mpoy a warning letter citing excessive tardiness and a failure
to follow written lesson plans.707 The principal later issued another letter to Mpoy accusing him
of failing to monitor and escort his students during a building fire drill.708 As a result of these
concerns, the principal recommended to the Board of Education that Mpoy be placed on a fiveday suspension as a consequence for failing to follow appropriate fire drill procedures.709 The
Board of Education approved the principal’s recommendation. Mpoy was frustrated and emailed
the district chancellor a five-page complaint citing problematic issues at Ludlow Taylor
Elementary School.710 Mpoy’s email included his concerns about the school’s lack of materials,
the lack of response from his principal regarding evaluation feedback and the principal’s
decision to alter Mpoy’s student assessment results.711
At the end of the year, Mpoy’s employment evaluation contained “needs improvement”
performance ratings.712 The principal told Mpoy he had recommended that the chancellor not
renew Mpoy’s employment contract. During the summer, Mpoy met with several members of
the chancellor’s staff. The chancellor’s staff told Mpoy his employment contract would not be
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renewed and that he would be receiving a termination letter. When Mpoy did not receive a
termination letter, he reported to work in the fall. On the day he reported to work, Mpoy was
issued a termination letter by the principal dated the previous month. Mpoy filed a lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia alleging his termination was the result
of his email to the chancellor. Mpoy claimed his termination constituted retaliation for having
engaged in First Amendment protected free speech.
Applying Garcetti, the district court considered whether Mpoy’s email to the chancellor
was protected by the First Amendment. The court pointed out Mpoy’s email was a
communication within the school district structure and therefore fell within his role as a public
school teacher.713 The court reasoned Mpoy was functioning pursuant to his official duties when
he drafted and sent the email.714 As a result, the court held Mpoy’s email did not qualify for
First Amendment protection.715 Mpoy appealed to the United States Circuit Court for the
District of Columbia, where Mpoy argued his email to the chancellor was written in his role as a
public citizen and not as a public school employee.
Applying Garcetti, referencing Winder v. Erste,716 the appellate panel pointed out “a
public employee speaks without First Amendment protection when he reports conduct that
interferes with his job responsibilities, even if the report is made outside his chain of
command.”717 This led the panel to reason Mpoy’s email was generated in conjunction with his
role as a public school employee and not as a private citizen.718 Based upon this conclusion the
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panel ruled Mpoy’s email to the chancellor was not entitled to First Amendment protection.719
Mpoy did not appeal the decision.
Pekowsky v. Yonkers Board of Education (2014)
In Pekowsky v. Yonkers Board of Education,720 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York evaluated whether comments made by a public school teacher in
his role as a union representative should be considered protected free speech. Marc Pekowsky
was a music teacher and teacher union representative at Yonkers Middle School. As a union
representative, Pekowsky and the principal engaged in heated exchanges regarding teacher rights
and compensation.721 During one meeting, the principal proposed to Pekowksy that due to
budget cuts, teachers should continue to work in extra-curricular activities without additional
pay.722 Pekowsky opposed the proposal.723 The principal held a follow up meeting with
Pekowsky and another union representative. The principal told Pekowsky she “did not wish to
deal with him…[and] she would be ‘very happy’ to deal with [the second union representative]
instead.”724 Subsequently, the principal requested that the second union representative attend a
teacher disciplinary meeting. The representative notified Pekowsky and Pekowsky found
coverage for his class and attended the meeting instead. The principal issued Pekowsky a verbal
warning for leaving his class with another teacher without her approval.725 At the end of the
school year, the principal recommended to the superintendent that Pekowsky be transferred to
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another teaching position within the school district. Pekowsky filed a lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York claiming the principal’s transfer
recommendation constituted retaliation for him having engaged in First Amendment protected
free speech.
Applying Garcetti, and quoting Ross v. Breslin,726 the district court examined whether
Pekowsky’s comments to the principal were made pursuant to his official duties as a union
representative. The court considered whether Pekowsky’s speech was intended to address a
personal grievance or whether it was intended for a broader public purpose.727 The court pointed
out Pekowsky had attended the meetings with the principal regarding payment for extracurricular activities as an advocate for union members, and not in his own role as a teacher. The
court also noted Pekowsky had attended the teacher disciplinary meeting as a union
representative and not in his role as a teacher.728 The court reasoned when a public employee is
functioning in the role of a union representative and advocating for another public employee, the
speech uttered in this role is protected.729 The court further reasoned, “union representation of
teachers is a matter of importance to the functioning of our public education system.”730
Additionally, the court noted “Pekowsky’s advocacy on behalf of [a] fellow teacher was not
aimed at redressing his own grievances, but was undertaken as a representative of the teachers’
union.”731 Based upon this reasoning, the court determined Pekowsky had been functioning in
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his role as a union representative, and not as a public school employee, when he spoke. 732 This
reasoning led the court to conclude Pekowsky’s comments while functioning in his role as a
union representative addressed a matter of public concern.733 As a result, the panel ruled
Pekowsky’s comments to the principal as a union representative were entitled to First
Amendment protection.734 The board of education did not appeal the decision.
McShea v. School Board of Collier County (2014)
In McShea v. School Board of Collier County735 the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Florida considered whether the First Amendment protected a public high
school reading coach’s complaints to building administrators and the Florida Department of
Education about perceived non-compliance with federal funding laws. Dorene McShea was
employed as a reading coach at Lorenzo Walker Technical High School. McShea’s position was
federally funded and her teaching role was designed to benefit at-risk high school students. The
school counselor asked McShea to tutor students who were not enrolled at the high school.
McShea refused, believing this would be a misuse of federal funds.736 McShea met with the
assistant principal and voiced her concerns about the counselor’s request. The following fall, the
principal told McShea she was being assigned to substitute for absent classroom teachers when
needed.737 McShea complained to the vice principal that substituting for a classroom teacher
would interfere with her ability to perform her assigned duties as a reading coach.
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Later that fall, McShea was reassigned to a long-term substitute position in a classroom
for two months. McShea requested a meeting with the principal and vice principal. During the
meeting, McShea complained the assignment to substitute for an absent teacher was
inappropriate because her salary was paid by federal funds that were intended to be used for
working with at-risk students.738 McShea filed a complaint with the Florida Department of
Education (FDE) alleging her reassignment was a misuse of federal funds.739
McShea was subsequently assigned to help supervise the required student state testing
process at the school.740 During the testing process, McShea became aware of testing
irregularities and notified several administrators.741 After the testing process was completed, the
principal directed McShea to sign the required state form attesting that she had not witnessed any
testing irregularities.742 McShea refused to sign the form. Several months later, the principal
posted the school’s annual improvement plan on the FDE website.743 The school improvement
plan falsely stated McShea had her doctoral degree and also reported the school was
implementing programs that did not exist.744 McShea contacted the inspector general for the
FDE, stating the characterizations about her federally funded position amounted to “’egregious
and unlawful fraudulent misrepresentation.’”745 The FDE conducted an investigation.
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At the end of the year, the principal informed McShea she was being reassigned for the
following year to a classroom teaching position within the school district. McShea resigned and
filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. McShea
alleged the transfer was the result of her complaints to district administrators and the Florida
Department of Education. McShea claimed this transfer was in retaliation for her having
engaged in First Amendment protected free speech.
Applying Garcetti, referencing Lane v. Franks,746 the district court considered whether
McShea’s complaints to building administrators and to the Florida Department of Education
qualified for free speech protection. The court pointed out McShea’s complaints to district
administrators fell within her job responsibilities as a public school employee.747 The court also
pointed out, however, McShea’s contact with the Florida Department of Education fell outside of
her official duties as a reading coach. The court stated that “it is this contact with third parties
that is key.”748 The court considered the FDE to be an independent third party, finding contact
with the FDE was outside the scope of a public employee’s duties.749
Next, applying the sequential five-step modified Connick/Pickering framework, the court
considered whether McShea’s communication to the Florida Department of Education addressed
a matter of public concern and if McShea had spoken as a private citizen or public employee.750
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The court pointed out “’exposing governmental inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of
considerable significance.’”751 Based upon this reasoning, the court determined McShea’s
complaints to the FDE were made as a private citizen on a matter of public concern and met the
first two prongs of the modified Pickering analysis.752
The court next examined the third prong in the modified Connick/Pickering test to
determine whether there was “adequate justification for treating [McShea] differently from any
other member of the general public.”753 The court noted McShea had suffered a “functional
demotion”754 and school officials had failed to provide sufficient reasons for McShea’s transfer.
As a result, the court determined McShea’s speech met the third modified Connick/Pickering
prong because it was found to be a substantial and motivating factor for her transfer.755
The court next examined the fourth and fifth modified Connick/Pickering prongs to
determine whether there was adequate justification for treating McShea differently than other
members of the general public. In addition, the court considered whether school officials would
have taken the adverse employment action absent McShea’s speech.756 The court pointed out the
school district had failed to provide justification for the way McShea was treated.757 Based upon
these conclusions, the court determined McShea’s complaints to the FDE met the five-step
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modified Connick/Pickering test and ruled her complaints were entitled to First Amendment
protection.758 The school board did not appeal the decision.
2015
Koehn v. Tobias (2015)
One year later in Koehn v. Tobias,759 the Seventh Circuit was called upon to rule on
whether the First Amendment protected a public school psychologist’s complaints to fellow
colleagues, administrators, and a state agency about perceived non-compliance with special
education laws.760 Peter Koehn was employed by the Harvard Community Unit School District
as a school psychologist. In 2008 Koehn’s principal rated Koehn’s job performance as
unsatisfactory. The performance evaluation stated:
[t]he administrative team has been very disappointed with your job performance for the
2007-08 school year. Our expectation is that you will adhere to the job responsibilities as
mentioned on this document for the 2008-09 school year. Failure to comply and adhere
to the above-mentioned responsibilities may result in non-renewal of your contract in
spring 2009.761
In January 2010 the principal emailed Koehn indicating a psychological report Koehn
had prepared for an Individual Education Plan (IEP) meeting was incomplete. In April 2010, the
principal again emailed Koehn expressing concern because one of Koehn’s psychological reports
prepared for another IEP meeting was late. The principal told Koehn she expected his reports to
be completed and submitted in a timely manner.762
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In October 2010 the principal sent Koehn a letter instructing him to attend a meeting to
discuss his conduct and job performance.763 Koehn emailed the principal, indicating he would
not attend the meeting without union representation and accused the principal of bullying staff
members into changing special education services.764 Koehn’s email also expressed his concern
about the principal’s decision to reduce services for special education students.765 Koehn alleged
the elimination of intervention programs and progress monitoring for special education students
in math violated state and federal law. Koehn explained the violation resulted when the IEP
team and parents were not involved in determining if, or how, the reduction in services would
alter a student’s current IEP.766 The principal did not immediately respond to Koehn’s email and
Koehn did not attend the meeting.
Two days later, the principal sent Koehn a letter setting a new meeting date and stating
Koehn’s failure to attend the original meeting had constituted “’an act of insubordination
warranting disciplinary action.’”767 Koehn emailed the principal indicating he would not attend
the meeting and copied the superintendent and two other staff members. Koehn’s email alleged
the principal was ignoring the law and was using her position to “impose [her] vengeance upon
[him]...”768 Subsequently, Koehn contacted the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) and
expressed his concerns over his school district’s reduction in special education services.769 The
superintendent was copied on Koehn’s communication to the ISBE.
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The following day the superintendent sent a memo to Koehn notifying him that the
superintendent would schedule a series of meetings to address Koehn’s special education
concerns, Koehn’s emails, and job performance.770 The superintendent stated Koehn’s prior
emails to her were “’inappropriate and unprofessional.’”771 Following these meetings, the
principal recommended to the Board of Education that Koehn be issued a notice of remedial
warning for insubordinate conduct and unprofessional behavior.772 Koehn refused to attend the
Board of Education’s closed session hearing to discuss the principal’s recommendation. Koehn
responded to the recommendation by sending an email to all school district employees and
members of the Board of Education repeating his earlier allegation that the principal was
“’besmirch[ing] [his] professional reputation, and is doing so in retaliation because [Koehn] filed
a complaint with the ISBE containing serious allegations about [the principal’s] conduct...’”773
The Board of Education unanimously approved the principal’s recommendation to issue Koehn a
remedial warning notice.774
One month later, the superintendent sent Koehn a memo directing him to attend an
investigatory meeting to discuss his “’failure to abide by directives …in the November 10, 2010
Notice of Remedial Warning.’”775 Koehn did not attend the meeting. The superintendent
rescheduled the meeting thirteen times before Koehn and his union representative finally
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attended the meeting. During the meeting, the superintendent and principal told Koehn they
were recommending to the Board of Education that Koehn’s employment contract be
terminated.776 The superintendent noted concerns over Koehn’s written IEP reports,
unprofessional communications, and unprofessional conduct in refusing to attend any of the
thirteen scheduled investigatory meetings.777 Koehn refused to attend the Board of Education’s
closed session hearing to discuss the superintendent’s recommendation. Subsequently, the Board
of Education approved the superintendent’s recommendation and Koehn’s employment was
terminated. Koehn filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, alleging his termination was the result of his complaints to colleagues, the school
district’s administration and to the ISBE. Koehn claimed the termination constituted retaliation
for his engaging in First Amendment protected free speech.
Applying Garcetti, the district court considered whether Koehn’s speech to employees,
school board members, and to the ISBE should qualify as protected free speech. The court noted
if “public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not
speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes...”778 Next, the court examined Koehn’s
complaints to district employees, administrators and the Board of Education. The court reasoned
these complaints were made pursuant to Koehn’s official duties because he was advocating for
the education of his students.779 As a result, the court concluded Koehn’s complaints to
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employees, administrators and the Board of Education fell within his duties as a special
education teacher and therefore did not qualify as protected speech.780
Citing the U. S. Supreme Court’s recent Lane v. Franks781 decision, the court considered
whether Koehn’s complaints to the ISBE should be considered protected free speech. The court
pointed out communicating to the ISBE was outside of the normal chain of communication and
not a part of Koehn’s official duties as a school psychologist.782 Applying the five-step
Connick/Pickering analysis, the court evaluated whether Koehn’s communication to the ISBE
addressed a matter of public concern.783 The court concluded Koehn’s complaints to the ISBE
about the school district’s perceived non-compliance with special education laws clearly
addressed a matter of public concern.784 Having met Connick/Pickering’s public concern
threshold, the court applied the test’s second prong to determine whether Koehn’s speech had
been a motivating factor for his termination. The court reasoned since Koehn had received an
unsatisfactory evaluation rating prior to his termination, school officials had documented
Koehn’s performance deficiencies prior to Koehn having communicated to the ISBE about the
special education programs.785 As a result, the court concluded although Koehn’s complaints to
the ISBE addressed a matter of public concern, Koehn’s termination had not been shown to be
the result of his complaints to the ISBE. Koehn appealed the decision to the Seventh Circuit.
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The appellate panel considered whether Koehn had been terminated as a result of his
complaints to the ISBE. The panel concluded:
A jury reasonably could find from the evidence of record that Koehn was fired on
account of his speech. And since the defendants have not pursued, for purposes of this
appeal, their contention that Koehn’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment,
we vacate the grant of summary judgement on the retaliation claim and remand for
further proceedings.786
This decision was not appealed.
Munroe v. Central Bucks School District (2015)
The same year, in Munroe v. Central Bucks School District,787 the Third Circuit reviewed
whether a high school English teacher’s blog posts should be considered protected speech.
Natalie Munroe was employed at Central Bucks East High School as an English teacher. Prior to
2009, Munroe had received positive performance evaluations from school officials. In 2009,
Munroe started an on-line blog entitled “’Where are we going, and why are we in this
handbasket?’”788 Munroe authored the blog under her first name and last initial. The majority
of Munroe’s blogs addressed personal interest topics. However, Munroe also posted her opinions
about administrators, colleagues, and students. In one blog entry she referred to her students as
“’jerk, rat-like, dunderhead, whiny, simpering grade-grubbers with unrealistically high
perception[s] of their own ability levels, and frightfully dim.’”789 Munroe also blogged about her
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students’ parents, stating they were “’breeding a disgusting brood of insolent, unappreciative,
selfish brats.’”790 The principal learned about Munroe’s blog after receiving an email from a
local newspaper reporter. The reporter claimed he had seen the blog on Facebook and that
students were circulating it through social media sites stating the identity of the teacher.791 The
next day, the principal met with Munroe. During the meeting, the principal confronted Munroe
about the blog posts and placed her on an unpaid suspension.792 While on suspension, Munroe
conducted television interviews defending her blogs, claiming she had been unfairly
disciplined.793 The following month, Munroe went on a previously planned maternity leave and
remained out for the rest of the school year. At the end of the year, Munroe’s evaluation from
the principal rated her job performance as unsatisfactory.794
The following year, Munroe returned to work. The principal received complaints from
parents who heard about the blog, some of whom requested their children not be placed in
Munroe’s classroom. Throughout the school year, Munroe received additional negative
performance evaluation ratings. Munroe requested a transfer to another school, but the principal
denied Munroe’s request. At the end of the school year, Munroe received a notice that her
employment contract was being terminated.795 Munroe filed a lawsuit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging her termination was a
consequence of her blog posts.
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Applying Lane796 and Garcetti, the court considered whether Munroe’s blog qualified for
free speech protection. The court pointed out there must be a “’balance between the interests of
the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the [public employer], in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its
employee.’”[sic]797 Reasoning that the blog had not been directed at her employer, the court
concluded Munroe had created the blog in her role as a private citizen.
The court next applied Connick to evaluate the context of Munroe’s blog. This
examination led the court to conclude the effect of Munroe’s blog had eroded “the necessary
trust and respect between Munroe and her students.”798 The court observed that Munroe’s
statements had attracted considerable negative attention from both parents and the general
public.799 Based upon this observation, the court concluded Munroe’s blog had produced
disruptive effects and reasoned Munroe’s blog, therefore, was not entitled to First Amendment
protection.800 Munroe appealed the decision to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.
Applying the modified Connick/Pickering balancing test, the appellate panel examined
whether Munroe’s blog should be considered protected speech.801 The panel pointed out
Munroe’s blog may have addressed matters of public concern because she was discussing
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educational issues. However, Munroe’s blog also significantly disrupted both Munroe’s ability
to perform her duties as a high school teacher and the overall functioning of the school district.802
The panel noted, “when a teacher’s derogatory comments about his or her students cause
numerous parents to tell the school district that they ‘don’t want her as my child’s teacher,’ it is
appropriate to conclude that his or her speech impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties as
a teacher.”803 The panel also explained when a citizen enters government service, “the citizen by
necessity must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom.”804 This reasoning led the panel
to rule Munroe’s blog was not entitled to First Amendment protection.805 Munroe did not appeal
the decision.
2016
Brown v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago (2016)
In Brown v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago,806 the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois examined whether a public school teacher’s use of a
racial slur in a classroom should be treated as protected free speech. Lincoln Brown was a
Caucasian sixth grade teacher in a Chicago middle school that served a predominately AfricanAmerican student population. During a grammar lesson, Brown used the word “’nigger’”807
when he read aloud a note he had confiscated during class from an African American student.
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After reading the note, Brown conducted a 40-minute in-class discussion about the word’s
history, using the word throughout the discussion. During the discussion, the principal entered
the room and heard Brown using the word. The principal reported the incident to the Board of
Education, indicating Brown’s use of a racial slur constituted a violation of the Board of
Education’s verbal abusive language policy.808 The Board of Education issued Brown a predisciplinary hearing notice.809 After the disciplinary hearing, the Board of Education issued
Brown a five-day suspension for violating the Board’s policy and disrupting the educational
process.810 Brown filed an appeal with the Board of Education and the board affirmed its
decision. Brown then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois alleging his suspension was the result of his protected classroom speech and violated
his First Amendment speech rights. Brown argued he used the word in a “teachable moment”811
and, therefore, his classroom use of the racial slur should be protected by the First Amendment.
The district court applied Garcetti to determine whether Brown’s classroom speech was
protected by the First Amendment. The court pointed out public employers can regulate
employee speech without violating the First Amendment if the speech is uttered as part of the
employee’s duties.812 Applying Mayer,813 the court pointed out a teacher’s classroom speech
related to “racial, cultural and ethnic epithets [are] subject to regulation.”814 In Mayer, the
Seventh Circuit ruled First Amendment protection did not apply to a classroom teacher when she
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departed from the Board of Education’s adopted curriculum.815 The district court noted Brown
had departed from his lesson plan and, as a result, ran the risk that his speech would be contrary
to the Board of Education’s expectations.816 Based upon this conclusion, the court held the
Board of Education had not violated the First Amendment by disciplining Brown. Brown
appealed the lower court decision to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
Applying Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit considered whether Brown’s classroom speech
qualified for First Amendment protection. The panel pointed out if a public employee is not
“wearing her hat ‘as a citizen’…” the speech does not qualify for First Amendment protection.817
The panel noted, “Brown’s First Amendment claim [had] fail[ed] right out of the gate.”818 The
court explained its 2007 Mayer decision had concluded a teacher’s political classroom speech
was not akin to speech made as a private citizen and therefore was not protected by the First
Amendment. The appellate panel further explained that the duties of a teacher are to teach what
is expected. A decision to deviate from those subjects does not take that speech outside of a
teacher’s official duties.819 As a result, the Seventh Circuit held Brown’s classroom speech was
not entitled to First Amendment protection. Brown did not appeal the decision.
Coomes v. Edmonds School District No.15 (2016)
In Coomes v. Edmonds820, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a special-education
teacher’s email complaints to school officials and colleagues should be considered protected free
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speech. Tristan Coomes was a middle school special education teacher working with students in
the school district’s Emotional and Behavioral Disorders (EBD) Program.821 Coomes’s duties
included developing student IEPs, providing students with specialized academic and behavioral
instruction, and managing the EBD program. During the first three years of employment,
Coomes received high ratings on her performance evaluations.822 However, these evaluation
reports noted the need for Coomes to “continue to develop the academic aspects of her
curriculum.”823
In the spring of her fourth year of employment, Coomes sent a letter to the principal,
the human resources manager, and her union representative stating the principal was creating a
“’hostile work environment…’”824 Coomes’s letter claimed the principal was targeting teachers
who voiced concerns about administrative decisions.825 Coomes claimed the principal refused to
mainstream her students who were ready for regular education experiences due to the increased
financial costs.826 Coomes forwarded the letter to several other teachers.827 Subsequently, the
principal contacted the assistant superintendent and requested that Coomes be transferred to
another building, but the assistant superintendent denied the request.
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The next year, the principal assigned all of Coomes’s EBD students to regular
education classes. Coomes emailed the assistant principal voicing her concerns that the
principal’s decision had not been based upon each student’s individual IEP. Next, Coomes
emailed her union representative and the assistant superintendent, citing the same concerns.
Shortly thereafter, Coomes emailed the principal and other EBD staff expressing her concerns
regarding one of her student’s mainstream classroom placement. Coomes continued to email her
concerns about students’ placements to the principal, assistant principal, union representative and
assistant superintendent. In the spring, Coomes received the highest evaluation ranking in four
performance categories and the lowest ranking in three other areas.828 The narrative section of
the evaluation contained negative feedback stating Coomes’s teaching practices were “’done in a
random manner without the use of planned curriculum…did not have clear goals…[and lacked a]
scaffold of learning…’”829
At the end of the year, Coomes was notified she was being transferred to another
school.830 Prior to the start of the school year, Coomes collapsed in the high school building and,
as a result, requested a medical leave for the first semester. School officials granted her leave
request. Thereafter, Coomes contacted an attorney stating she could not return to work for the
second semester. Coomes’s attorney sent a letter to school officials stating that due to the hostile
work environment Coomes had suffered at the elementary building and subsequent transfer to
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the high school, Coomes’s therapist had advised she could not return to work in the school
district.831 Thereafter, Coomes filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District
of Washington claiming her transfer to the high school had been prompted by her email
complaints to school officials and these email complaints should be treated as protected First
Amendment free speech.
Applying the Connick/Pickering analysis, the court considered whether Coomes’s emails
about special education services concerns to school officials and colleagues qualified for First
Amendment protection. Referencing Johnson v. Poway,832 the court noted that a failure to meet
each step of the Connick/Pickering analysis would immediately discontinue any further court
inquiry.833 Applying the first prong, the district court pointed out Coomes’ emails raised
concerns regarding services for children with disabilities, and, therefore, addressed a matter of
public concern.834 Next the district court examined the second prong of the Connick/Pickering
analysis and considered whether Coomes was speaking as a private citizen or pursuant to her
official duties as a school district employee. Applying Garcetti, the court pointed out Coomes’
emails criticizing changes to the EBD program were part of her job as the EBD teacher and
manager of the program.835 The court further pointed out Coomes’ emails were “expressing her
professional opinions about the appropriate management of a program in which she played a
leadership role.”836 Therefore, the court concluded Coomes’ claim did not pass the second prong
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of the Connick/Pickering analysis. Based upon this conclusion, the district court did not proceed
with any further analysis. Coomes appealed the decision.
Applying Garcetti, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether Coomes’
emails to school officials and colleagues qualified for First Amendment protection. The panel
pointed out in Dahlia v. Rodriguez837 when applying the Connick/Pickering analysis “all five
factors are independently necessary…[but] …failure to meet any one of them is fatal to the
plaintiff’s case.”838 As a result, the panel focused on the second prong to determine whether
Coomes had spoken as a private citizen or as a public employee.839 Quoting Garcetti, the panel
reasoned if Coomes’ speech “’owes its existence’ to [her] position as a teacher, then [she] spoke
as a public employee, not as a citizen, and our inquiry is at an end.”840 The panel noted, as the
teacher and manager of the EBD program, Coomes’ emails about concerns with the EBD
program and students’ services were within the scope of her duties as an EBD teacher and
program manager.841 Based upon this conclusion, the panel determined Coomes’ emails to
school officials and colleagues were made in her role as a public employee and not as a private
citizen. As a result, the panel affirmed the lower court’s decision and held Coomes’ emails were
not entitled to First Amendment protection. Coomes did not appeal the decision.

837

Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2013).
Coomes v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15, 816 F.3d 1255, 1260 (W.D. Wa. 2016), quoting Dahlia v. Rodriguez, 735
F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2013).
839
Coomes v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15, 816 F.3d 1255, 1260 (W.D. Wa. 2016).
840
Id., quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-422 (2006).
841
Coomes v. Edmonds Sch. Dist. No. 15, 816 F.3d 1255, 1264 (W.D. Wa. 2016).
838

148

2017
Sorescu v. Harper (2017)
The following year, in Sorescu v. Harper,842 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois considered whether a public school teacher’s speech to the Board of
Education’s Office of Inspector General (OIG) and to a local news reporter about student
attendance tracking practices should be treated as protected free speech. Valentina Sorescu was
a high school math teacher for the Chicago Public Schools. Sorescu was endorsed to teach
computer science and served as a member of the school’s Professional Problems Committee
(PPC).843 During a PPC meeting, Sorescu learned building administrators were altering student
attendance data. Sorescu learned building administrators were changing the attendance codes for
students who had been marked as “’unexcused’ to ‘school function.’” 844 Sorescu claimed this
practice increased student attendance percentages, presumably because student attendance was
one factor used in determining state financial aid for the school. Subsequently, Sorescu and two
colleagues contacted a local newspaper reporter to share this information. The information led to
an article that was published in the local newspaper entitled “What Schools Will Do to Keep
Students on Track.”845 The article did not identify Sorescu as a source because she had indicated
she wished to remain anonymous.846 Thereafter, the Board of Education’s Office of Inspector
General (OIG) contacted Sorescu to schedule a meeting regarding the alleged attendance
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issues.847 During the meeting Sorescu shared how student attendance data was changed in order
to increase student attendance percentages.
Sorescu subsequently alleged she had suffered retaliation from the interim principal.
Specifically, Sorescu claimed she had been singled out to complete a new access request form
for computer access. Sorescu also claimed the interim principal had assigned Sorescu to teach
more computer science elective classes than math core classes. Sorescu also claimed she had
been denied access to the teacher grading software program on several occasions.848 Sorescu
also noted she had been excluded from the local school council (LCS) meeting where school
budget crisis issues were discussed.849 At the end of the school year, the interim principal
reviewed the projected student enrollment for the next school year. As a result of a projected
decrease in enrollment and budget shortfalls, Sorescu was informed her teaching position had
been eliminated.850 Sorescu filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois alleging her speech to the OIG and newspaper reporter had triggered a series of events
that had cumulated in the elimination of her teaching position.
Applying Garcetti, the district court considered whether Sorescu’s speech to the OIG and
interview with a newspaper reporter should be accorded free speech protection. The court
pointed out, “The critical question under Garcetti is whether the speech at issue is itself
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ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those
duties.” 851 The court noted Sorescu learned of the attendance fraud as a result of her
membership on the building’s Professional Planning Committee (PPC). The court also noted as
a public employee, Sorescu was “required to cooperate with OIG investigations pursuant to
Board rules and state law.”852 As a result, the court concluded Sorescu’s speech to the OIG was
part of her job duties and therefore was not entitled to First Amendment protection.853
Next, applying Garcetti, the court evaluated whether Sorescu’s interview with a
newspaper reporter was protected free speech. The court noted Sorescu spoke to the newspaper
reporter anonymously and, therefore, this speech was made outside of her official employment
duties. As a result, the court concluded Sorescu’s speech to the newspaper reporter had been
made in her role as a private citizen for F’irst Amendment purposes.854 Applying Connick, the
court evaluated whether Sorescu’s speech touched upon a matter of public concern. The court
noted the “‘quality of education and conditions in the Chicago public schools constitute matters
of vital public concern.’”855 As a result, the court reasoned Sorescu’s speech to the newspaper
reporter met the public concern prong of the Connick/Pickering analysis. Applying the third
prong of the Connick/Pickering analysis, the court examined whether Sorescu’s interest in
speaking to the newspaper reporter “outweighed the employer’s interest in ‘promoting the
efficiency of the public services it performs…’”856 Here, the court noted Sorescu’s interview
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with the newspaper reporter took place during the summer and therefore did not disrupt the
school’s operations. Next, the court examined whether Sorescu’s discussion with the reporter
was a factor in her layoff. The court pointed out Sorescu had failed to demonstrate her
discussion with the newspaper reporter was a substantial factor in the interim principal’s decision
to lay her off. The court further noted the interim principal had not learned Sorescu was one of
the anonymous sources for the newspaper article until after the layoff.857 As a result, the court
concluded Sorescu’s speech to the newspaper reporter was not a motivating factor in her layoff.
This led the court to conclude Sorescu’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment.
Sorescu did not appeal the decision.
Payson v. Board of Education of Mount Pleasant Cottage School USFD (2017)
In Payson v. Board of Education of Mount Pleasant Cottage School USFD,858 the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York considered whether a special
education teacher’s complaints as a teacher and as a union vice president to her superintendent
and principal were entitled to First Amendment protection. Laurie Tyler was a special education
teacher for Pleasantville Cottage School. Tyler complained to the superintendent and principal
that her students were not receiving required IEP services from the school psychologist. Several
months later, Tyler complained to the superintendent that she did not agree with a counselor’s
recommendation for one of her student’s IEP placements. One month later, Tyler complained
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again to the superintendent that her classroom was out of compliance with the school district’s
student-to-teacher-assistant ratio. No action was taken following any of these complaints.
Several years later, Tyler became the teacher union’s vice president. Tyler emailed the
president of the union asking whether teachers completing professional development work
beyond their contract hours violated the teachers’ collective bargaining agreement.859 Upon
hearing about the email, the principal met with Tyler and the superintendent. During the
meeting, the principal accused Tyler of missing a professional development workshop and
informed her that a reprimand would be placed in her file. Tyler claimed she had been given
permission to work in her classroom during the professional development time.860
Several months later, a teacher asked Tyler to attend a meeting with her and the
superintendent. The teacher was filing a workman’s compensation claim alleging harassment by
the superintendent. During the meeting, when Tyler asked questions in her role as the union
representative, the superintendent told her she was “not allowed to speak.”861 Following the
meeting, the superintendent wrote Tyler another letter of reprimand stating Tyler was harassing
members of the building’s IEP team. Later that same day, the superintendent contacted the
principal and stated Tyler’s class “has to be disbanded now.”862 As a result, Tyler found herself
without any students or a teaching assignment for two weeks. Thereafter, Tyler was assigned to
an Interim Alternative Education Setting (IAES) program located in another building on the
school’s campus.863 Students who were assigned to the IAES program were students who had
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been suspended for violent episodes. Tyler was concerned she would be alone with the students
who were in the program. Tyler expressed her concerns to the superintendent about her safety
since she was often by herself with the students.864 The superintendent did not respond to
Tyler’s concerns.
Shortly thereafter, the superintendent recommended to the Board of Education that Tyler
undergo a medical examination to assess her mental fitness for duty.865 The Board of Education
approved the superintendent’s recommendation, and Tyler was placed on paid administrative
medical leave. After Tyler was medically cleared by her doctor, she complained to the
superintendent that she needed additional leave. The superintendent indicated Tyler would need
to use her accumulated sick leave instead of continuing on paid administrative leave. Tyler filed
a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, arguing her letters of
reprimand, subsequent transfer, and denial of additional paid medical leave constituted
retaliation for the complaints she had made and her advocacy as a union vice president.
Referencing Montero v. City of Yonkers, New York,866 and Garcetti, the district court first
considered whether Tyler’s complaints to the superintendent and principal about students’ IEP
services merited First Amendment protection. The court pointed out Tyler advocated for her
students’ needs and since she was responsible for her students’ academic and behavioral
progress, this advocacy was carried out in her role as an employee.867 Based upon this
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observation, the court concluded Tyler’s complaints to the superintendent and principal were not
made as a private citizen and therefore were not protected free speech. As a result, the court did
not proceed with further teacher free speech analysis.
Applying Lane, the court next examined whether Tyler’s speech as a representative of the
union was protected free speech. The court pointed out when Tyler inquired about professional
development hours for teachers she was functioning within her responsibilities as a public
employee.868 The court explained that part of a public school employee’s responsibilities were to
understand their required work hours and compensation. As a result, the court ruled Tyler’s
advocacy regarding employees’ professional development work hours and compensation was
made in her role as a public employee. However, the court also pointed out when Tyler was in
her role as a union representative during her colleagues workman’s compensation meeting, this
was outside her responsibility as a teacher because it “did not concern Tyler or her employment
in any way.”869 As a result, the court concluded Tyler’s speech during that meeting had been
made in her role as a private citizen and was not entitled to First Amendment protection.
Referencing Lynch v. Ackley,870 the court next considered whether Tyler’s role as a union
representative for a colleague’s workman’s compensation claim was of a personal interest for
Tyler or whether it constituted a matter of public concern. The court noted Tyler’s advocacy for
an employee as a union representative held no personal interest for Tyler and, therefore,
addressed a matter of public concern.871 As a result, after concluding Tyler’s advocacy in her
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role as a union representative qualified for First Amendment protection, the court next
considered whether Tyler had suffered “adverse employment action”872 as a result of her union
advocacy. The court reviewed Tyler’s claims, including the dissolution of her class and
subsequent lack of any teaching assignment for a period of time. The court reasoned this could
“’deter a similarly situated individual…from exercising his or her constitutional rights.’”873
Finally, the court assessed whether Tyler had “demonstrate[d] a causal link between her
protected activity and the adverse employment action.”874 The court pointed out the
superintendent dissolved Tyler’s class on the day following Tyler’s advocacy for the teacher
regarding the workman’s compensation claim.875 As a result, the court concluded Tyler had
“thus established a prima facie claim for First Amendment retaliation based on her Union
representation of another employee.”876 The school district did not appeal the decision.
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CHAPTER 3
ANALYSIS
As highlighted in Chapter 2, the Supreme Court has issued three significant decisions
impacting teacher free speech rights. The earliest of these cases, Pickering v. Board of
Education,877 established that there should be a balance established between the First
Amendment free speech rights of a public employee and the need for the employer to maintain
efficiencies in its services.878 This balance, often referred to as the Pickering balancing test,
contained three distinct questions, or “prongs” that lower courts were suggested to evaluate when
ruling on litigation involving First Amendment free speech rights and public employees. The
prongs of the Pickering test were:
1.

Did the individual show his or her speech addressed a matter or matters of
public interest and concern?

2.

Did the individual show his or her speech was a significant or motivating
factor in the employer’s [disciplinary] decision?

3. Did the court balance the individual’s interests in commenting on matters of
public concern as a citizen against the public employer’s interest in
‘promoting the efficiency of public service’?879
In 1983, Connick v. Myers880 modified the original Pickering analysis. The Connick
Court added to the original public concern prong found in the Pickering analysis. The Court
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added that when courts evaluate a public employee’s speech to determine whether the speech
addressed a matter of public concern, lower courts must also consider the content, form, and
context of the public employee’s speech to determine if the public concern prong is met. The
Connick Court differentiated public employee speech that addressed matters of public concern
(which was more likely to receive First Amendment protection) from speech related to an
employee’s private interests by adding the examination of the content, form and context of the
public employee’s speech within the first prong of the Pickering analysis.881 This expanded
analysis became known as the Connick/Pickering balancing test.
Thirteen years later, the Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos882 added a new element
to the established Connick/Pickering test. Garcetti suggested courts begin their analysis of public
employee free speech cases by first considering whether the employee’s speech was made in
their role as a public employee or as a private citizen. Per Garcetti, if an employee’s speech was
made as a private citizen or failed to address a matter of public concern, the Connick/Pickering
balancing test need not be applied, as the employee speech would per se be unprotected by the
First Amendment.883
The Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti narrowed the Connick/Pickering test for public
employee free speech protection.884 Prior to Garcetti, courts had worried teachers could abuse
their captive audience of students in public school classrooms by using classroom time to
discuss topics unrelated to the curriculum they were hired to teach.885 Under Garcetti, public
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employees speaking as part of their official duties were no longer entitled to First Amendment
protection.886 This expanded analysis became known as the Garcetti test. The expanded analysis
asked:
1. Whether the speech was made pursuant to an employee’s official duties;
2. Whether the speech was on a matter of public concern;
3. Whether the government’s interests, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff’s free speech interests; and
4. Whether the protected speech was a motivating factor in the adverse employment
action:
5.

Whether the defendant would have reached the same employment decision in the
absence of the protected speech.887

Figure 1 outlines how the Garcetti test is generally applied by courts.
The progression in case law from Pickering to Garcetti has had a significant impact on
whether or not teacher speech has enjoyed First Amendment protection. While teacher speech in
the Pickering era needed only to tip the proverbial balance between the teacher’s right to speak
and the employee’s right to control the speech in order to be protected, the bar for First
Amendment protection is now much higher. Under Garcetti, which to date remains the law of
the land, if a teacher’s speech is made “pursuant to their official duties”888 the speech will
receive no protection. As will be outlined in the sections below, the Garcetti test has had a
significant impact on recent case law, leading to just a handful of successful teacher victories in
teacher free speech cases in recent years.
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Garcetti’s First Prong

The teacher’s speech is not entitled to First
Amendment protection.

YES

Was the speech made pursuant to the
teacher’s official duties?

NO
Garcetti’s Second Prong

NO

The teacher’s speech is not entitled to
First Amendment protection.

Does the speech address a matter of public concern?

YES
Garcetti’s Third Prong

YES

Does the government’s interest in promoting its
efficiency outweigh the teacher’s free speech interests?

The teacher’s speech is not entitled to
First Amendment protection.

NO
Garcetti’s Fourth Prong

NO

The teacher’s speech is not entitled to
First Amendment protection.

YES

The teacher’s speech is not entitled to
First Amendment protection.

Was the speech a motivating factor in
the adverse employment decision?

YES
Garcetti’s Fifth Prong
Would the school district have reached the
same employment decision absent the speech?

NO

The speech is entitled to First
Amendment protection.

Figure 1. Judicial process for Garcetti application.
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Methodology for Analysis of U.S. District and U.S. Circuit Court Litigation
Forty-three teacher free speech cases were examined and reviewed in Chapter 2. The
process of reviewing both U.S. District and U.S. Circuit Court cases began with an open coding
analysis to identify initial concepts and categories of these cases. As a result, the U.S. District
and Circuit Court cases were evaluated in separate groups to better organize and analyze the data
between the two different levels of courts. Next, utilizing axial coding methodology, each case
in Group 1 (U.S. District Court cases) and in Group 2 (U.S. Circuit Court cases) was categorized
based on commonalities that presented in each group. Finally, utilizing selective coding
methodology, these commonalities were titled by category.889
Upon analyzing all forty-three U.S. District Court and U.S. Circuit Court cases, three
categories emerged within the data for both Group 1 and Group 2. The three common categories
that emerged from this analysis were: judicial tests applied, litigation outcome by state, and type
of teacher speech. Further analysis from the type of teacher speech category created the need for
additional coding, which is presented in Table 5. The data from Group 1, U.S. District Court
decisions, is presented in Tables 1, 3, and 6. The data in Table 6 is also presented in bar graph
form in Figure 3. The data from Group 2, U.S. Circuit Court decisions, is presented in Tables 2,
4, and 7. The data in Table 7 is also presented in bar graph form in Figure 3.
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Analysis of Judicial Tests and Holdings in U.S. District Court Litigation
All 22 U.S. District Court decisions reviewed in Chapter 2 were issued post-Garcetti. As
might be expected, every court but one applied the newest speech test—Garcetti—in their
analysis of the speech in question. Each of the cases, and the legal test applied by the court in
the case, are listed in Table 1. Teachers in just four of the 22 U.S. District Court cases
successfully argued for First Amendment free speech protection. Out of the 18 cases where
courts did not find the teacher-speakers to enjoy First Amendment protection, 16 (89%) of these
cases were lost after application of the first prong of the Garcetti test. This data suggests that the
first prong of the Garcetti test is the biggest hurdle for litigants seeking First Amendment
protection.
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Table 1
U.S. District Court Litigation
Federal District Court Cases

Pagani v. Board of
Education890
Wilcoxon v. Red Clay
Consolidated School
District891
Houlihan v. Sussex Technical
School District892
Ryan v. Shawnee Mission
Unified School District893
Pearson v. Board of
Education894
Carone v. Mascolo895
Bryant v. Gardner896
Veggian v. Camden Board of
Education897
Dorcely v. Wyandanch Union
Free School District898
Kramer v. New York City Board
of Education899
Adams v. New York State
Education Department900
Condiff v. Hart County School
District901
Stahura-Uhl v. Iroquois School
District902
Kelly v. Huntington Union Free
School District903

Pickering
Applied

Connick/
Pickering
applied

Garcetti
applied

Teacher
Wins

√
√

District
Wins
√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√
√
√

√
√
√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

(Table continued on the next page)
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(Table 1 continued)
Federal District Court Cases

Goudeau v. East Baton Rouge
Parish School Board904
Palmer v. Penfield Central
School District905
Bielewicz v. Penn-Trafford
School District906
Ross v. New York City
Department of Education907
Pekowsky v. Yonkers Board of
Education908
McShea v. School Board of
Collier County909
Sorescu v. Harper910
Payson v. Board of Education
of Mount Pleasant Cottage
School USFD911

Pickering
Applied

Connick/
Pickering
Applied
√

Garcetti
Applied

Teacher
Wins

District
Wins
√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√
√

√

√

Judicial Application of the Garcetti Prongs in U.S. District Court Cases
As mentioned above, of the 22 U.S. District Court cases reviewed, just four teachers
successfully argued for protection of their speech under the First Amendment. In two of these
cases, Wilcoxon and Pekowsky, courts found the teachers were entitled to First Amendment
protection after successfully arguing the first two prongs of the Garcetti test, by demonstrating
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that their speech was not made pursuant to their professional duties and the speech in question
did address a matter of public concern.912
It is unclear as to why two courts found the teacher speech in question was entitled to
constitutional protection after applying just the first two prongs of Garcetti while the other two
cases were ruled on only after the teacher successfully argued all five prongs of the Garcetti test.
Interestingly, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York ruled on two of the
four cases where teachers successfully argued for First Amendment protection. However, the
court differed in the number of prongs they applied in each case. In Pekowsky, the court held the
teacher’s speech to be protected by meeting the first two prongs of Garcetti, whereas in Payson,
the same court came to the same constitutional determination only after applying all five Garcetti
prongs. While there are a host of reasons as to why the court may have applied Garcetti
differently in these two cases, the severity of the sanction being levied against the teacherplaintiff may have played a role in the outcome of the case. In Payson, the teacher had been
reprimanded and transferred. In Pekowsky, the teacher had only been recommended for a
transfer. It could be that—at least in the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of New
York—a court is more likely to apply all five prongs of Garcetti when the employee is facing the
loss of a significant property right to continued employment.
In three of the four cases where a teacher successfully argued for First Amendment
protection at the U.S. District Court level, the teacher speech in question took place outside of
their teaching role. In Pekowsky and Payson, both teachers were functioning in their role as
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McShea v. Sch. Bd. of Collier Cnty., 58 F. Supp.3d 1325 (M.D. Fla. 2014); Payson v. Bd. of Educ. of Mount
Pleasant Cottage Sch.., USFD 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154296 (S.D.N.Y.2017). Once a court finds that a teacher’s
speech is not protected under one prong of Garcetti, often the other prongs are not applied.
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union representatives when the speech occurred. In McShea, the speech was issued outside of
the petitioner’s role as a teacher, when she contacted a third party regarding perceived school
district misconduct. This is an important pattern that administrators and boards of education
should note. Together, these cases suggest that the further the speech in question is distanced
from an employee’s traditional teaching role, the more likely it may be to enjoy First
Amendment protection.
Analysis of Judicial Tests and Holdings in U.S. Circuit Court Litigation
As with the District Court decisions, all 21 U.S. Circuit Court decisions reviewed in
Chapter 2 were issued post-Garcetti. Like the U.S. District Court decisions, all but two of the
U.S. Circuit Courts applied the newest speech test—Garcetti—in their analysis of the speech in
question. While just 4 in 22 teachers successfully argued for First Amendment protection at the
District Court level, teachers fared far worse in the federal appellate courts. Just one teacher in
the 21 U.S. Circuit Court cases successfully argued for First Amendment free speech protection.
Of the 20 cases where teachers were unsuccessful in arguing for First Amendment speech
protection, 12 of these cases, or 57%, ended after application of the first prong of the Garcetti
test. This data suggests, much like with the U.S. District Court cases, that the first prong of the
Garcetti test is an especially difficult hurdle for teachers to successfully surmount. Each of the
appellate cases, and the legal test applied by each court, are listed in Table 2.
Judicial Application of the Garcetti Prongs in U.S. Circuit Court Cases
As outlined above, of the 21 U.S. Circuit Court cases, only one teacher successfully
argued that her speech was entitled to First Amendment protection. In Reinhardt, the Tenth
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Circuit ruled the teacher was entitled to First Amendment protection after successfully arguing
only the first prong of the Garcetti test. Reinhardt is the second case in this study where a
teacher successfully argued for First Amendment protection for speech that took place with an
outside agency, much like the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida’s 2014
decision in McShea. Both teachers’ speech involved an outside agency that the teachers would
not normally interact with as a part of their official duties. In both instances, the court
determined that the speech was entitled to First Amendment protection. As outlined in the U.S.
District Court analysis section, it is essential that administrators and boards of education are
aware of the fact that teacher speech with an outside agency may be more likely to find First
Amendment protection than other types of speech.
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Table 2
U.S. Circuit Court Litigation
Federal Circuit Court Cases

Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County
School Board913
Mayer v. Monroe County
Community School
Corporation914
Lee v. York County School
Division915
Williams v. Dallas Independent
School District916
Panse v. Eastwood917
Samuelson v. LaPorte
Community School
District918
Baar v. Jefferson County Board
of Education919
Weintraub v. Board of
Education of the City
School District of the City
of New York920
Reinhardt v. Albuquerque
Public School Board of
Education921

Pickering
applied

Connick/
Pickering
applied

Garcetti applied

Teacher
Wins

√

District
Wins
√

√

√
√

√
√

√

√
√

√
√

√

√

√

√

√

√

(Table continued on the next page)
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Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 186 Fed. Appx. 885 (11th Cir. 2006).
Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Comty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007). The Seventh Circuit in Mayer applied
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part of her official duties.
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917
Panse v. Eastwood, 303 F. Appx. 933 (2d Cir. 2008).
918
Samuelson v. LaPorte Comty. Sch. Corp., 526 F.3d 1046 (7th Cir. 2008).
919
Baar v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 311 Fed. Appx. 817 (6th Cir. 2009).
920
Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2010).
921
Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 595 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 2010).
914

168

(Table 2 continued)
Federal Circuit Court Cases

Fox v. Traverse City Area
Public School Board of
Education922
Evans-Marshall v. Board of
Education of the Tipp City
Exempted Village School
District923
Johnson v. Poway924
Nagle v. Marron925
Massaro v. New York City
Department of Education927
Duvall v. Putnam City School
District928
Diadenko v. Folino929
Mpoy v. Rhee930
Koehn v. Tobias931
Munroe v. Central Bucks
School District932
Brown v. Board of Education
of the City of Chicago933
Coomes v. Edmonds School
District No. 15934

922

Pickering
Applied

Connick/
Pickering
Applied

Garcetti
Applied

Teacher
Wins

District
Wins

√

√

√

√

√
√
√

√
√

926

√

√

√

√
√
√
√

√
√
√
√

√

√

√

√
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Analysis of Litigation and Outcome by State
The speech cases reviewed in Chapter 2 were analyzed to look for any geographical
trends. Surprisingly, nearly one third, or 14 out of all 43 cases reviewed, originated in the state
of New York, making this state—by far—the most frequent origin of teacher free speech
litigation. Another state with multiple cases (although far fewer than New York) was Illinois.
Five of the 43 cases (12%) originated in Illinois. Five additional states accounted for two cases
each, or 5% of the total, and the remaining 43 states had either zero or one teacher free speech
case. In total, New York and Illinois accounted for 44% of all teacher free speech litigation.
One possible reason for the disproportionate number of cases originating in these two
states may be due to the strength of teacher unions and high teacher pay: teachers with strong
union representation and/or high pay might be better situated to litigate when free speech issues
arise. According to NBC News.com, the state of New York has the highest rate of union
membership in the United States and Illinois has the tenth highest.935 According to a Fordham
Institute report from 2012, Illinois rates number 8 and New York rates number 9 in teacher union
strength by state.936 According to app.com, a subsidiary of the USA Today Newspaper, New
York rates number 1 and Illinois number 13 in highest wages paid to teachers.937 While it is
impossible to know for sure why cases of this type disproportionately originate in New York and
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Charles B. Stockdale and Michael B. Sauter, The States with the Largest Unionized Work Forces, Feb 26, 2012,
available at https://www.nbcnews.com/businessmain/states-largest-unionized-work-forces-1C7100633 (last visited
Aug 26, 2018).
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Amber M. Winkler, Janie Scull, and Dara Zeehandelaar, How Strong are U.S. Teacher Unions? A State-By-State
Comparison, Oct. 2012, available at https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED537563.pdf (last visited Aug 26, 2018).
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Susanne Cervenka, These States Pay the Teachers the Most. Where Does Your State Fall?, Aug. 1, 2017,
available at https://www.app.com/story/news/investigations/data/2017/08/01/states-who-pay-teachers-themost/495826001/ (last visited Aug 26, 2018).
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Illinois, it is essential that administrators in these states are aware of the fact that there is a strong
history of litigation originating in these jurisdictions. Table 3 lists the state of origin for each
case reviewed by U.S. District Courts. Table 4 designates the state of origin for each case
examined by U.S. Circuit Courts.
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Table 3
U.S. District Court Cases by State of Origin
Federal District Court Cases
Pagani v. Board of Education
Wilcoxon v. Red Clay Consolidated
School District
Houlihan v. Sussex Technical School
District
Ryan v. Shawnee Mission Unified
School District
Pearson v. Board of Education
Carone v. Mascolo
Bryant v. Gardner
Veggian v. Camden Board of Education
Dorcely v. Wyandanch Union Free
School District
Kramer v. New York City Board of
Education
Adams v. New York State Education
Department
Condiff v. Hart County School District
Stahura-Uhl v. Iroquois School District
Kelly v. Huntington Union Free School
District
Goudeau v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Board
Palmer v. Penfield Central School
District
Bielewicz v. Penn-Trafford School
District
Ross v. New York City Department of
Education
Pekowsky v. Yonkers Board of
Education
McShea v. School Board of Collier
County
Sorescu v. Harper
Payson v. Board of Education of Mount
Pleasant Cottage School USFD
938

Teacher Wins

District Wins

Origin of
Litigation by State

√

Connecticut
Delaware

√

Delaware

√

Kansas

√
√
√
√
√

New York
Connecticut
Illinois
New Jersey
New York

√

New York

√

New York

√
√
√

Kentucky
New York
New York

√

Louisiana

√

New York

√

Pennsylvania

√

New York

√

√

New York938

√

Florida
√

√

Illinois
New York

New York had two of the four federal district court cases where a teacher won. The U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York opined both Pekowsky v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 23 F. Supp.3d 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
and Payson v. Bd. of Educ. of Mount Pleasant Cottage Sch.., USFD 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 154296
(S.D.N.Y.2017). In both cases, the teacher was acting in their role as a union representative when their speech
occurred.
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Table 4
U.S. Circuit Court Cases by State of Origin
Federal Circuit Court Cases
Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County
School Board
Mayer v. Monroe County
Community School Corporation
Lee v. York County School Division
Williams v. Dallas Independent
School District
Panse v. Eastwood
Samuelson v. LaPorte Community
School District
Barr v. Jefferson County Board of
Education
Weintraub v. Board of Education of
the City School District of the
City of New York
Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Public
School Board of Education
Fox v. Traverse City Area Public
School Board of Education
Evans-Marshall v. Board of
Education of the Tipp City
Exempted Village School
District
Johnson v. Poway
Nagle v. Marron
Massaro v. New York City
Department of Education
Duvall v. Putnam City School
District
Diadenko v. Folino
Mpoy v. Rhee
Koehn v. Tobias
Munroe v. Central Bucks School
District
Brown v. Board of Education of the
City of Chicago
Coomes v. Edmonds School District
No. 15

Teacher Wins

District Wins

Origin of
Litigation by State

√

Alabama

√

Indiana

√
√

Virginia
Texas

√
√

New York
Indiana

√

Kentucky

√

New York

√

New Mexico
√

Michigan

√

Ohio

√
√
√

California
New York
New York

√

Oklahoma

√
√
√
√

Illinois
District of Columbia
Illinois
Pennsylvania

√

Illinois

√

Washington
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Analysis of U.S. District Court Litigation by Speech Location, Speech Type
and Speech Target Group
The U.S. District Court cases reviewed in Chapter 2 were further analyzed to identify
emerging themes in the data. Utilizing axial coding methodology, three different themes
emerged from each U.S. District Court case: the location where the speech occurred, the type of
speech at issue, and for whom the teacher was advocating in each case. Next, using selective
coding, each theme was assigned a title.
The theme of speech location, defined as public school teacher speech that occurred within the
walls of the classroom, was entitled “in-classroom” (IC) speech. public school teacher speech
that occurred outside of the classroom, but with parties employed by the school district (such as
colleagues or administrators), was entitled “in-district” (ID) speech. Public school teacher
speech that occurred outside of the classroom and was directed to a party or parties not affiliated
with the school district was entitled “outside agency” (OA) speech. The theme of speech type
was sub-divided into two different categories. Public school teacher speech intended to voice
concerns about a decision or a practice that was taking place in the school district was classified
as “educational dispute” (ED) speech. Public school teacher speech intended to voice concerns
about a building or district policy was classified as “policy” (P) speech. The theme of speech
target group was also subdivided into two different categories. Public school teacher speech
issued with the intent to advocate for students was entitled “student advocacy” (SA) speech,
whereas teacher speech advocating for themselves or for a fellow teacher was entitled “teacher
advocacy” (TA) speech.
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Theme 1: Speech Location in U.S. District Court Cases
Of the 22 cases decided by U.S. District Courts, speech in the vast majority of cases –
18/22 (82%) – took place within the school district (ID). Speech in three cases (13%) took place
outside the school district with an outside agency (OA). Speech in only one of the 22 (4.5%)
U.S. District Court cases took place within the classroom walls (IC). These percentages are
significantly different from decisions made at the U.S. Circuit Court level and will be addressed
in the next section.
Theme 2: Speech Type in U.S. District Court Cases
Twelve of the 22 U.S. District Court cases (55%) involved teachers complaining about
decisions or practices occurring within the district or building (ED). Nine of the 22 cases (41%)
involved teachers complaining about school or district policies (P). In four of the U.S. District
Court cases successfully argued under Garcetti, three involved educational dispute (ED) speech.
Theme 3: Speech Target Group in U.S. District Court Cases
Nine of the 22 U.S. District Court cases (41%) involved teachers advocating on behalf of
themselves or other teachers (TA). Twelve of the 22 U.S. District Court cases (55%) involved
teachers advocating on behalf of students (SA). The data outlined in Table 5 defines the
terminology used in Tables 6 and 7 and Figures 3 and 4. The data outlined in Tables 6 and 7 list
the speech themes public school teachers engaged in that were litigated in U.S. District Courts.
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Table 5
Teacher Free Speech and Terminology
Code for Speech
Location/Type/Target Group
IC – In-Classroom Speech
ID – In-District Speech

OA – Outside Agency Speech
ED – Educational Dispute
P – Policy
C – Curricular
SA – Student Advocacy
TA – Teacher Advocacy

Definition
Teacher speech that occurred within the classroom
walls.
Teacher speech that occurred outside of the
classroom walls but within the school building or
district such as complaints to colleagues or
supervisors.
Teacher speech that occurred outside of the district
with an outside or independent agency such as a
department of education.
Teacher speech when a teacher complained about
decisions or practices occurring in the district or
building.
Teacher speech when a teacher complained about a
building or district policy.
Teacher speech regarding curriculum or lessons.
Teacher speech when a teacher was advocating for
students.
Teacher speech when a teacher was advocating for
another teacher
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Table 6
U. S. District Court Litigation by Speech Location, Type and Target Group
Federal District Court Cases

Pagani v. Board of Education
Wilcoxon v. Red Clay Consolidated
School District
Houlihan v. Sussex Technical School
District
Ryan v. Shawnee Mission Unified
School District
Pearson v. Board of Education
Carone v. Mascolo
Bryant v. Gardner
Veggian v. Camden BoE
Dorcely v. Wyandanch Union Free
School District
Kramer v. New York City BoE
Adams v. New York State Ed. Dept.
Condiff v. Hart County School District
Stahura-Uhl v. Iroquois School
District
Kelly v. Huntington Union Free School
District
Goudeau v. East Baton Rouge Parish
School Board
Palmer v. Penfield Central School
District
Bielewicz v. Penn-Trafford School
District
Ross v. New York City DoE
Pekowsky v. Yonkers BoE
McShea v. School Board of Collier Co.
Sorescu v. Harper
Payson v. Board of Education of Mt.
Pleasant Cottage School USFD

Teacher
Wins

District
Wins
√

√
√

ID/P/SA

√

ID/ED/TA

√
√
√
√
√

ID/ED/TA
ID/ED/TA
ID/P/SA
ID/P/SA
ID/ED/TA

√
√
√
√

IC/C
ID/ED/SA
ID/P/SA
ID/ED/SA

√

ID/ED/TA

√

ID/P/SA

√

ID/ED/SA

√

ID/P/SA

√

ID/ED/SA
ID/ED/TA
OA/P/TA
OA/P/SA
ID/ED/TA

√
√
√
√

Speech
Location/Type/Target
Group
OA/P/SA
ID/ED/TA
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9
8
8
7
6
6
5
4
4
3
2
2
1

1

1
0

0

0

0

0

0
In-District ED

In-District Policy
Issues

Teacher Advocacy

Outside Agency ED

Student Advocacy

Outside Agency
Policy Issues

IC/Curricular Speech

In-Classroom/Curricular Speech

Figure 2. U.S. District Court cases by speech location, speech type and target groups,
2006-2017.
Interestingly, none of the (SA) cases (0%) resulted in obtaining First Amendment speech
protection for the teacher-speaker. The U.S. District Courts in this study have clearly ruled that
advocating for students is part of a teacher’s official duties. If a teacher’s official duties include
advocating for the rights of students, teachers may become hesitant to continue to fight for what
is best for their students knowing that their speech is not likely to receive First Amendment
protection.
Analysis of U.S. Circuit Court Litigation by Speech Location, Type and Target Group
The U.S. Circuit Court cases reviewed in Chapter 2 were also further analyzed to identify
themes in the data. Utilizing axial coding methodology, each U.S. Circuit Court case was
evaluated. Identical themes emerged from the U.S. Circuit Court cases as the U.S. District Court
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cases. Utilizing selective coding, each theme was classified into one of the same categories as
the U.S. District Court cases. These themes are: speech location, speech type and speech
target group. The theme of speech location was entitled “in-classroom” (IC) speech, “indistrict (ID) speech” or “outside agency” (OA) speech. The theme of speech type was entitled
“educational dispute (ED) speech or “policy” (P) speech. The theme of speech target group
was entitled either “student advocacy” (SA) speech or “teacher advocacy” (TA) speech.
Theme 1: Speech Location in U.S. Circuit Court Cases
Of the 21 cases, 12 (57%) involved in-district speech (ID). Eleven of these 12 cases
included teachers who had voiced concerns to colleagues or supervisors and experienced
negative treatment as a result of what they perceived was engagement in First Amendment
protected speech. Six of the 21 U.S. Circuit Court cases (29%) involved speech with outside
agencies (OA) and another six cases (29%) involved in-class (IC) speech. In-classroom (IC)
speech litigation saw a more significant presence at the U.S. Circuit Court level as compared to
the U.S. District Court level. This difference may be explained by the fact that the Sixth and
Seventh Circuit Courts both opined that Garcetti did not clearly address the teaching of
curriculum in the classroom as found in Evans-Marshall939 and Mayer940. Specifically, the
Seventh Circuit interpreted Garcetti as guidance for teachers to follow the prescribed curriculum
per boards of education. The data reviewed here suggests that administrators and boards of
education should be very aware of the litigation history as it relates specifically to in-class (IC)
speech. In-classroom (IC) speech is still somewhat of a complex issue when applying Garcetti

939
940

Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of the Tipp City Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332 (6th Cir. 2010).
Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Comty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2007).
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in part due to the fact that the Supreme Court did not fully define how the case should properly
be applied to scholarship or teaching. In-classroom (IC) speech litigation in this study involved
teachers working not only with the curriculum within the classroom but also involved teachers
making political comments outside of the board-approved material. This could be an area for
future study, as will be discussed in Chapter 4.
Theme 2: Speech Type in U.S. Circuit Court Cases
Of the 21 cases, 12 (58%) involved educational dispute (ED) speech. Only six cases
(28%) involved curricular speech and three cases (14%) involved policy speech. This data
suggests that teachers are not litigating speech involving school district policies at the same rate
as they are litigating speech involving local school building or district practices.
Theme 3: Speech Type in U.S. Circuit Court Cases
Of the 21 U.S. Circuit Court cases reviewed, 10 (47%) involved teacher advocacy (TA) speech
and six (29%) involved student advocacy (SA) speech. Student advocacy (SA) speech was
involved in less than one-third of the U.S. Circuit Court cases, whereas this type of speech was
represented in 55% of all U.S. District Court cases on point. On the 21 U.S. Circuit Court cases,
only one petitioner was successful in obtaining First Amendment protection. The data outlined
in Table 7 and Figure 3 show the types of speech public school teachers engaged in that were
litigated in U.S. Circuit Courts. In Reinhardt, the Tenth Circuit opined that when a public school
speech-language pathologist went outside of the school district (OA) with her speech by hiring
an attorney to advocate for special needs students (SA), her speech was protected. The unique
factor in this case was when Reinhardt hired a private attorney, the Tenth Circuit opined she was
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speaking as a private citizen and the speech therefore was not part of her official duties. This
data suggests that public school teachers could possibly overcome Garcetti by engaging a private
resource for advocacy. An area for future study, which will be addressed in Chapter 4, could
further explore this possibility of skirting Garcetti.
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Table 7
U. S. Circuit Court Litigation by Type of Speech and Outcome
Federal Circuit Court Cases

Gilder-Lucas v. Elmore County
School Board
Mayer v. Monroe County
Community School Corporation
Lee v. York County School Division
Williams v. Dallas Independent
School District
Panse v. Eastwood
Samuelson v. LaPorte Community
School District
Barr v. Jefferson County Board of
Education
Weintraub v. Board of Education of
the City School District of the
City of New York
Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Public
School Board of Education
Fox v. Traverse City Area Public
School Board of Education
Evans-Marshall v. Board of
Education of the Tipp City
Exempted Village School District
Johnson v. Poway
Nagle v. Marron
Massaro v. New York City
Department of Education
Duvall v. Putnam City School
District

Teacher
Wins

District
Wins
√

Speech
Location/Type/Target
Group
ID/ED/TA

√

IC/C

√
√

IC/C
ID/ED/TA

√
√

IC/C
ID/P/TA

√

ID/ED/TA

√

ID/ED/TA

√

OA/ED/SA
√

ID/ED/TA

√

IC/C

√
√

IC/C
ID/ED/TA
ID/ED/SA
ID/ED/TA
OA/ED/TA
ID/ED/SA
OA/ED/SA

√
√

(Table continued on next page)
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(Table 7 continued)
Federal Circuit Court Cases

Teacher
Wins

District
Wins

Speech
Location/Type/Target
Group

√
√
√
√

OA/P/SA
ID/ED/TA
OA/P/SA
OA/ED/TA

√

IC/C

√

ID/ED/SA

Diadenko v. Folino
Mpoy v. Rhee
Koehn v. Tobias
Munroe v. Central Bucks School
District
Brown v. Board of Education of the
City of Chicago
Coomes v. Edmonds School District
No. 15

7
6

6

6
5
4
3
2

2

2

2
1

1

1

1
0
0
In-District ED

In-District Policy
Issues

Teacher Advocacy

Outside Agency ED

Student Advocacy

Outside Agency
Policy Issues

IC/Curricular Speech

In-Classroom/Curricular Speech

Figure 3. U.S. Circuit Court cases by speech location, speech type and target group,
2006-2017.

183

How Did Garcetti Change the Landscape for K-12 Public school Teacher
First Amendment Free Speech Rights?
The Second Circuit’s opinion in Weintraub provides an excellent example of how
Garcetti narrowed the scope of First Amendment free speech rights for public school teachers.941
In 2006, Weintraub sued his school district after being disciplined by administrators for engaging
in what he argued was First Amendment protected free speech. The U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York agreed, finding Weintraub’s argument met the public concern
threshold in the Connick/Pickering analysis. However, shortly after the U.S. District Court’s
ruling, the Garcetti decision was handed down by the Supreme Court and the school district filed
for reconsideration. The Second Circuit, now applying Garcetti, found Weintraub’s speech was
made pursuant to his official duties and Weintraub, on reconsideration, lost the case.
Prior to Garcetti, whether a teacher’s speech had anything to do with their duties was
generally not a stand-alone factor in court decisions. Under Connick/Pickering, a teacher needed
only to prove the speech they engaged with addressed a matter of public concern. Thus, the
courts have moved from considering the topic of a teacher’s speech to the capacity in which a
teacher was acting when the speech was uttered. Garcetti created a new hurdle impacting K-12
public school teachers’ free speech protections. Teacher speech that was previously thought
constitutional suddenly became unprotected under Garcetti.
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Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the City of New York, 593 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2010).
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According to the National Education Association (NEA), Garcetti has had a devastating
impact on the free speech rights of public school teachers.942 The NEA advises public school
teachers that in order to go around Garcetti’s tenets they should “go public.”943 Going public can
help better ensure that teachers’ speech will enjoy First Amendment protection, as
communicating outside the public school system is “rarely an employee’s official duty.”944 The
NEA suggests that when a teacher feels that an action, policy, or perceived treatment of a
student, colleague, or a practice is unfair, the teacher should contact someone outside the school
district. This plan is not infallible, however. The Second Circuit opined in their decision in
Massaro, that even though the teacher had gone outside the school district and reported his
concerns to the Department of Education (DOE) (having used school district forms that were not
intended for use by private citizens) this was not enough to survive Garcetti.945 The only
appellate panel ruling where the teacher was successful in attaining First Amendment protection
was in the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Reinhardt when the teacher hired a private attorney to
handle his complaint.
The NEA further advises teachers to review their Collective Bargaining Agreements
(CBA) and to explore legislation that may afford them with statutory protections.946 public
school districts should take the initiative to help all employees understand how Garcetti impacts
public school teacher free speech. Providing training in current law as well as placing current

Mike Simpson, Rights Watch: First Amendment Protections for Teachers, NAT’N ED. ASSOC., available at
http://www.nea.org/archive/40920.htm (last visited Aug 26, 2018).
943
Id.
944
Id.
945
Massaro v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 481 Fed. Appx. 653,656 (2d Cir. 2012).
946
Mike Simpson, Rights Watch: First Amendment Protections for Teachers, NAT’N ED. ASSOC., available at
http://www.nea.org/archive/40920.htm (last visited Aug 26, 2018).
942
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legal language in a CBA could help school districts avoid potential conflicts. One example of
suggested language for a CBA has been, “Avoid discussing your personal beliefs on ‘hot button’
issues such as politics, sex, religion and money.”947
CBAs are the result of a negotiation process between a union and the employer that
outline the terms of the union members’ employment.948 CBAs cover topics from salary and
benefits to work hours and policies. Recent legislation in Wisconsin and Iowa, however, has
changed the voice of teachers in CBAs by passing legislation that has reduced the topics
contained in CBAs to issues related primarily to just salary and benefits.949 It is vital that
teachers and administrators are current on the legislation in their state as it relates to First
Amendment protections that may or may not exist for K-12 public school teachers.
School District Control of Teacher Speech
Prior to Garcetti, public school teachers’ speech warranted First Amendment protection if
their speech was ruled by a court to address a matter of public concern. The Pickering balancing
test was instituted in 1968 and was the public school teacher standard for First Amendment free
speech protection for fifteen years. In 1983, the Supreme Court’s decision in Connick v. Myers
added that a teacher’s speech needed to be additionally reviewed based on the speech’s content,
form and context when First Amendment protection considerations were made. This test became
known as the Connick/Pickering balancing test and was the standard for lower courts to apply for
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Penn. St. Educ. Assoc., Your Speech and Your Job, Feb. 13, 2009, available at
https://archive.psea.org/general.aspx?id=3866 (last visited Aug 26, 2018).
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twenty-three years. When the Supreme Court decided Garcetti, the additional prong asking
whether the speech in question was made pursuant to an employee’s official duties began to
significantly limit public school teachers’ free speech protections.950
The impact of Garcetti has been felt by both public school teachers and administrators.
Garcetti has limited the free speech rights of public school teachers by narrowing the type of
teacher speech that qualifies for constitutional protection. At the same time, Garcetti has also
given school districts the increased opportunity to impose discipline for teacher speech that is
made as part of a teacher’s official duties. For example, in Brown, the Seventh Circuit held a
teacher’s speech was not entitled to First Amendment protection when the he used the word
“nigger”951 during an English lesson with sixth graders. Brown read this word aloud from a
student note he confiscated and proceeded to use the word throughout a forty minute in-class
lesson on the word’s history. This illustrates the impact of Garcetti on a teacher’s classroom
speech. In Reinhardt, the 10th Circuit ruled the teacher only qualified for First Amendment free
speech protection when she hired a private attorney in order to file a complaint with the state
department of education. The court held this action was made outside of the teacher’s official
duties. In Stahura-Uhl, the teacher advocating for the lack of student IEP services failed in her
argument for First Amendment protection.952 In Palmer, a kindergarten teacher advocating for
perceived mistreatment of an African-American student in obtaining learning services also failed
to find First Amendment protection.953 This data suggests that per Garcetti, local school districts
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Duvall v. Putnam City Sch. Dist., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95050 at *34 (W.D. Okla. 2011).
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have a significant amount of control over public school teacher speech. This finding could create
opportunities for public school administrators to abuse this control and potentially harm what
may be in the best interests of students by limiting such communication from public school
teachers.
Teachers Advocating for Students
Forty-two percent of all the cases reviewed in Chapter 2 dealt with teachers’ speech
when they were advocating for students.954 Twelve of these cases were argued in U.S. District
Courts and five were argued in U.S. Circuit Courts. Eleven cases of the twelve cases (92%)
resulted in a loss for the teacher based upon the first prong of the Garcetti test. This data
supports the conclusion that the first prong of the Garcetti test is a significant hurdle for public
school teachers to overcome in obtaining First Amendment free speech protection.
Five different U.S. District Courts ruled (in Pagani, Bryant, Adams, Condiff, Stahura-Uhl
and Palmer) that when a teacher advocates to administrators for the protection of students, their
speech is made as part of their official duties as a public school teacher. Two different U.S.
Circuit Courts ruled, in Samuelson and Duvall, that when a teacher advocates to administrators
for the protection of students their speech is also a part of their official duties. In all of these
cases, the courts found that when teachers are advocating for students, this type of speech is
considered to be an official duty of a public school teacher, and as a result does not qualify for
First Amendment protection. These findings suggest that public school teachers run the risk of
no longer qualifying for First Amendment protection when engaging in speech when advocating
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For the purposes of this study, student advocacy is defined as when a teacher felt the rights of a student or groups
of students were being violated and voiced concerns to supervisors.
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for their students. The result of these findings is concerning. A critical responsibility for public
school teachers is to advocate for the educational needs of their students. Realizing this critical
piece of advocacy no longer qualifies for First Amendment protection will negatively impact the
job of a public school teacher and could in turn impact their ability to meet the needs of public
school students.
The only U.S. Circuit Court case in this study where a teacher qualified for First
Amendment protection post-Garcetti was Reinhardt. The Tenth Circuit held in Reinhardt that
the teacher’s speech was protected by the First Amendment when Reinhardt went outside the
chain of command by consulting a private attorney to file a complaint with the New Mexico
Public Education Department (NMPED). This suggests the possibility of First Amendment free
speech protection for a teacher when they go outside of the school district and hiring an advocate
before engaging in the speech at question. Reinhardt establishes a loophole for public school
teachers to utilize in trying to ensure First Amendment protection for their speech. The impact
of Reinhardt could negatively affect the operations of a school and school district. Teachers may
seek out private personnel rather than school personnel to communicate their concerns in order to
feel better protected from potential school discipline. This prevents issues from being most easily
resolved at the local level.
Conclusion
Garcetti continues to be the guiding case for First Amendment free speech protection for
K-12 public school teachers. Courts have consistently applied the prongs of the Garcetti test in
determining whether a public school teacher qualifies for First Amendment protection.
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Currently, U.S. District and U.S. Circuit Court litigation for public school teachers’ First
Amendment free speech protection is statistically unfavorable.
Upon reviewing public school teacher free speech litigation, the data in this study shows
that teacher wins for First Amendment free speech protection post-Garcetti, have been very
limited. Of the 43 cases reviewed in this study, only 12% of the free speech cases saw teachers
qualifying for First Amendment protection. This is a clear message that public school teachers
engaging in speech on topics such as district policies, student advocacy and educational disputes
will seldom find First Amendment protection. This finding is concerning. Public school
teachers should be able to appropriately voice concerns to administrators about perceived issues
that affect topics such as the work environment and students’ best interests.
Although the data from this study was categorized into three different speech locations
and two different types of speech, 47% of all the cases analyzed involved In-District (ID) speech
over Educational Disputes (ED). The data suggests that almost half of the cases reviewed in this
study involved public school teacher speech about local school or school district issues. Better
communication practices at the local school and district level about concerns and issues could
minimize litigation and in turn promote better practices that benefit public school teachers and
students. This is a potential area for public school districts to be aware of which will be
addressed in Chapter 4.
The litigation and its effects surrounding public school teacher free speech does not
benefit any party. The time and resources disrupt and detract from the work of teachers and
administrators in educating students. Garcetti seems to have created an adversarial relationship
between teachers and administrators in what should be a mutual goal in providing a free and
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appropriate education for students. It is critical that public school teachers and administrators
clearly understand the parameters of public school teacher free speech. In addition, it is essential
that clear communication and expectations are known and understood among public school
teachers and administrators regarding First Amendment free speech rights. Educating public
school administrators and teachers on the status of public employee free speech rights will better
support public school students. This is another area for school districts and public school
teachers to explore as explained in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION

Public school teachers’ First Amendment free speech rights changed dramatically in 2006
when the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos modified the free speech landscape
that had existed since the Court’s 1968 Pickering decision. Prior to 2006, a public school teacher
who was speaking out on a matter of public concern was generally entitled to First Amendment
free speech protection. However, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, post-Garcetti guidance
dictates that teacher speech is now first analyzed to determine if the speech was made as part of a
teacher’s official duties. Some scholars believe that one of the Supreme Court’s objectives in
Garcetti was to permit public employers to have more control over employee speech.955 Despite
the Court’s intention, case law outcomes detailed in previous chapters suggest that this objective
has been successful.
The Garcetti test has become the legal test courts have consistently applied to public
school teacher free speech cases. As a result, it is important for school administrators to
understand the application of Garcetti to the public school setting in order to know how to
respond in situations involving questionable teacher speech. This chapter outlines what
administrators need to be aware of when considering discipline for a public school teacher who
has engaged in questionable speech. Specifically, this chapter will discuss the how the legal
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application of the Garcetti test to public school teacher free speech has impacted litigation, what
to expect in future litigation, recommendations for school officials, and areas for further study.
Public school Teacher Speech: Was the Speech Part of the Teacher’s Official Duties?
In public school teacher free speech litigation, the first prong of the Garcetti test has
become the most difficult hurdle for public school teachers to overcome. Public school
administrators face unique teacher speech issues every day. Administrators must be aware of
potential disputes that can come from a failure to understand current case law as it relates to
public school teacher free speech. It is essential for administrators to understand how to navigate
this post-Garcetti era in order to know not only when to recommend disciplinary action against a
teacher, but more importantly to know how to educate their staff in order to help avoid potential
discipline and litigation.
Public school building administrators make disciplinary recommendations to district
superintendents, who in turn make disciplinary recommendations to boards of education.
District superintendents and boards of education also need to be informed and given guidance
about the current legal status of First Amendment free speech litigation post–Garcetti. This
practice could help avoid unnecessary expenditures of administrative time and resources related
to potential free speech cases. If superintendents and boards of education are also trained to
understand and apply the Garcetti test, recommendations for teacher discipline can (and should)
better follow legal guidelines.
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Defining Official Duties
Garcetti asked “whether the First Amendment protects a government employee from
discipline based on speech made pursuant to the employee's official duties?”956 The Garcetti
Court opined that the First Amendment would not protect such speech. However, the scope of a
K-12 public school teacher’s official duties has never been completely defined by the Supreme
Court. The Court also did not address whether the Garcetti test analysis "would apply in the
same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or teaching."957 In the cases
examined in this study, the Garcetti test was applied to public school teacher speech that
occurred both inside and outside of the classroom walls. U.S. District and Circuit Courts have
essentially defined official duties to include not only the speech that occurs within the classroom
but also speech to colleagues and supervisors when it relates to workplace decisions and/or
advocating for the needs of their students. As a result, questions surrounding the relationship
between a teacher’s official duties and a teacher’s job description have been raised. Public
school district board members and administrators need to be aware that a teacher’s written job
description does not necessarily describe all of the duties of a teacher. As outlined in the
Introduction, the Garcetti Court stated, “We reject…the suggestion that employers can restrict
employees’ rights by creating excessively broad job descriptions.”958 The Court further stated
the first prong of the Garcetti test involved considering “the duties an employee actually is
expected to perform.”959 Defining the duties of a teacher can be a complex process for school
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districts and administrators. For example, a teacher’s job description can (and does) vary from
district to district. The lack of legal guidance on this issue could encourage public school
districts to create teacher job descriptions that dictate any action related to classroom duties is
considered to be a part of a teacher’s job. In practice, a teacher’s job includes daily
communications with parents, colleagues, supervisors, and students. However, a teacher could
argue that anything not specifically outlined in a job description should automatically pass the
first prong of the Garcetti test. The lack of further explanation or guidance from the Supreme
Court on how Garcetti applies in public school settings leaves the interpretation open to the U.S.
District and U.S. Circuit Courts.960 As a result, post-Garcetti questions for school districts are
largely centered on how to define a teacher’s official duties.
Utilize a Public school Teacher Speech Checklist
The following tool, Public school Teacher Speech Checklist for K-12 Public school
Administrators (Table 8), may assist building and district administrators when evaluating teacher
speech. This checklist could be utilized proactively as part of professional development or
training sessions, or as an investigative tool after questionable speech has occurred.
This checklist was created based upon the Supreme Court’s legal guidance when
determining whether a public school teacher’s speech could be entitled to First Amendment
protection. The five bolded questions on this checklist are the five prongs of the Garcetti test.
The questions following each prong were taken from cases in Chapter 2 that were examined by
U.S. District Courts and U.S. Circuit Courts when applying the Garcetti test. Administrators
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who utilize the Public school Teacher Speech Checklist for K-12 Public school Administrators to
guide their discipline recommendations in questionable teacher free speech situations will ensure
they have complied with Garcetti.
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Table 8
Public School Teacher Speech Checklist for K-12 Public School Administrators
YES

NO

□ The speech likely
does not qualify for
First Amendment
protection.

□ Proceed to Question 2.

□ Proceed to
Question 3.

□ The speech likely does
not qualify for First
Amendment protection.

3. Does the school or district’s interest in promoting

□ The speech may
not qualify for First
Amendment
protection.

□ Proceed to Question 4.

4. Was the teacher’s speech a motivating factor in the

□ Proceed to
Question 5.

□ The speech may not
qualify for First
Amendment protection.

□ The speech may
not qualify for First
Amendment
protection.

□ The speech is likely to
qualify for First
Amendment protection.

1.

Was the teacher’s speech a part of his or her official
duties?
Questions to ask:
Was the topic of the speech about a student?
A policy or a practice?
Was the topic of the speech related to the boardadopted curriculum?

2. Does the speech address a matter of public concern?
Questions to ask:
Was the topic of the speech something the general
public would be interested in?
Was the speech made to someone outside the
school or district (ie: a private citizen)?

workplace efficiency outweigh the teacher’s free
speech interests?
Questions to ask:
Did the teacher’s speech interfere with the
operations of the school or the district?
Did the speech occur during the teacher’s
contracted time?

discipline that was issued?
Questions to ask:
Is the discipline I am considering a result of the
teacher’s speech on its own?
Is there another reason I am considering
disciplining this teacher?

5. Would I have reached the same employment
decision if the speech had not occurred?
Questions to ask:
Would I have disciplined the teacher in the
same manner if the speech had not occurred?
Is the discipline I am considering reasonable
without the questionable speech?
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Public school Teachers’ Speech Remaining Prongs: Garcetti Prongs 2-5
The remaining prongs of the Garcetti test have remained relatively unchanged since the
establishment of the original Pickering balancing test in 1968, as Garcetti adopted the original
Pickering language. However, in Connick v. Myers,961 the Court did add a layer to the
established Pickering public concern prong. Although some courts have determined that a
teacher’s speech is or is not protected by the First Amendment prior to examining all five prongs,
it is important that administrators examine all prongs of the Garcetti test when contemplating
teacher discipline.
Prong 2: Was the Speech a Matter of Public Concern?
When the Supreme Court ruled in Connick v. Myers,962 the Court added a layer to the
established Pickering public concern prong. Post Myers, lower courts now needed to evaluate
the content, form, and context of the public school teacher’s speech when determining whether
the public employee’s speech addressed a matter of public concern. The guiding questions from
the Public school Teacher Free Speech Checklist for K-12 Public school Administrators can aid
administrators when they are evaluating if a teacher’s speech addressed a matter of public
concern. Administrators need to also be aware that in several cases where courts have ruled that
a public school teacher’s speech has qualified for First Amendment protection, this has happened
as a result of successfully arguing Garcetti’s second prong.

961
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Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
Id.
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Prong 3: Does the School or District’s Interest in Promoting Workplace Efficiency
Outweigh the Teacher’s Free Speech Interests?
When investigating public school teacher speech, administrators should consider whether
the operations of the school were disrupted as a result of the teacher’s speech. For example, in
Sorescu,963 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois opined that since the
teacher’s speech to a newspaper reporter took place during the summer, it did not disrupt the
operations of the school. This is an important factor for administrators to consider when issuing
discipline.
Prong 4: Was the Protected Speech a Motivating Factor
in the Adverse Employment Action?

In McShea,964 the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida, opined when
McShea was involuntary transferred to another position in the district shortly after speaking with
the Florida Department of Education, her speech was first ruled to be protected and subsequently
ruled to be a motivating factor in her involuntary transfer. One of the constants in public school
educational practices is that teachers are routinely evaluated by their supervisor. Public school
administrators need to utilize the evaluation tools provided by their district to document the
strengths and areas of improvement for their teachers. This process allows for the administrator
and teacher to be clear on professional expectations and when the expectations are not
satisfactorily met. The evaluation process is one example of evidence for teacher discipline
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Sorescu v. Harper, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71113 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
McShea v. Sch. Bd. of Collier Cnty., 58 F. Supp.3d 1325 (M.D. Fla 2014).
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including transfers and terminations that is tied to job descriptions and expectations for a public
school teacher.
Administrators need to further understand possible legal ramifications as they relate to
what may be considered First Amendment protected speech. Administrators should be prepared
to provide reasons for teacher discipline unrelated to any questionable speech that may be
protected. As stated before, many teacher free speech cases do not make it past Garcetti’s first
prong. Nonetheless, administrators should look at all the Garcetti prongs when reviewing
teacher speech issues and discipline recommendations.
Prong 5: Would the School District Have Reached the Same Employment Decision
if the Protected Speech Had Not Been Said?
When considering discipline for a public school teacher’s speech, the final prong in the
Garcetti test specifically asks for a reason for the discipline. If administrators can show that
there were other reasons for the recommended discipline unrelated to the speech in question,
then this could meet the final Garcetti prong. Administrators who examine all of prongs of the
Garcetti test prior to determining teacher discipline, will strengthen their decision if litigated in
court. As stated before, a mutual understanding by the board of education, its administrators,
and teachers in regards to public school teacher First Amendment free speech rights, can
minimize litigation risk. By having a mutual understanding by these parties, the resources that a
school district expends in teacher discipline and litigation can be decreased.
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Public school Teacher Speech: What Can Be Expected in Future Litigation?
The future of teacher free speech litigation is unknown. When the Supreme Court handed
down Garcetti in 2006, it was a 5-4 decision. Justice Kennedy delivered the majority opinion.
Justices Roberts, Scalia, Thomas and Alito made up the rest of the majority opinion. Justice
Souter filed a dissenting opinion that Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Four of the
Garcetti majority opinion Justices remain on the Court today (Roberts, Kennedy, Thomas and
Alito). Only two of the Garcetti dissenting Justices are currently serving on the Court (Ginsburg
and Breyer). Post-Garcetti Justices Sotomayer and Kagan historically have been more liberal in
their rulings which would align more with an anti-Garcetti approach. Justice Gorsuch
historically has ruled more conservatively on cases, aligning more with a pro-Garcetti approach.
As a result, if the current Supreme Court were to hear future public school teacher First
Amendment free speech cases, chances are strong that it could be a similar outcome as in 2006.
Three of the four U.S. District Court cases where the teacher realized First Amendment
free speech protection occurred within the last four years. In two of these cases, the teacher was
found to be acting outside of their official duties when acting in the role of a union advocate.965
This is an important development in free speech protections for public school teachers.
Administrators need to be aware that it has been found that a teacher is acting outside of their
official duties when he or she engages in speech in the role of a union representative. This is an
important factor for administrators to consider when handling issues of speech in their buildings.
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The only U.S. Circuit Court case where the teacher realized First Amendment free speech
protection occurred when the teacher hired a private attorney to advocate on her behalf.966 The
10th Circuit ruled hiring a private attorney was outside a teacher’s official duties. Administrators
also need to realize that case law has determined if a teacher were to hire any private citizen as a
free speech advocate, this is also considered beyond a teacher’s official duties. While
administrators may not be aware of this information at the time of the speech issue,
administrators need to know the potential impact should this occur.
Public school teacher free speech litigation will continue. Critics of Garcetti claim the
Supreme Court “has left public employees who want to expose wrong-doing in their school
districts in a precarious position.”967 Critics further worry, “children in our public schools may
be the ultimate losers because unethical or illegal activities in their school districts may not be
brought to light.”968 Justice Souter’s dissent specifically critiqued the majority opinion in
Garcetti when he stated, “it seems perverse to fashion a new rule that provides employees with
an incentive to voice their concerns publically before talking frankly to their superiors.”969
Administrators and school districts must build a culture of trust and transparency with teachers
that allows communication regarding concerns to be handled professionally within the district in
order to minimize the need for teachers to voice their concerns publicly.
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Recommendations for K-12 Public school Districts
The potential for administrators to encounter teacher free speech issues in the K-12
public school setting is certain. On a daily basis, teachers speak to students, parents,
administrators and interact with colleagues. Failure to understand litigation regarding public
school teacher First Amendment free speech rights can lead to expensive mistakes.
Administrators need to be aware of teachers’ rights as well as the rights of the district and school
board when recommending teacher discipline based upon teacher speech. The following is a list
of recommendations to support and provide guidance for public school administrators.
1. Require annual mandatory training of building and district administrators on current
teacher free speech litigation. This should include annual in-service training as well as
workshops for boards of education on the Garcetti test.
2. Require mandatory training of teachers new to a public school district by district
administrators or the school district’s attorney outlining First Amendment free speech
rights and limitations for public school teachers.
3. Implement additional or enhanced coursework at colleges and universities in
undergraduate and graduate educational degree programs on public school teacher free
speech litigation, including the Garcetti test.
Areas for Future Study
Since the Supreme Court’s 2006 decision in Garcetti, teacher First Amendment free
speech rights have changed. Garcetti’s impact has altered K-12 public school First Amendment
free speech rights by removing free speech protection for public school teachers who engage in
speech that is determined to be a part of their official duties. Currently, the U.S. District and
U.S. Circuit Courts have been consistent in applying the Supreme Court guidance per Garcetti.
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It is unknown whether future litigation will change the impact of Garcetti. Continued
research on future public school teacher free speech cases will reveal whether Garcetti remains
the standard for analyzing First Amendment free speech protection for K-12 public school
teachers. Currently, there are areas of post-Garcetti public school teacher free speech litigation
that could be further explored in future studies.
The data analysis provided in Chapter 3 contained several tables that could be expanded
into further research. Tables 3 and 4 highlighted how post-Garcetti litigation rulings trended by
state. A deeper study to determine why certain states had a higher percentage of litigation than
others could prove to be important information for future litigation. Table 7 could be further
researched to determine how and why the type of teacher free speech litigation varied between
each circuit court. Additional research could also be conducted by classifying public school
teacher speech cases by grade level to determine if any patterns in the number or categories of
cases between elementary (K-8) teachers and secondary (9-12) teachers exists and why. Still
another area for future study could be to identify trends in the teaching experience of teacher
litigants. Research could disclose if a discrepancy exists in the number of teacher litigants who
are veteran teachers versus the number of teacher litigants who are newer to the profession.
Public school teacher free speech is an area of law that will continue to be relevant.
Litigation will continue to occur in our judicial system. As additional cases emerge combined
with changes that transpire in Justices for the Supreme Court, it will be important for public
school administrators, teachers and boards of education to remain educated in the First
Amendment free speech rights of public school teachers.

